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ABSTRACT
Much has been written in recent years on Nigeria's foreign policy
behaviour but little attention has been paid to the institutional
structures, political processes and problems in the formulation
and implementation of these policies. This study addresses itself
to these neglected areas in the study of Nigeria's foreign
policy. It highlights not only the influence of other countries
on foreign policy formulation, but also investigates the
influence of international organisations. Most importantly, it
points out the continuity of foreign policy within the various
Nigerian governments, be they military or civilian governments.
The author has also sought to address vital issues, such as how
dependent foreign policy formulation is upon the presidential
office, and whether this limits the influence of the Ministry of
External Affairs. Also investigated is the degree of Nigeria's
involvement with the Southern African liberation movements and
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PART I:
THE ORIGINS OF FOREIGN POLICY
CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION:
The thesis is divided into three parts. Each part seeks to
illuminate a distinct area of Nigerian foreign policy
formulation. The first part is to do with the origin of foreign
policy, particularly with regard to South Africa. The second part
investigates the application of this policy, particularly within
international organisations such as the United Nations,
Organisation of African Unity, and the Commonwealth. The last
part discusses the continuity of foreign policy within the
various Nigerian governments, particularly since the military has
played a major role in foreign policy formulation and in doing
so has collaborated with civilian personnels. How this role has
been discharged, and what it means for many existing treatments
of civil-military relations is also investigated.
Although there have been many studies of Nigerian foreign policy,
the present thesis makes an original contribution in three areas,
related to the divisions of the thesis described above. The first
contribution is to do with its critical reading of the history
of policy formulation. The findings of this thesis on the role
of Ghana are original ones.
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PART I:
THE HISTORY OF POLICY FORMULATION
At first there was no foreign policy at all. The vacuum here is
described using both primary and secondary sources. When they
came, the first views were conservative. Nigeria had a different
view of the OAU in comparision to Ghana. Although disguised under
the umbrella of non-alignment, Nigerian policy was in fact biased
one, at all times pro-western and anti-communist.
It was not until the civil war that Nigeria saw that there were
non-western powers who were prepared to lend support and realised
then the need for more complex views of international relations.
Among other things, it came to a new recognition of how it should
approach the USSR as a result of the civil war. So, the
historical starting point of having no foreign policy at all
changed, first to the development of a conservative foreign
policy, and later developed to a more complex foreign policy as
a result of the civil war and embraced relations with some of
the eastern states.
The difficulties of relationships with Ghana were made even worse
during the civil war because before then, they were purely
difficulties based on ideological differences. During the civil
war, Biafra attracted unofficially Ghana's support and this
certainly, as the thesis shows, complicated Nigeria's view
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towards Ghana. However, the events of the civil war made Nigeria
realise that the world is larger than simply Ghana or even West
Africa. It made Nigeria realise three things in particular.
Firstly, it made Nigeria realise the problem of white rule in
Southern Africa with Portugal and South Africa supporting Biafra.
This led Nigeria to a policy change, looking at Africa as a whole
and seriously addressing the need for liberation of the whole
continent. Secondly, Nigeria was worried and continued to be
worried by Ghana's stand in the civil war and it was precisely
the civil war which made Nigeria come closer to the original
Ghanaian idea of Pan-Africanism which sought the completely free
and liberated continent, including the liberation in the south.
This led Gowon's government to introduce policy on South Africa.
This policy was not conservative and it was complex. Thirdly,
Gowon's government was able to view the future of West Africa and
took into consideration how the region could be a model for the
rest of Africa in terms of its struggle for liberation, followed
by non-dependence on the outside world. It was at this time that
Nigeria conceived the idea of ECOWAS.
The importance of these things was realised by a military
government, and was occasioned by the civil war. It was designed
not to depend on outside states, not to interfere in the internal
activities of other states, but to build the region both to
resist South African aggression and also to be a model to the
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rest of independent Africa. Interdependence was seen as a
foundation against dependency, and as a natural derivative of
liberation.
PART II:
APPLICATION OF FOREIGN POLICY IN
TERMS OF INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS:
In my thesis I investigated how three institutions have been used
by Nigeria to further its foreign policy objectives as they
developed in terms of the history I have outlined overleaf and
lay out in deeper terms in the chapters that follow. Here, it
becomes clear how Nigeria viewed the importance of each
organisation by the amount and level of activity it sought to
engender through each one.
PART III:
CONTINUITY OF THE NIGERIAN FOREIGN
POLICY FROM GOVERNMENT TO GOVERNMENT
There are three major issues to be expressed. Firstly, the major
steps in foreign policy over the years would not have been
possible without there having been military governments. These
4
governments were able to cut through domestic hesitations, and
cut through red tape. The process of formulation and
implementation, however, depended heavily on the military
governments' involvement of civilians. Here there are two
subsidiary issues. First of all there were a number of military
governments, revolving often from one government to another. But
always there were military governments with civil servants as
advisers, and a great deal of co—operation existed. There is,
secondly therefore, the case of a developing military culture in
government which nevertheless depended on co—operation between
the military and civilians.
When Finer talked about weak institutions, such as civilian
governments, drawing in the strong, i.e. the military,[1] this
view can no longer be applied to Nigeria. Strong institutions
(the military) have drawn in the strong (the military again), but
such strong institutions have actively and successfully
cooperated with the 'weak,' civilians. Chan's view of revolving
door governments and of technocratic military governments drawing
on technocratic civilian services and support seems more apt than
Finer's.[2]
Nigerian foreign policy was not therefore,' militarised.' The
sort of foreign policy developed in Nigeria is the type of
foreign policy that any government of Nigeria, civilian or
military, mindful of its emerging role as an African power,
would have wished to embark upon. What the military did was to
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make this crossover of both military and civilian policy
decisive.
However, as the 1980s drew to a close, the 1990s began with links
and exploration between Nigeria and South Africa, as in the case
of De Klerk when he visited Babangida at Abuja. This is a sign
that one era is ending and another is beginning with economic
pragmatism between former enemies.
To conclude this introduction, therefore, I have made original
investigations as outlined above and developed in the body of the
thesis below. In addition, are two other areas of originality:
1. The second one is the actual formulation of Nigerian
foreign policy. This is dependent on the views of the
presidential office. The author's recorded interviews
of some Foreign Ministers who were very close to the
centre of foreign policy formulation, who disclosed
for the first time, at length, the feelings of
frustration with their role in foreign policy
formulation, even though they were in senior
positions, provide original evidence. Very often
foreign policy was simply the decisions made by the
President often without major reference to anyone
else. This, however, seems to be common in Africa and,
even, in some developed countries. This is not
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therefore an argument against my findings on civil-
military relations outlined above.
2. Finally, I have made an original survey of the
financial aid made available to the liberation
movements. These figures have not been uncovered
before because they were regarded as highly secret. In
fact, I was unable to remove any of the relevant
documents but I was able to obtain these figures
during my interview with senior officers who were part
of the budgetary allocation process.
CHAPTER 2:
PRE-INDEPENDENCE POLITICAL THOUGHT ON FOREIGN
POLICY
This chapter begins with a brief account of Nigeria as it was
before its creation through the Anglo-French agreement in June,
1898.[1] Even up to the time of this agreement, though Britain
had gained a colony by pushing the French out of Nigeria, the
territory had no name until the deal to buy out the Charter of
the Royal Niger Company was completed on the 1st of January 1900,
whereby the governments of Northern and Southern Nigeria were
created, while Lagos formed a third administration. [2]
Nigeria being the most populous country on the African
continent,[3] its history did not begin only when the British
Government amalgamated its North and South in 1914. It has been
alleged that Nigeria was the creation of European ambition.[4]
The newly created country contained not just a multiplicity of
what were called "pagan tribes" but also a number of "great
kingdoms" that evolved complex systems of government, independent
of contact with Europe. [51 These kingdoms included such widely
differing groups of peoples that not only the British but the
inhabitants themselves often doubted whether the territory could
survive as a single political entity.[6] During this period much
migration was on a short term basis only; men from the south
emigrated mainly in search of jobs. There were no attachments
formed to the towns of such temporary domicile.[7] There were,
however, strong ethnic associations in these towns, particularly
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among the Ibos, whose social structure is based upon localised
descent groups.
NIGERIA AFTER 1914
After the amalgamation of the Northern and the Southern
Protectorate by Lord Lugard in 1914, a careful survey was made
both of the different attitudes and cultures within the
amalgamated country. The British ruling system had two categories
- known as the 'Direct' and 'Indirect' systems. Under the
'direct' rule system, the administration was carried out by the
British colonial government, while under the 'indirect' system
which allowed local administration, a relationship was maintained
between the community leaders and the colonial leaders. Here, the
colonial rulers acted only as advisers and overseers.[8] Though
the colonial rulers used this to exercise power peacefully in
Nigeria, it created a misconception among the Nigerian elites
since the direct/indirect dichotomy to them represented a
difference in degree of importance.
However, it could be argued that the direct/indirect dichotomy
did not arouse so much political agitation as the 1945 Richard
Constitution. Many Nigerian leaders recognise the Richard
Constitution as the 'seeds of regionalism, and the disease which
killed Nigeria.' [9] The three-regional state was the worst of all
possible worlds once the attitude of the North had been
ascertained; it was an attempted marriage of irreconcilables.[10]
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The North demanded not only to be alloted fifty per cent
representation at the central government (during the inauguration
of the Richard Constitution in 1947) but also separation from the
rest of Nigeria on the arrangements existing before the 1914
amalgamation. This request was granted (in order to avoid any
possible secession), and the Northern domination of the centre
became an inbuilt feature of Nigerian politics.[11]
FORMATION OF PARTIES
The pattern of power struggle in Nigeria followed closely the
lines of regionalism laid down by the Richard Constitution.[12]
The East was dominated by the National Council of Nigerian
Citizens (NCNC) party, headed by Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe, the North
by the Northern Peoples Congress (NPC) party, headed by the
Sarduana of Sokoto, Sir Ahmadu Bello. The West was dominated by
the Action Group (AG) party, headed by Chief Obafemi Awolowo. The
attitude of the political leaders created a very great impact in
a society where only few were literate and, to achieve their
aims, the elites had to draw on the language of primordialism and
communual parochialism for the terms of political discourse.[14]
Irrespective of their political differences, the inability of any
one political party due to parochial reasons to form a majority,
created the atmosphere whereby the NCNC and the NPC entered a
coalition government both in 1954 and 1959, while the AG remained
the Opposition Party.[15]
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SOME DEBATES ON THE FORMULATION OF NIGERIAN
FOREIGN POLICY BEFORE INDEPENDENCE
Bearing in mind the party system which reflected the country's
regionalism, forms of ethnocentricism playing a major role, it
can be seen how decisions on national interests in terms of
foreign policy formulation could arouse much controversy.
There were many pros and COnS in the different debates towards
foreign policy formulation amongst those Nigerian leaders who
were interested and whose views were influential. In July 1959,
in a newspaper article, Dr. Otegbeye of the Nigerian Youth
Congress (who later became the president) advised Nigeria to
emulate the Indian policy of neutrality. He also warned the
Nigerian government against out-of-date 'waves of anti-
communism,' particularly when the government did not really know
much about the doctrine of communism or communist countries.I161
According to him:
The new Nigeria must maintain its national integrity and
must put itself in a position to mediate between the two
blocs - East and West, in the interest of world peace and
prosperity.
He called on Nigeria to endeavour to "project the African
11
He called on Nigeria to endeavour to "project the African
personality and to champion oppressed negro peoples all over the
world. "[171
Aminu Kano and his Northern Elements Progressive Union Party
remained constantly Pan-Africanist as regards his opinion on
Nigerian foreign policy. As Whitaker observed, [18]
The outlook of the party was enthusiastically Pan-African
though preliminary unification on a regional basis (West
Africa, East Africa, etc) was generally regarded as a more
realistic immediate goal; in principle, they welcomed
economic assistance from Eastern bloc countries and
unreservedly subscribed to 'neutralism' as a foreign policy
for Nigeria.
The Action Group Party leaders had different views on foreign
affairs in Nigeria. Chief Enahoro, an influential Action Group
member (later the party's spokesman) during the All African
Peoples' Congress at Accra in 1958, emphasised his support for
the evolution of a West African Federation, with the ultimate
objective of an African Commonwealth of States.[19] But a year
later after the Accra congress, Chief Awolowo put forward a
different view. Chief Remi Fani-Kayode, another influential
member of the Action Group whose foreign policy view was
significant, expressed his fear that Arab influence (especially
Nasser's) was growing in Africa whereas, in his opinion, a more
black approach to African relations was preferred.[20]
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In the 1958 Action Group Party Congress, Chief Awolowo provoked
a debate on Nigerian policy regarding military power and
armaments. He argued that Nigeria should reject power politics
and armament and go instead for welfare politics for its people.
Chief Awolowo thus based the completion of his foreign policy in
the light of his party's domestic policies. The Action Group's
motto was: "Life More Abundant."[21] But the consensus of the
Congress was simply against such a simplistic view of choice
between power and welfare politics. Awolowo, at the end, accepted
the views of his colleagues that an armed force was necessary
after independence.
There was one thing which all the three major political parties
(the NPC, the NCNC, and the AG) agreed. They all proclaimed in
their constitutions or as one of their objectives that Nigeria
should remain within the Commonwealth.[22] It was observed that
the NCNC leaders spoke more about foreign policy for Nigeria than
the NPC leaders did. The latter saw foreign policy as an entirely
new dimension of official concern. There was the prospect of a
continuing close relation with the British; therefore, foreign
policy was not regarded as important until after independence at
least. This was eventually articulated during the 1956
parliamentary debate on the training of the Nigerian diplomats;
Alhaji Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, the Vice President of the NPC
party (who later became the Prime Minister of Nigeria) stated
that "as a teacher, I am used to starting from the known to the
unknown."[23] To him foreign policy was still an unknown then.
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during this early period.
In 1955 the British administration in Nigeria still retained
constitutional responsibility for Nigerian foreign affairs and
did so until independence in 1960.[24] It also instituted a ban
on communist papers and literature on the grounds that they were
subversive. On the attainment of independence the ban was not
removed immediately by the Nigerian government until a year after
independence and even then it was emphasised that the lifting of
the ban was tentative. The Nigerian Prime Minister still refused
free visits to communist countries by Nigerians as witnessed by
the government's reaction on Mrs. Ransome—Kuti's visits to
communist countries which led to the withdrawal of her Nigerian
passport by the Nigerian government. In defending this particular
action before parliament in March 1958, Balewa declared:[25]
I and my colleagues are determined that while we are
responsible for the government of Nigeria and for the
welfare of its people, we shall use means in our power to
prevent the infiltration of communism and communistic ideas
into Nigeria.
Also the 1955 White paper on the training of Nigerians for future
overseas representation as presented by the British colonial
government to the central legislature was not fully debated by
most Nigerian representatives. The paper stressed the intention
of the British foreign service to continue to represent Nigeria
in many world capitals irrespective of their attainment of
independence. It stated that "it does not mean that in the course
14
independence. It stated that "it does not mean that in the course
of time Nigeria would automatically have to find men and women
to represent it everywhere."[26] This was not challenged in the
legislature; rather those who questioned it concentrated only on
the need to increase the number of trainee diplomats. During this
period it seems no one wanted anything to upset the British
government; the major political parties, the central executive
council and even the appointed Prime Minister (1957) inclusive.
At the regional government levels all the Premiers shared the
same opinion with the central government. They all favoured a
very strong association with Britain. This was formally confirmed
by the Prime Minister when he moved the motion which formally
demanded independence from Britain.
Eventually, there was an attempt to formalise the desired
cooperation between Britain and Nigeria in defence matters at the
1958 conference on Nigerian defence, but Nigerian leaders
realised that it would create problems for both governments.
Northern Nigeria in particular had that vision of a very long
dependency on the British for both economic and personnel
assistance irrespective of self-government. Such an intention was
demonstrated by its agent-general in the United Kingdom, Abba
Gana, when he declared that "although Nigeria has attained
independence but we shall still be dependent in many ways upon
Britain."[27] This dependency, indeed overlap, was to create
serious foreign policy problems after independence in 1960.[28]
The 1959 electioneering witnessed a gigantic struggle among major
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advancement by any party were utilised. Foreign policy was one
of such instruments though most of the Nigerian people could
hardly comprehend exactly what foreign policy stood for but it
was mainly aimed at the intellectuals and the more politically
oriented citizens. It would be necessary to take note of just a
few of such debates which concentrated on the foreign policy
issues, as this would give an insight to what transpired between
Nigerian leaders and why it was so difficult for Nigeria to
present a confirmed foreign policy to its people even four months
before independence.
In an address to the London Branch of the NCNC, in his
electioneering debate on foreign policy on behalf of his party,
Dr. Azikiwe pointed out that on winning the election his party's
foreign policy goals would be highly concentrated on "national
security and national interest."[29] Though remaining a member
of the Commonwealth after independence, Nigeria would 'remind
Britain to be persistently democratic in its relations toward
Africa.'[30] He further stated that Nigeria would not inherit
anybody's prejudices regarding its consideration of future
diplomatic relations with China and the USSR. On African issues,
he spoke of a United States of Africa to be moulded as a final
product from the base of cultural exchanges and customs unions.
Nigeria's membership of the United Nations was recommended too.
He also added that both in Africa as well as in global security
matters, Nigerian foreign policy would be formulated "in the
national interest based on an independent and not a neutral
attitude."[31]
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On the strength of Dr. Azikiwe's address, a spokesman for the
Action Group Mr. Agunbiade-Bamishe, attacked his views on a
policy for a free Nigeria. He accused the NCNC of "asking for a
blank cheque and exhibiting its own ignorance of foreign
affairs."[32] But the AG failed to put forward any alternative
proposal. The NCNC seized this opportunity once more to respond
to AG's criticism. Mr. Fred Anyam, Deputy National Secretary of
the NCNC, dismissed the AG's criticism as the "effort of a waning
party to drag others down to its level."[33]
As the electioneering rhetoric continued, with Dr. Azikiwe
appearing to get tougher on the United Kingdom government and on
the AG's position of foreign affairs, he declared that his party
would establish a consulate in Pretoria in an effort to mobilize
African opinion to bring together the blacks and whites in South
Africa. He therefore pointed out that, should this effort fail,
his party and the government would tell the British government
and the Commonwealth that South Africa should leave the
organisation or Nigeria would not stay in such an
organisation. [34] This was a starting point for debate to come on
South Africa. He also stressed that it was not in the interest of
Nigeria to align itself with the Western bloc as the AG
eventually wanted. He disagreed with the AG's claim that "there
was no community of interest whatsoever between Egypt and the
Arab states on the one hand and the other African states on the
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other, particularly those in Africa - south of Sahara."[35]
The Action Group leader, Chief Obafemi Awolowo, at the Action
Group's Sixth Annual Congress in 1959, outlined the party's ideas
on foreign policy. He stated that: the Action Group wanted to
promote friendship between Nigeria and all African countries and,
indeed, the whole world, but warned that any serious attempt to
bring about political union among the states of Africa was bound
to engineer suspicion, distrust and dishamony among those states.
He also saw economic and cultural association, presupposing
common economic problems and similar political, social and
cultural patterns such as had created the European Common Market,
a 's being as fanciful as a political union of African states.[36]
From AG's point of view, Egypt was regarded as more Arab than
African, and its leader, Nasser, they saw as territorially
ambitious overseas and totalitarian at home; therefore Awolowo
recommended that there should be no cooperation between African
states and Egypt. He warned that cooperation between African
states and Egypt "would only be possible if the black races of
Africa were prepared to remain as satellites in Egypt's orbit in
the same way as Syria."[37] Besides he argued, there were no
similarities in substance in the economic and social problems of
Egypt and Nigeria.[38] On the same presidential address to his
party's congress, Chief Awolowo referred to John Foster Dulles'
castigation of neutrality in international affairs by arguing
that, neutrality, whether "passive, positive or independent was
an unmitigated disservice to humanity." He believed that such
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neutrality as the basis of foreign policy of certain nations was
"no more and no less than the projection, consciously or
unconsciously of deepseated prejudices which these nations have
had towards the countries of Western democracies."[39] These were
Chief Awolowo's views and remarks on the formulation of the
Nigerian foreign policy as at that time, whether or not this
position on foreign policy was maintained after independence
would be seen in due course.
Though these debates had been strongly argued by both parties it
would be necessary to note that it had an 'attentive public' only
in the Southern part of Nigeria. The NPC had its own ideas on its
foreign policy formulation which were close to that of the AG.
The NPC also rejected the policy of neutrality in international
affairs, and preferred an alignment with the Western powers, with
close ties with the British government in the Commonwealth and
with the United States of America.[40] Sir Ahmadu Bello, the
leader of the NPC party regarded the idea of a United States of
West Africa as too premature, but that the party welcomed
friendly relations and closer cooperation with all African
countries, especially those of West Africa.[41] Nigeria, he
declared, should also subscribe to the Charter and principles of
the United Nations and become a member of the organisation. The
NPC wanted a large military force but for internal security and
border protection duties only.[42]
Despite the fact that there was no great difference between the
AG's and NPC's position on foreign policy proposals, except the
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issue concerning Egypt, the NCNC concentrated its attacks on the
AG's ideas on foreign policy while ignoring those of the NPC;
though it could be argued that, since there was resemblance
between the two in their approach towards foreign policy
formulation, the NCNC implicitly was attacking the NPC too. It
was noted that the absence of direct attack on the NPC by the
NCNC on this and many other issues during this election campaign
had more to do with the underlying domestic political
understanding between the two parties.[43] Apparently in this
election, the NPC and the NCNC saw the AG as the greatest enemy.
When the elections were held in December 1959, none of the three
major political parties gained enough seats to form the federal
government. The NPC and the NCNC, whose positions on foreign
policy were somewhat divergent though they campaigned without
open expression of their differences in foreign policy, formed
a coalition government.[44] It is also important to state that
none of the alliances entered by the major political parties had
been based on ideological compatibility but rather on 'national
unity.' Due to the coalition between the two parties, the NPC and
the NCNC both had to smooth the sharp edges of their foreign
policy positions. It had been suggested that, without the
coalition, Nigerian foreign policy would perhaps have been
assertive, more Pan-Africanist and more-neutral especially if the
NPC had taken exclusive control of the Federal Government.[45]
But up till the end of March 1960, the coalition government had
nothing to offer as a distinctive or a defined foreign policy.
It turned out to be a time consuming issue for the coalition
20
government. There were some circumstances surrounding such a
delay. The fact was that the government at that time was faced
with so many initiatives to take which included consolidating
itself and completing the final arrangements for the
constitutional as well as the ceremonial transfer of power from
the British to the Nigerian leaders. Secondly, the government did
not want to make pronouncements on foreign policy which might
cause division in the country. In fact, it has been suggested,
the Prime Minister made several attempts to bring in the
Opposition party's Chief Spokesman, Enahoro, as Nigerian Foreign
Minister but his offer was rejected. Above all, the Prime
Minister did not see any need to hurry in making official
pronouncements on foreign policy.
The Federal Parliamentary Committee of the NPC confirmed the
Sarduana's views on this subject. The Committee observed that
"Nigeria's problems cannot be solved by a 'West African Union'
nor by Pan-Africanism since it would be suicide for Nigeria to
sacrifice its leadership role which it is bound to play on the
continent and in the world as a whole."[46] On the other hand,
the Nigerian Socialist Group (based in Enugu, Eastern Nigeria),
called for a greater support for both Pan-Africanism and a Union
of West African States. At a one week symposium - entitled
'Nigeria can be Great', which included a lecture on the foreign
policy of an independent Nigeria, Mr. B.C. Okwu, a Regional
Minister, called for the elimination of apartheid, imperialist
and white minority regimes all over Africa. Nigeria was also
called upon to open its door and extend the hand of friendship
21
to everyone, whether the USSR or the USA.
After so much pressure, the Federal government could no longer
resist it. On the 20th of August 1959, a White Paper was
presented which the Daily Times summed up as follows;
We will consider it wrong for the Federal Government to
associate itself as a matter of routine with any of the
power blocs.[47]
In short, the government stood for the policy of non—alignment
with any power bloc, the promotion of national interest, and
membership of the Commonwealth and United Nations. On African
affairs the government would prefer to pursue clear and
practicable policies," and that colonial boundaries in Africa,
however arbitrary and artificial, would be respected in the
interest of peace and non—interference.
This policy statement provoked many reactions: the Daily Times
supported the idea, while the AG criticised the government for
proclaiming neutralism and non—alignment which were at variance
with its practices,[48] such as the banning of communist
literature, the refusal to employ suspected communists in the
Civil Service, the refusal to allow citizens of Nigeria to visit
communist countries, assurances given to Western countries of the
safety of their investments, and the granting of special
facilities to the British in Nigeria for their military aircraft.
There was a great deal of disagreement with the Prime Minister
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over his foreign policy formulation, but he refused to heed to
any such criticisms. The main reason for what so many Nigerians
recognised as an ambiguous attitude was that - the government had
a desire not to embark on a foreign policy which would antagonise
various sections of the articulate public and the major political
parties. At the same time the British still retained a
substantial influence in both the domestic and foreign policies
of the country. The attitude towards Nigerian foreign policy then
was very much consistent with the Prime Minister's own personal
and political views which dominated the national agenda. In
addition, the idea of all-party coalition (to symbolise Nigerian
unity) remained with him all through his years in the office.
During his last interview before his assassination, he still
maintained that as at that time Nigeria was not ripe for such a
system which would maintain a full-fledged opposition party, and
gave a strong approval for a coalition government which he
commended as the only answer to problems of workable "Nigerian
Democracy."(49) Awolowo described the Prime Minister's foreign
policy principles as "vague and hypocritical in the extreme."[50]
It would be worth noting that Awolowo's reaction and shift from
his first view of Nigerian foreign policy was after the 1959
election, which he lost, and he had never been Pan-Africanist
before then. It was after this period that he started his attack
on the Anglo-Nigerian Defence Pact and he seems to have become




It would be necessary to point out that such ups and downs
observed in the formulation of the Nigerian foreign policy is not
unique to Nigeria alone but rather a common experience for many
other new democratically-oriented independent states. Nigerian
foreign policy in the 1960s remained very vulnerable to
criticisms and amendments.
The issue of foreign policy in the first civilian government
played a divisive role among the Nigerian elites. The division
was owed much to the system of party formation. The party system
had much influence on what transpired during the period
especially since the central government did not have much power
over the regional governments which made it easier for the
opposition party to make constant criticisms of the government's
foreign policy principles. For example, in August 1960, the
government was forced to restate its foreign policy principles
twice in four months. The attitude of the Nigerian leaders
towards the formulation of foreign policy was not a surprise to
people who are conversant with Nigerian history and background
in general. The British Diplomat, Mr. Cliford, stressed that
Nigeria meant a collection of 'nations' ruled by government from
abroad.[51] Apart from the 'direct' and 'indirect' rule
established by the British rulers, the 1945 Richard Constitution
had been so much blamed for such an overwhelming loyalty being
shown on a regional level instead of a national level.
In conclusion, the first civilian government maintained vagueness
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and abstraction in its foreign policy. This may be seen as an
attempt to transpose to it the inherently conservative Nigerian
nationalist objectives (sovereignty, self-reliance, equality).
In addition, the Nigerian leadership elite perceived their
foreign policy options to be limited by a degree of historical
determinism, which dictated a strong practical economic and
psychological commitment to Britain (and by extension, the West),
and other issues concerning African affairs were dealt with
pragmatically.
At independence in 1960, the Nigerian state represented a
contrived federal balance between three ethnically and
politically divided federal states. The political rivalry and
tension between the three factions precluded the evolution of any
specific "Nigerian ideology or doctrine" and the emergence of any
single charismatic national leader (as was the case in many other
emergent African states) who could be identified as the voice of
Nigeria. [521 The bitterness, hostility and distrust thus created
by the influence of regionalism in Nigeria culminated in the
tragedy of the Civil War.
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CHAPTER 3:
FOREIGN POLICY AND THE FIRST YEARS OF INDEPENDENCE:
THE COMPARISON WITH GHANA
The colonial status of most peoples in black Africa made it
possible for them to look for a common platform in the fight for
independence. In this struggle the 'African Motherland' was
exalted.[1] It was not uncommon to hear some spokesmen of Pan-
Africanism such as Azikiwe, Nkrumah, Sekou Toure and Senghor say
that independence for their own country alone was not enough, and
that the anti-colonial struggle would not be at an end until the
whole continent had been freed.[2] This was summed up in the
words of Sekou Toure after he had become President of the
Republic of Guinea:
We look upon Africa as a human body; if its finger is
cut, it is not the cut finger alone which feels the
pain, but rather the whole body.[3]
This chapter will be reviewing to what extent Nigeria and Ghana
shared the same perspective since at first glance they seem to
have passed through a similar historic phase.
Ghana was the first tropical African colony to secure its
independence in 1957; Nkrumah .was the pioneer.[4] Nkrumah was
noted as having had a long association with Pan-African ideas
right from his student days in USA, Africa, (under the influence
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of Marcus Garvey and his movement - 'Back to Africa') and later
in London. [5] During the period of the 1960s many more African
states gained or regained sovereignty. Some of the new
independent states were much larger than Ghana and inherited what
they regarded as more important internal problems to solve than
the problem of African unity. In large, conceptual terms, there
was what might be called the choice of either 'micro-nationalism'
or 'macro-nationalism.' In other words it was a choice between
national sovereignty on one hand or some form of African
federation or unity on the other. The problems of national
sovereignty gave rise to a foreign policy conservatism in some
of these larger states, leading to continuing reliance on their
former colonial masters, especially where sovereignty was gained
without any major sort of. antagonism. Professor Gambari,
interviewed by the present author, identified Nigeria's position
here as that of uncertainty and timidity.[6] Between 1960-65, the
major issues were the official foreign policy declaration which
included the Anglo-Nigerian Defence Pact; the Congo Crisis and
the Organisation of African Unity; negotiations for associate
status with the European Economic Community; the Rhodesian crisis
and Commonwealth relations; and the Arab-Israeli antagonism and
the search for a cohesive policy toward the Middle East.
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THE CONSERVATIVE VS RADICAL GOVERNMENT
LABELS AND THEIR FOREIGN POLICY
APPROACHES:
Most African leaders shared the notion of Pan-Africanism, but with
different perspectives. On attainment of independence, the
Nigerian leadership (being a conservative alliance as seen in the
last chapter) was ideologically opposed to, and resented the
radical views of Nkrumah. Nkrumah, on the other hand, due to the
Anglo-Nigerian military alliance, felt politically distanced from
the Nigerian government and more supportive of opposition
political factions.[7] Although Azikiwe initially was more
responsive to Nkrumah's Pan-Africanism, perhaps due to his
involvement in the movement during his stay in the US and
Britain, the Action Group (AG) and the Northern Peoples Party
(NPC) opposed any plans for political unity and economic-
cooperation embracing the whole of the African continent. This
type of attitude by the AG and NPC may be attributed to national
interests, or perhaps national pride, centred in the perception
that the population of each region of Nigeria was greater than
the entire population of Ghana. Hence, Awolowo, Balewa and the
Sarduana, as potential leaders of an independent Nigeria,
resented what they regarded as an attempt by Nkrumah to arrogate
to himself the leadership of Africa. [8] According to Professor
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Gambari, the basic problem was that on all these issues Nigeria
did not speak with one voice and, even when it sought to do
this, it leaned towards the West. In other words, foreign policy
as at that time was made and conducted by a government which
reflected the country's disunity, a weak coalition of regional
and ethnic-based political parties.[9]
By 1958 the relationship between Nigeria and Ghana had
deteriorated; firstly due to ideological differences over whether
and what type of Pan-Africanism was to be adopted by Africa.[10]
It has been noted that Ghana was the one striving at all times
to challenge Nigerian leadership rather than the other way
round, [11] and this view suggests that Ghana used Pan-Africanism
as an instrument in its rivalry with Nigeria. There is little
real doubt, however, of Nkrumah's Pan-Africanist credentials.
Pan-Africanism certainly was an old aspiration to which Nkrumah
gave a new turn. Nkrumah as a Pan-African visionary "saw that
political independence would mean little if it were unaccompanied
by economic independence from the former colonial masters; and
he saw that this economic independence could not be gained by a
plethora of small states. Faced with Africa's technical and
economic backwardness he wanted a united Africa which, by pooling
its economic and human resources, might operate independently in
a world from which, as Nkrumah well knew, Africa could not opt
out."[12] Nkrumah's argument was based on his perception that
irrespective of the widening economic disparity between the
northern and southern hemispheres, the disparities of power in
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the political kingdom could be challenged. This understanding
remained very vital to Nkrumah and his new state. He was very
convinced that power in terms of nuclear and military strength
could not hold continuously as the method of measuring a state's
strength and looked forward to the emergence of a new pattern of
international relations. This notion of 'new pattern' was
expected to emerge from Africa or Asia, hence his perseverence
in seeking to make such an ambition a reality through the unity
of all African states or perhaps all black people which would
serve as a deterrent to the growing strength of the northern
hemisphere. In Nkrumah's own words:
"Force alone is no longer a decisive factor in world affairs"...
he visualised a distinctive African contribution to international
discussions and the achievement of world peace through its
contribution. 113]
Sociologists and ethnologists who have carefully studied African
social life have laid much stress on what seems to a common
dominant trait of a form of socialism in traditional African
societies. The individual hardly considers himself as other than
a member of the group.[14) 'Socialism' in most cases is used in
its widest sense. But there is a sharp difference between
'Socialism' in a European context and 'Socialism' in a
traditional African context. As Reverend Father Temples and
Marcel Griaule (expounding their concept of African 'negro
philosophy') put it:
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African negro socialism rests on a cosmogony, an explanation of
the universe, according to which the being is not individualised,
is not an irreducible real presence, but constitutes the cell of
a unity into which he is integrated and from which he draws
strength and life.[15]
In other words, this type of socialism reflects on the presence
of a 'community' and not the creation of a 'collectivism' as in
the case of the European socialism. The latter represents a
victory by society over individuals. By contrast, the phenomenon
of African community is not the result of a fight, or of
conquest, rather an agreement, harmony and mutual fulfilment.[16]
It seems however that the contemporary African leaders saw
socialism from different perspectives. Some accepted socialism
on European terms while others accepted it on traditional African
terms.
The building of African unity gave the doctrine of Pan-Africanism
a political expression. The desire to achieve African unity was
as old as the desire to achieve independence. But whereas all the
colonial territories were in unanimous agreement about the
attainment of independence there had been disagreements on the
type of unity which Pan-Africanism was proclaiming. This type of
disagreement gave rise to the formation of groups like - The
Conseil de l' Entente, the Brazzaville Group, the Casablanca
Group and the Monrovia Group. The formation of these groups
reflected the fact that all the African states were animated by
two movements, forces and aspirations pulling simultaneously in
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opposite directions - micro-nationalism and Pan-Africanism. To
some, nationalism remained uppermost. The thesis at this stage
will briefly touch on the activities of the last two groups which
witnessed discord while pursuing what on the surface seemed to
be the same goal of African unity. The major difference between
the Monrovia Group and the Casablanca Group was not anti-
colonialism but the anti-colonialist movement expressed in
different ways.
THE CASABLANCA GROUP:
The Casablanca Group which originated from the Union of Guinea,
Ghana and Mali, claimed to be laying the 'United States of
Africa.' On the 23rd December 1958, they plainly proclaimed that
"following the example of the thirteen American colonies which
finally gave birth to the United States of America, and in
sympathy with the trend among the peoples of Europe, Asia and the
Middle East to organise themselves in a rational manner, we
decide to adopt a 'Flag of Union' and to encourage the closest
contacts between governments, in order to harmonise the policies
of our countries, notably in regard to defence, foreign and
economic policy. Our second task will be to frame a constitution
giving stability to the Union, now established."[17]
The formation of the Casablanca Group was in circumstances which
affected the interests of those states which formed it. These
included the danger which the three states, Guinea, Ghana and
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Mali, felt of numerical inferiority vis-a-vis the twelve
Brazzaville states. It is necessary to note that Mali and Senegal
had been in dispute since the break-up of the Federation of which
they had been both members. On the strength of this, an option
for Mali was to go north of the Sahara in search of alliance.
Secondly, Morocco, not recognising the sovereignty of Mauritania
(which was a member of Brazzaville Group and supported by all the
states of this group), turned to the Union of Guinea, Ghana and
Mali for support. The formation of the Casablanca Group was
characterised by virulent anti-colonialism. Its leaders wanted
to stand to the left of other groups in Africa and to appear as
representatives of a trend known as that of revolutionary Africa.
These states grouped themselves as they did because some were
motivated by anti-European hatred and looked on African
unification as a last dramatic or radical expulsion of all
European influence in the continent, as in the case of the
Casablanca Group. The others were more nationally-minded and
concentrated on the progress of their newly won independence e.g.
the Monrovia bloc.[18]
The Casablanca Group resolution on Mauritania reflected its
rejection of European influence and declared that:
France has cut Morocco off from its southern portion in
Mauritania, to consolidate its domination over the Sahara, to
exploit its wealth and to secure for itself an outlet on to the
Atlantic Ocean; the creation of an 'artificial state' called
Mauritania against the wishes of the population and in defiance
of solemn undertakings by France constitutes a violation of
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treaties and international agreements; the setting up of
Mauritania as a state is only a means whereby France can encircle
the African countries, provide itself with support bases and add
to the number of its allies. [1 9]
Furthermore, President Nasser recognised the danger for the Arab
World arising from the appreciable progress that had been made
by the state of Israel in black Africa; therefore, President
Nasser, being the champion of Pan—Arabism, could not afford to
remain indifferent to the southern part of the continent. Nasser
linked the problem of Palestine with the general theme of defence
of independence and security on the African continent. He argued
that the main aim of creating the Israeli state was to make it
a base for imperialist aggression. He also stressed that since
Israel's main objective was to dominate the independent African
states through aid, he (Nasser) had no alternative but to prevent
what he recognised as a start of l a highway for imperialist
infiltration into the continent.'[20] Therefore, the problem the
Mauritania and Israel presented as a common African problem was
a way of urging the representatives of black Africa to take up
a similar position with their colleagues on the other side of the
Sahara. Finally, President Nkrumah, whose policies in the
Congolese Republic were incompatible with the action of the UN
there, was seriously looking for alliances to enhance his attempt
to thwart the work of that international organisation. Nkrumah
saw the Congo crisis as a period of great hope in fulfilling his
African unity policy. Nkrumah's paramount concern was to back the
winner in a power struggle in Congo. Until the eve of Congo's
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independence Nkrumah's support remained with Kasavubu and not
Lumumba. His support for Lumumba was strengthened after the May
1960 election whereby Lumumba emerged the strongest
candidate.[21] He thought that his objective on African policy
could be achieved through Lumumba whose weaknesses he understood.
At the same time he wanted to involve the UN as much as possible
especially since his influence alone would be minimal. A member
of Nkrumah's Congo Coordination Committee, in an interview by
Thompson confirmed this when he stated that:
"We felt that if we could attract the UN into the crisis, Ghana's
stature would be augumented, because all the world would be
focusing on us; more important, we could wield influence within
the UN."[22]
When Katanga declared its secession on July 11th 1960, Ghana was
a principal supplier of troops on terms of special friendship
with the Congolese government. Ghana eventually became 'the
diplomatic cockpit of Africa.'[23] Nkrumah thought that the
Congolese conflict would be short—lived with a swift
intervention. By August 8th 1960, a Ghana—Congo agreement for
union was signed.[24] With the agreement signed, Nkrumah was
convinced that he had gained leverage in Africa towards greater
unity. There were high stakes for Nkrumah in the crisis and this
gave him the opportunity to show international statesmanship as
a mediator. In order to gain international recognition he saw no
harm in involving both powers of East and West in the conflict.
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Nkrumah's first disagreement with the US and the UK was when
there was a delay on his demand for planes to move his first
troops to Leopoldville. This was delayed on the ground that the
first Security Council resolution authorising the formation of
a UN force had not been passed, therefore both countries refused
to offer such assistance until it came under a UN operation. But
when the Soviet Union offered him the use of two 'Ilyushin 18's,'
Nkrumah accepted without any reference to the UN Secretariat. [251
When this action was queried by the UN Secretary General, Ghana
replied that the "Ghana government had seen it fit to make a
direct request to the Soviet Union for planes without reference
to the Secretariat."[26] By mid August 1960, there was a great
concern about Ghana's unilateralism in the Congo Crisis. During
the middle of August, the Ghanaian contingent acted directly on
Lumumba's request for protection without any directive from the
Secretariat. This action was supported by Ghana when it stated
that "one of the inevitable facts of the UN administration was
that it moved too slowly and often too late." Nkrumah argued that
the government of Ghana considered that adequate protection of
the members of the lawfully constituted central government on
whose invitation the UN forces were in Congo, was a paramount
duty imposed by the Security Council resolution.[27] The police
contingent, which brought invaluable aid to Lumumba, was one of
the few trumps Ghana had in Leopoldville, and so it did not
arrange to follow the Secretariat's directive.[28] African
leaders became very skeptical of Nkrumah's Congo policy,
especially such states that were also in a position to play an
active role. On the 12th of July, Nkrumah cabled every African
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Head of State that reports from Congo were so disturbing that he
had to send a special mission.., to obtain first-hand
information.[29] Tunisia was in favour of Nkrumah's move, its
government cabled back and promised to cooperate with Ghana as
well as with other African states at the UN level.[30] Liberia's
Tubman publicly expressed his irritation at Ghana's unilateral
action, [31] while Nigeria totally condemned intervention in the
internal affairs of other African states.[32]
On August 8th, 1960, in his Guinea Communique, Nkrumah announced
his intention to mobilise the remaining Ghanaian troops to
Lumumba's aid if possible. He stated that, firstly, the African
states had been seen to be "technically competent to tackle any
problems arising on the African continent." Secondly, he argued
that if the UN failed in Kantanga, Ghanaian and Congolese forces
would fight alone against Belgium, in which case "Ghana and
other African states would not be without aid and assistance from
such countries which value as a principle, the concept of African
independence."[33] But in a cabinet meeting on the same day, ath
August, a Minister defended Nkrumah's announcement by stating
that the "President explained that the policy of Ghana was not
calculated to cause aggression anywhere on African soil." He was
instead guided by the fact that unless a policy of toughness was
followed, the initiative in the Congo would be lost to the
Belgian and other imperialist powers.[34] Nkrumah tried hard to
confine the conflict as much as possible within Africa and wished
the UN force would be used to crush Katanga's secession as
quickly as possible.
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By October 1960, Nkrumah was actually thinking about having
Algerian and Ghanaian troops alone replace the UN command in
Leopoldville. (The proposals are summarised in the record of the
OAU Council of Ministers, Lagos Conference, 24-29 February 1964).
Nkrumah had reached his highest level of influence i.e. the
presence of Ghanaian troops in Leopoldville together with his
remaining influence in the UN Secretariat. But by October 16 (due
to Kasavubu's demand for the withdrawal of Ghanaian troops) on
the orders of the ONUC the Ghanaian troops had to leave
Leopoldville. [35]
All these circumstances precipitated the Casablanca Conference
which was held in Morocco. Many African countries were invited
for the meeting but because of the background outlined above most
of these countries including Liberia, Nigeria, Togo, Somalia,
Tunisia, Sudan and Ethopia decided to abstain irrespective of the
official invitation by the King of Morocco; while Asiatic states
and Indonesia politely excused themselves.
As noted by Thiam, three things were observed in the Casablanca
conference. Firstly, it was charaterised by virulent anti-
colonialism; its leaders wanted to stand to the left of other
groups in Africa and to appear as representatives of a trend
since known as that of revolutionary Africa. Secondly, the
resolutions adopted seem to have been the result of reciprocal
concessions, each representative having endeavoured to gain
recognition for his particular viewpoint on his own special
38
problems. Thirdly, it was committed to a non-colonial African
unity, as the Charter adopted at the conclusion of the conference
declared:
Let us proclaim our desire to liberate the African territories
still under foreign domination, to lend them aid and assistance,
to liquidate colonialism and neo-colonialism in all its forms, to
discourage the establishment of troops and foreign bases which
endanger the liberation of Africa and to free the African
continent from political intervention and economic pressure.[36]
THE MONROVIA GROUP:
The Monrovia conference grew as a reaction to the Casablanca
conference which most African countries recognised as a 'radical'
bloc. On one hand, this conference served as a clarification of
the position of those states which were not committed to the
Casablanca Group. On the other hand, the Congo crisis demanded
urgent attention from such a conference. It was Senegal that
suggested that the uncommitted African countries such as Togo,
Nigeria and Liberia should organise a conference at which all
African countries would try to reach and define a common policy
towards the Congo crisis.[37] Such a call by Senegal made a very
big impression, and the focus of the proposed conference became
larger than the Congo problem. It was this conference which
brought Nigeria's Tafawa Balewa to international attention.
Many observers credited him with saving the conference by
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offering compromises for some of the differences among
members.[38] The Monrovia conference of 12 May 1961 was attended
by twenty African states (though all independent African states
were invited - excluding South Africa and the unstable Congo) and
the Casablanca Group abstained. This was the first time twenty
African states had attended one meeting on the continent. Because
of the good attendance the conference decided to look into other
important African problems. The resolutions adopted at the end
of the conference included:
The states present agreed to govern themselves on the principles
of equality regardless of size, non-interferences in the internal
affairs of other states, respect for the sovereignty of each
state, condemnation of subversion directed from neighbouring
states, cooperation throughout Africa based on tolerance and the
non-acceptance of any leadership, and unity without political
integration. They also resolved to set up a technical commission
to work out details for cultural, scientific, and technical
cooperation. They condemned colonialism, and called on African
states not to take sides on the Congo crisis. They also condemned
further manufacture and stockpiling of nuclear weapons, and urged
disarmament. Apartheid was condenmed, but there was an
overwhelming approval of the UN. They urged that African disputes
be settled by peaceful means and that a commission should be
created to promote such ends. Finally, they regretted the absence
of some African states from the conference and hoped they would
attend a follow-up meeting to be held in Lagos. [39]
The Monrovia conference created a conservative bloc in Africa to
counteract the Casablanca bloc. It is necessary to point out that
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not all Nigerian leaders approved of the line Nigeria toed. Chief
Awolowo, for example, charged that the Monrovia conference was
inspired and completely financed by the more important countries
of the Western bloc.[40] He then called on the Nigerian
government to join Nigeria to the Guinea-Ghana-Mali Union, a move
hardly calculated to strengthen the Monrovia bloc since Nigeria
was in fact the most powerful member of that group.[41] At the
All-Nigerian Peoples Conference of August 1961, many delegates
preferred joining Ghana than other African states. The conference
passed a resolution calling on the government to make special
contacts with the Casablanca bloc. This move was also supported
by the radicals of the NCNC. In the November 1961 session of
Parliament, the government was faced by extreme criticism from
some NCNC and NPC members regarding its drifting away from
friendly relations with Ghana. But the Foreign Minister in his
lengthy reply, rather than deny the rift, charged that Ghana had
refused to cooperate with Nigeria.[42]
However, following such criticisms from the members of the
opposition party (AG) and some members of the ruling parties (NPC
and NCNC), the government made a dramatic attempt to patch up the
differences between the Monrovia Group and the Casablanca Group
before the Lagos conference which had been scheduled to begin on
January 25th 1962. It was noted that on December 10th 1961, the
Nigerian Prime Minister paid a visit to President Sekou Toure of
Guinea to persuade him to attend the Lagos conference. It should
be recalled that President Sekou Toure was a member of the
Casablanca Group. The aftermath of the visit was a joint
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communique issued by the two leaders indicating that they shared
common views on external matters[43] though he failed to attend
the Lagos conference as promised.) During the Lagos conference
an official statement issued from Accra stated two reasons for
abstaining:
The Casablanca Powers had not been consulted as a Group; and the
Algerian Provisional Government had not been invited.[44]
The absence of the Casablanca bloc did not make the Lagos
conference a failure.	 It was during the Lagos conference that
a proposal for the Charter for the Inter-African and Malagasy
Organisation was initiated. It made no reference to political
integration, rather emphasising economic cooperation, and the
educational and cultural, health and nutritional, political and
diplomatic fields. It agreed "to explore the possibility of
building up the defence of the African and Malagasy states
against external aggression and in safeguarding the territorial
integrity of their countries."[45] It also reaffirmed the
principles of Monrovia (which Azikiwe described as the
distinguishing factor between the two blocs during the
conference). It proposed the establishment of three organs to
give the organisation permanence and administration - an Assembly
of Heads of States and Governments (to meet at least once every
year); a General Secretariat (to serve as the Central
Administrative Organ); a Council of Foreign Ministers (to meet
at least once every year). And membership was open to any
independent African state under indigenous African rule.[46] It
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further proposed the creation of an Association, of African and
Malagasy Economic Cooperation and Development and a Permanent
Conciliation Commission for the settlement of disputes, each to
be effected by a separate treaty which should form an integral
part of the Charter. The official languages were to be English
and French, and the Charter would have come into force thirty
days after two-thirds of the signatory states had deposited their
ratifications. [47]
The absence of Ghana in the Lagos conference widened the gap
between Nigeria and Ghana. Ghana's attitude to Nigeria on this
occasion caused a narrowing of the gap between the Nigerian
radicals and the moderate politicians, and Ghana was condemned
for its attitude towards the Nigerian policy regarding African
affairs, especially when A.K. Bardon, Chairman of the Ghana's
Convention Peoples' Party's Bureau of African Affairs, charged
that Dr. Azikiwe's speech was prepared in London and read at
Lagos (in other words not initiated by the Nigerian government).
Secondly, he pointed out, provocatively and wrongly, that not
even a single country represented in Lagos conference had made
any visible contribution towards the anti-colonial fight in
Africa as a whole.[48]
Despite this attack on it, the Lagos conference could be regarded
as a success since it eventually became the model for the African
Summit Conference at Addis Ababa in 1963. Remarkably parallel to,
and based on the principles of the Lagos Charter, the OAU charter
indicates a victory for the Nigerian position which placed it
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firmly in the moderate or conservative camp of African states.
The 1963 Addis Ababa conference witnessed a very good turn out
of African states. For the first time thirty one African states
were represented at the conference, including the Casablanca
bloc. During this period the solidarity of the Casablanca Group
had been declining because of disquiet over Nkrumah's personal
policy making at the expense of the group as a whole. President
Toure of Guinea was opposed to Nkrumah's plan for the pre-summit •
meeting of Foreign Ministers which called for "close unity, with
a common foreign policy for all of Africa, a common set of
diplomatic representatives, a continental economic-industrial
plan, a common currency, and a central bank."[49] On this ground,
Toure later announced the demise of the Ghana-Guinea-Mali Union.
The moderate position of the Nigerian Prime Minister was
supported by Halie Selassie, Nyerere, Toure and Tubman, and also
Nasser and Ben Bella,[50] whereby he condemned political unity
and called for the 'practical approach' of economic, educational,
scientific, and cultural cooperation, and by trying first to get
the Africans to understand themselves before embarking on the
more complicated and sophisticated arrangement of political
union. These leaders persuaded the less moderate leaders to join
them, thus the conference produced the new document called the
Charter of the Organisation of African Unity (modelled mainly on the
Lagos Charter). It was assumed therefore, at this point, that the
new Charter liquidated the former Casablanca and Monrovia Camps.
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Thus, the moderate position which called for caution and slowness
in African unification movements, respect for all boundaries, and
anti-subversion, as well as the elimination of 'blocs' was
accepted in principle by all African states (except South Africa
which was not invited). Bearing in mind the motivations of the
two former blocs, there was the tendency of differences in the
interpretation of the new Organisation's Charter. For example,
Ghana interpreted II(I-d) - "to eradicate all forms of
colonialism from Africa," to mean "active and armed support for
the struggle of dependent African territories against colonialism
and apartheid."(51) Whether this meant the same thing to the
Nigerian leaders was not expressed but Nigeria was one of the
nine African states in control of the one million pounds for aid
towards various national liberation movements.
THE COMPARISON OF NIGERIA AND GHANA'S ATTITUDE
TOWARDS AFRICAN UNITY
Nigeria being the largest single unit in tropical Africa both in
size and population, had some grounds to consider it had
leadership capacity in African affairs. In contrast, Ghana is a
relatively small state. Its population then was about six
million people while Nigeria had about fifty million people.(52)
On attainment of independence it proclaimed that:
Nigeria is an African nation, it is part and parcel of that
continent of Africa and therefore, it is so completely involved
in anything that pertains to that continent; that it cannot be
45
neutral and must never be considered as a neutralist
country.. ."[53]
In the Prime Minister's own words, he said:
We are independent in everything but neutral in nothing that
affects the destiny of Africa. [54]
But irrespective of such a notion towards Africa, Nigeria still
had its reservations in pursuing visionary Pan—African
objectives. Nigeria made its African policy very clear, as stated
by its Foreign Minister:
(a) Policies must be clear and practicable, not sentimental or
designed to soothe people's nerves or for propaganda purposes
(b) Help would be offered to any African State to solve its problems,
but the help must be solicited and unpublicised
(c) Promotion of cultural and economic links with Africa
(d) Territorial boundaries must be respected to avoid chaos and
bloodshed.
(e) No interference in the internal affairs of others so as to
prevent unrest and harm to the overall plan for the future unity
of the African continent.[55]
From Nigeria's point of view, it was not wise to embark on total
isolation of Western Europe especially Britain. Nigeria, though
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independent, found itself unready to stand wholly alone as a
developing country with such a large population. Throughout the
deliberations about unity, the Nigerian Prime Minister reiterated
constantly his disapproval and maintained that there was not to
be talk of political union before knowing exactly what the
African problems were.[56] Instead the Nigerian government
maintained a moderate position whereby it sought African unity
through cooperation among independent African states and argued
that "Europe did not divide Africa — it united squabbling
villages and made nations of them." These may join together now
if their people wish it but the Pan—African state is not for this
generation. [571 On the role of Nigerian leadership in Africa, or
the idea that Nigeria might attempt to force itself on African
states as their leader, the Prime Minister remarked
that 'Nigeria is big enough and does not need to join others.'
But if others wished to join Nigeria, their position would be
made clear in such a union.[58]
From Ghana's point of view, one of the main objectives of
Nkrumah's African unity was to make Ghana an African bastion of
'scientific socialism.'[59] The composition of Ghana's political
institutions should not be overlooked when considering Ghana's
political attitude towards African policy. Ghana is a small state
and observed a one party system and therefore had no challenges
as such to its policy formulations. Assessing Nkrumah's position
in Ghana, it was said that:
Kwame Nkrumah was the Conventional Peoples Party (CPP), and the
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CPP was Ghana. [ 60 ]
According to Thompson, by 1962, Ghana's Foreign Policy was
dominated by Nkrumah's obsession, shared in its particular form
by no one else of influence in Ghana, to bring a 'continental
union government' to Africa, and to align Ghana with all anti-
imperialist groups and countries.[61] Due to his increasingly
dictatorial powers, he was able to set about his policy virtually
without regard to domestic pressure. The motive behind Nkrumah's
radicalism has been observed as his "anti-Americanism," friendship
with the East, and the moving of Ghana towards "scientific
socialism," a belief which grew in his decade in America - though
he had had such notions even before he left the Gold Coast for
America in 1953. In other words, Nkrumah was trying to make his
personal dream and ambition into a reality and this was not
necessarily a genuine African cause.
Ghana, having gained independence before Nigeria,. was able to use
a position of radicalism towards African union as a means of
making an impact on international affairs. Ghana wanted to play
a role in African issues and wanted to garner support for its
ambition. But the emergence of Nigeria as an independent country
in 1960 detracted from Ghana's position. Nigeria's refusal to toe




Contrary to Ghana's claim that Nigeria was against the progress
of African unity, both countries proclaimed African unity but
with different approaches. Both countries had their short-comings
in their pursuit of African unity. This could be attributed in
part to the difference in their perceptions of the attitudes of
the 'great powers.' For Nkrumah of Ghana, any interest in the
Western bloc meant a continuing establishment of imperialism. But
Sir Robert Jackson (Nkrumah's spokesman) described Nkrumah as a
man with "two separate sealed compartments." In explaining this
phrase a British diplomat described him as a "chameleon."(62) It
was noted that prior to independence Nkrumah told Western
statesmen that his heart was with the West and at the same time
he told the Eastern envoys that they should bide their time until
he was in a position to declare that his real loyalties were with
their cause.[63) As Sir Robert remarked the "separate sealed"
Eastern compartment of his mind in the event turned out to be
bigger than the Western one.[64]
To Nigeria, the right of self-determination did not apply to the
ethnic groups within member states of the OAU, but only to
insurgents against colonial or white minority rule.[65] Nigeria
stood for "national unity" at all times and this remained policy
not only at the Nigerian level but with other African countries,
especially in the insistence on non-interference in the internal
affairs of other countries.
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Nigerian foreign policy makers constantly worked to ensure that
irredentist and secessionist forces in Africa were contained
within the existing territorial boundaries of post independence
Africa especially after the Congo experience. To this end,
Nigeria's political leaders played an active role in negotiating
the form of Pan-African alliance that became the Organisation of
African Unity (OAU). In contrast to the more radical leaders of
the time, Nigeria sought an alliance that would protect the
territorial integrity of these fragile states and provide at
least a diplomatic weapon against any attempts from within or
outside the region to alter the status quo by means of wars of
aggression or subversion.[66] The Soviet economic concept
received practically no support in Nigeria, the overwhelming
preference being for some form of mixed economy. The Nigerian
policy of non-alignment under these circumstances could be
regarded as a pragmatic one with no desire for any blanket
indentification with either bloc, but with a strong tendency
nonetheless to give the Western bloc the benefit of any doubt
except on questions of colonialism.
It must be concluded therefore that both Nigeria and Ghana
created two distinct international images. Nigeria is a Federal
State and acted in order to harmonise the various internal forces
of a pluralistic nation. Ghana was a unitary government and at
the same time smaller than Nigeria both in size and population,
and followed a "One Party System" which was the sole voice of




FOREIGN POLICY UNDER THE FIRST MILITARY GOVERNMENT
GO WON, BIAFRAN SECESSION AND THE APPROACH TO WORLD
OPINION:
In Balewa's government 'non—alignment' was declared as the
foundations of the Nigerian Foreign Policy but what was observed
was nothing more than a "facade."[1] There were, for instance,
no conscious efforts to move closer to any of the communist
powers to balance a predisposition to the West.[2] To Balewa,
foreign policy was clear cut — either support the West and be
in good and respectable company, or support the communist powers
and be in the company of the devil.[3] As a conservative and
devoutly religious statesman he favoured a pro—Western approach
to foreign relations.
There were some factors which made it possible for the Balewa
administration to maintain such a strongly pro—Western attitude
from 1960-1966, irrespective of views within the coalition
government, the opposition party and even the pressure groups.
These included[4]
1. The inability of the radical elements in the NCNC to
impose their desire for a more militant stance, so the
decision of the NPC prevailed.
2. The making of the country's foreign policy was
essentially an executive responsibility which was
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dominant actor.
3. The Federal Parliament, which might have redressed the
one-sided nature of Nigerian foreign policy, never had
a chance; it played a peripheral role, constantly
rubber-stamping the key decisions of the Federal
Executive Council.
4. There was no powerful 'watch-dog' parliamentary
committee on foreign relations, and this lack was
coupled with the infrequency of parliamentary
meetings. Also, the members of parliament themselves
did not sufficiently understand the proper place and
role of the legislature within the parliamentary
democracy, nor did they effectively utilise the
opportunity provided by the question period to deal
with the inadequacies of the Federal government's
foreign policy.
There were indeed some well-organised and powerful pressure
groups during Balewa's administration which articulated diverse
and at times contradictory views on the shape and form that
Nigeria's foreign policy should take; on the whole, however,both
the pressure groups and public opinion were ineffective in
influencing public policy. The only major exception was the
successful campaign mounted by the Action Group, the Nigerian
Congress, the Labour Unions, and Student Groups against the
Anglo-Nigerian Defence Pact.[5] The continuous campaign mounted
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by these groups led to a change of heart by the Federal
Government especially when it nearly became a barrier to the
success of the Monrovia Group.
It can be concluded that Balewa's administration observed a
psuedo-non-alignment process in its foreign relations. Following
from this, this chapter will endeavour to examine the behaviour
of the foreign policy formulation of the first long standing
military government. Special attention will be paid on whether
this first military government toed the same line as its
predecessor in its foreign policy formulation or otherwise.
THE DEMISE OF A BRIEF FIRST MILITARY GOVERNMENT:
It is necessary to point out that due to the relatively short
period covered by Ironsi's regime' which succeeded the Balewa
administration immediately after the coup d'etat of 15th January
1966, (though it declared non-alignment as the central theme of
Nigeria's foreign policy) it could not provide sufficient basis
for comparison with Balewa's administration. The regime lasted
for barely six months before it was overthrown by the July 1966
counter-coup which led to the nomination of Gowon as the new Head
of State of the Federal Military Government. Likewise the
assessment of the foreign policy behaviour during the Gowon
regime would not be complete without taking into consideration
the attempted secession of the Eastern part of the country,
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including the impact of the civil war as a whole. These stood
as the determining factors in guiding the attitude of the Federal
Military Governmnt and its foreign policy formulation.
THE IMPACT OF THE CIVIL WAR ON NIGERIAN FOREIGN
POLICY FORMULATION: - BRITAIN AND THE SOVIET UNION
DURING THE CIVIL WAR:
This section will be assessing the impact of the civil war on
Nigeria's relations with the Great Powers (and the impact on the
policy of non-alignment), the African countries, and its
neighbouring countries.
At the outset of the hostilities between the Federalists and the
secessionists in July 1967, the general belief on both sides was
that Britain had an important role to play; and its stance would
influence the course of the war. This resulted in every effort
put by both parties in order to explore the possibilities of
getting Britain's recognition and the attendant benefits of arm
supplies, technical assistance, advice, and relief aid.[6] But
Britain, on one hand, was anxious to limit the scale of the
conflict and at the same time to safeguard its commercial and
political interests in the country.[7] This reluctance shown by
the British government created some doubts on the benefits of the
long-standing good relationship maintained by Balewa's
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administration. Following the declaration of an independent state
of Biafra on 30th May 1967, and the United States and the United
Kingdom's refusal to supply Nigeria with military aircraft and
weapons, Nigeria had no alternative than to turn to the Soviet
Union for help. [8]
The USSR by contrast seized upon this reluctance shown by the
British government as a golden opportunity. This was expressed
in the Soviet diplomat's remark, "we will take advantage of
mistakes the British make; it is only human."[9] The Soviet Union
used all means available to secure the good relationship it had
been denied by the Balewa government. It presented itself as more
peace-loving than the Western Powers. Statements like the
following were issued:[10]
"The Soviet Union, guided by the peace-loving principles of its
foreign policy, considers foreign interference in Nigeria's
internal affairs inadmissible. The Soviet Union in its relations
with Nigeria will continue to render it support in its
independent national development on the basis of equality and
mutual respect."
From the strength of the Soviet stand at that crucial period in
Nigerian history, there developed an unprecendented opinion
amongst many West African countries that the Soviet concern for
the protection of African independence was sincere. For example,
a Radio Nigeria commentary supported this view when it said that
at the beginning of the war both the UK and USA had refused to
sell arms to Nigeria. But on the USSR, it noted - "to its
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pleasant surprise, it was a country with which it (Nigeria) had
hitherto had very little economic or political ties that proved
willing to satisfy its urgent needs."[11]
Writing in 1968, Walter Schwaz said that as a result of the civil
war Britain had lost ground, perhaps irretrievably, in
Nigeria.[12] Though Schwarz's remarks contained some truth, it
might be regarded as perhaps too harsh, and too rash because in
1968 when the book was written it was a difficult period in which
to forecast accurately the future pattern of Anglo-Nigerian
relations. However, during this period many Nigerian leaders did
regard the British government's attitude as a betrayal by a
former friend. Apart from the delay in taking sides in the civil
war, there were certain issues over which Nigeria considered
Britain's approach as unfriendly. These include the way in which
Mr. George Thomas, then Minister of State in the Commonwealth
Office, waded into the oil blockade of the former Eastern
Nigerian Coast, denouncing it as being totally against
international law[13] which angered the Federal Government. The
anger generated by this statement was noted to be very high
especially when it was observed that earlier on the 30th June
1967, the British government had informed the Federal government
that the 'British oil companies - Shell-BP would make a token
payment of royalties to the secessionists because they could do
serious demage to the assests of the companies around Port
Harcourt. , [14] This attitude portrayed by the British government
at that period coupled with Mr. Thomas's statement which accused
the Federal Government of violation of international law,
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provoked all types of criticism. The Nigerian press was not
restrained on this issue. The Morning Post stated that the
attitude of Mr. Thomas showed that Britain was more interested
in the flow of oil than the survival of Nigeria as a unit.[15]
The New Nigeria said that his statement was clear evidence of the
British government's involvement on the side of the
secessionists.[16] Again, the Morning Post summed up the general
impression in the country by stating that the attitude of the
British government had shown the bankruptcy of the former pro-
British stance of Nigerian foreign policy.[17]
The involvement of the Soviet Union in the civil war on the side
of the Federal Government to a great extent motivated the British
Government's belated decision to take sides with the Federal
Government. Secondly, the Federalists' early military
superiority, as demonstrated in their ability to overcome the
Biafran secessionist forces from the mid-west, demonstrated that
they were worth backing. After the British decision, Britain and
the Soviet Union remained Nigeria's major allies, supplying arms
and ammunition to the Federalists at a staggering pace.1. 181 But
while there were some public outcries in Britain over the arms
supplies, the USSR because of the closed nature of its political
system encountered no such problems from its public. The Soviet
Union, striving to redress the pro-west imbalance in Nigeria's
'non-aligned' policy, supplied massive material assistance to the
Federalists.[19] At first, many in the West nervously felt that
Moscow was in fact gradually edging out Western interests in
Nigeria particularly in the first two years of the civil war when
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the Soviet Union was prominent in cultural and economic
activities in the country.[20] But by March 1969, Soviet
influence had passed its peak and Western activities in Nigeria
again increased steadily. Prime Minister Harold Wilson paid a
well publicised official visit to the country.[21]
Admittedly, Britain supplied the bulk of Nigeria's weapons, and
in spite of ministerial denials in the House of Commons, it
supplied many more arms than the British people realised. The
true value of the British support to the Federal Government
cannot be over—estimated particularly in terms of supplies. Apart
from obvious value in providing part of Nigeria's armoury,
British support also implied diplomatic, political and moral
backing. Britain's pro—Federal posture influenced other
governments, especially those in North America and the old
Commonwealth in shaping their policies. There is no doubt that
Britain's role was one of the critical factors that helped the
Federalists to achieve victory. Nevertheless, its support was,
(in Nigeria's eyes) far from total commitment, even duplicity was
sometimes suspected. The strident, parliamentary debates, the
hostile mass media, the wavering attitude of some key cabinet
ministers, and the British refusal to supply the Nigerian
airforce with aircraft and bombs, all helped to inflict serious
damage to the goodwill that Britain enjoyed in Nigeria.[22]
Despite the fact that the Soviet Union was the first to support
the Federal cause this did not qualify it as an alternative to
Britain as an ally. However, the experience of the civil war
established an increased Nigerian pragmatism in its dealings with
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other countries and a greater commitment to a genuine 'non-
alignment' policy. On the other hand, the Soviet commitment in
the civil war created an atmosphere whereby communism was seen
as a system and not an evil as had been feared by many prominent
Nigerian leaders.
NIGERIA AND THE UNITED STATES DURING THE CIVIL WAR:
The United States, unlike Britain, right from the start of the
civil war clearly pointed out her intention to stay aloof from
the whole affair; its reason being that it had no direct role to
play especially since the conflict fell within Britain's sphere
of influence." Four days after the outbreak of hostilities in
July 1967, Washington announced that it would neither sell nor
otherwise supply arms to either side in order "not to deepen" the
conflict.[23] The US decision comprised many reasons. Firstly,
Washington was very wary of any deep involvement in any civil war
especially with the Vietnam war already in progress, and the
domestic difficulties and prostests created by it. Secondly, the
memory of the US involvement in the Congo crisis was still very
fresh. Even when the Soviet Union became involved in the conflict
by arming the Federalists, the US did not reverse its declared
policy, partly because it felt that Britain's commitment to the
Federal cause would check, if not neutralise Moscow's efforts;
and partly because it assessed Gowon to be hardly a Bolshevik,
therefore, "there were obvious limitations to the extent to which
Gowon would flirt with the Russians."[24]
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The Federal Military Government was angered by the US imposition
of an arms ban but, with the Soviet Union on its side, Lagos was
very tactful in order to avoid a cold-war confrontation. Nigeria
tried as much as possible to maintain its traditional stand and
friendship with the UK and the USA. This was expressed in a
statement whereby it pointed out that:[25]
The recent purchases from Soviet sources have been strictly for
cash on a commercial basis. The Nigerian government maintains its
traditional friendship and foreign policy of non-alignment. The
Federal Military Government expects its friends, particularly in
the West, not to do anything to hamper its current efforts to
defend the territorial integrity of the Federation of Nigeria and
to guarantee justice to all communities.
As the civil war proceeded there was a slight change of policy
on the US side. Washington's policy of non-intervention came
under severe attack from a strong pro-Biafra lobby. This was due
to continuous reports of starvation and suffering among the
Biafran civilian population, coupled with well-organised and
high-powered Biafran propoganda. This led to the option of a low-
profile approach by Washington. It maintained the arms embargo
on both sides, declared political support for the Federal
government on the basis of the 'one Nigeria' concept, but in the
event the US was seen as the largest contributor to the relief
efforts in Biafra. In justifying the humanitarian intervention,
President Johnson explained that:[26]
While we have no intention of interfering in Nigerian affairs, we
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do not believe innocent persons should be made victims of
political manuoeuvering.
The change of administration did not affect the US policy of
neutrality other than in the relief operations. Though President
Nixon promised a radical change on the relief supplies to the
secessionists on attainment of office, this never occurred. This
was due to pro-Federal bias in the US embassy at Lagos, the
Department of State in Washington, and the apparently anti-
Biafran stance of Dr. Kissinger in the White House.[27]
Eventually, the low profile policy led to the US falling foul of
both the Federalists and the secessionists. The US relief
intervention was regarded as having some distinctly political
overtones. For instance, it involved direct dealings with the
secessionists which indirectly strengthened the status of Biafra
in striving for international recognition. It built false hopes
within Biafra which intensified active Biafran resistance and
helped to prolong the civil war.
However, by the autumn of 1969, many Americans were stressing
their impatience with Biafran leader Ojukwu's attitude to the
suffering and starvation of his own people. By this time the
State Department had become more pro-Federal and Biafra failed
to obtain the recognition from the US which it had hoped for. In
January 1970, when Biafra finally collapsed, President Nixon was
among the very first leaders to congratulate the Federalists.
NIGERIA AND FRANCE DURING THE CIVIL WAR:
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The position of France in the Nigerian conflict was totally
different from that of either the British or the US. Initially
French assistance was implicit but by September 1968 President
de Gaulle openly acknowledged that diplomatic recognition of
Biafra might not be ruled out. Although this was not accorded,
France remained the secessionists' principal support in the civil
war. Many reasons engendered the French decision to back Biafra.
These included: "The fear of a united, a successful Nigeria
presenting a strong pole of attraction to the weak and fragmented
Francophone states around it and so, by implication, threatening
to upset the balance of power in the region to the detriment of
French influence. The attraction of oil, de Gaulle's distrust of
the Anglo-Saxons; his general dislike of Federations; and also
the roles of President Houphouet-Biogny of Ivory Coast and Mr.
Foccart, the Secretary General of African Affairs at the
Elysee."[28]
Despite this, French commitment to the secessionists was far from
total. This could be seen through its 'semi-recognition' and
half-hearted assistance moreover, France played a double-game at
a late stage in the conflict. This became necessary partly
because of the unexpected solidarity and strength of the Federal
supporters among western and african states, and partly due to
innate caution.[29] For example, M. Schuman, the Foreign
Minister, told the National Assembly on 4th November 1969, that
French constant policy was to avoid an intensification of the
war. The caution also extended to mediation which he said "can
only come from other African countries with whom (the French)
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maintain constant contact." He said that it would be at a later
and decisive stage France could intervene without running the
risk of interfering with other initiatives and thus making the
situation even more confused.[30]
The Federal Military Government on the other hand did not take
any obvious repraisals such as breaking off diplomatic relations,
harassment of French nationals, or confiscating French properties
in Nigeria. The maintenance of contact between Nigeria and
France, and the fact that diplomatic links were not severed,
paved the way for a speedy improvement in Franco-Nigerian
relations after the war. Thus, whereas the Biafran policy was
mainly carried out by M. Jacques Foccart, the Secretary General
for African Affairs, the rapprochment was performed by the Quai
d'Orsay, the French Foreign Ministry which had been, behind the
scenes, sympathetic to the Federal cause throughout.[31]
NIGERIA AND CHINA DURING THE CIVIL WAR:
Just as Nigeria did not enjoy the total support of the Western
powers, so it did not receive full support from all the communist
powers.[32] There had been no existing cordial relationship
between Lagos and Peking, and the fact that the Soviet Union
backed the Nigerian Military Government prompted China to support
the secessionists. It could be recalled that during this period
the Soviet Union and China were no longer enjoying the cordial
relationship which once existed between the two powers. Under
these circumstances it would be necessary to examine China's role
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and its effect in the Nigerian civil war.
The Peking backing of the secessionists during the civil war was
attributed to two main reasons. Firstly it was due to Sino-Soviet
rivalry. The Chinese posture also stemmed from what it saw as the
bourgeois nature of the civilian administration and the pro-
Western nature of its foreign policy, and Lagos made no attempt
to form a working relationship with China. Above all, Lagos
blindly followed the Western lead and refused to recognise
Peking. [331 However, Peking did not begin to support Biafra until
it was clear that Moscow was backing Lagos. The main motive for
China's unwavering support of the Biafran regime throughout the
war which ignored the volatile behaviour of this regime
(sometimes bourgeois, sometimes apparently revolutionary, and
sometimes down right reactionary)[34] was to oppose Moscow's
support for the Federalists. Peking also ignored the OAU's
support for Lagos. The recognition of Biafra by radical states
in the African spectrum such as Tanzania and Zambia allowed China
to rationalise its policy. On the other hand, the concurrent
recognition by 'bourgeois' and 'neo-colonial' Ivory Coast and
Gabon neutralised this effect.[35]
Nevertheless, Lagos played a pragmatic role to keep the impact
of any Sino-Soviet differences in the war to a minimum. The
Federal Military Government adopted a stance of playing down the
Chinese involvement at the official level as much as possible
meanwhile, Soviet support for the Federalists remained open and
extensive.
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NIGERIA AND THE AFRICAN STATES DURING THE CIVIL WAR:
Nigeria's policy towards its immediate neighbours (the states of
Cameroon, Chad, Niger, Benin and Togo) and Africa as a whole has,
since independence been guided by and large by the following five
principles: [36]
1. The sovereign equality of all African states
2. Respect for the independence, sovereignty and
territorial integrity of every African state.
3. Non-interference in the internal affairs of other
African countries.
4. The commitment to functional cooperation as a means of
promoting African unity.
5. The total eradication of racialism and colonialism
from Africa.
All these five principles of Nigeria's African policy are
contained in Articles II and III of the OAU Charter. Much of the
achievement of these policies was due to the views of Balewa and
other leaders of the Monrovia group of states.
Nigeria's foreign policy was (in the words of Dr. Okoi Arikpo,
then Commissioner for External Affairs), constructed in
concentric circles,[37] radiating outwards from Nigeria's
immediate neighbours, to West Africa, to Africa as a whole and
thereby to the world.
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In reviewing the attitudes of the African states during the
Nigerian civil war the role of the OAU should be considered as
a principal factor. It was the Congo experience which brought the
awareness and fear of disintegration within African states into
perspective among the African leaders. At the birth of the OAU
in 1963 a basis of foreign policy formulation was established
which incorporated settlement of disputes through peaceful
negotiation, non-interference in internal matters of other
states, respect for the existing borders, the policy of non-
alignment and also the promotion of unity and solidarity in
African states, and eradication of all forms of colonialism. [381
At the outbreak of the Nigerian civil war (bearing in mind the
principles of the OAU) the Federal Military Government maintained
that the conflict should remain strictly an internal affair.
Under these circumstances the civil war put into test the two
main principles of the OAU Charter. On the outbreak of the civil
war, the federalists referred constantly to Article III, 2 i.e.
the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of
member states; while Biafra held unto Art.III,3 - respect for the
inalienable right to independence.[39]
The OAU's intervention in the civil war was precipitated by three
major issues; the involvement of foreign powers; the attitude of
the governments of Tanzania, Gabon, Ivory Coast and Zambia; and
also the starvation of Biafra's population and more importantly
Biafra's allegation of genocide' on its people.[40] However, the
OAU's participation in the civil war did not go beyond
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negotiations and its , own deliberations. Such deliberations on
several occasions eventually led to the OAU Summmit Meeting at
Algiers which established a policy of "non-recognition" of Biafra
and called on all member states of the United Nations and the OAU
to refrain from any action detrimental to the peace, unity and
territorial integrity of Nigeria, expecially since it upheld the
principle of African unity.[41] This call had an effect within
the UN as was demonstrated by the UN refusal to give audience to
Biafran leaders when they called for UN intervention. This action
in turn promoted the OAU's credibility. Loyalty to the call was
maintained by the African states too with the exception of the
governments of Tanzania, Gabon, Ivory Coast and Zambia which gave
their reasons for their preference of Art.III, 3 to Art.III, 2.
They declared their reasons for their actions (irrespective of
the views of the other African states) during their different
speeches on their recognition of Biafra as an independent state.
Briefly speaking these four states seem to have had the same
opinion on Biafra's right to secede. They all condemned the
massacres of the Ibos in the Northern part of Nigeria, and also
the Federal government's refusal to abide by the Aburi conference
recommendations which they claimed led to the declaration of
Biafra as an independent country. They argued that in the light
of the actions against the Ibos, the secessionists had no other
option than to segragate themselves from the other parts of
Nigeria which they no longer trusted.
The actions of these four states did not radically change the
OAU's stand on the conflict but rather it strengthened its
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African policy as enunciated by the Balewa government, and the
five principles of its African affairs stand as a policy. But its
policy towards the eradication of racialism, colonialism and
imperialism took new dimensions as a result of the assistance of
South Africa, Rhodesia and Portugal for the secessionists. In
1968, the Nigerian government took upon itself the policy of
direct assistance to the various nationalist groups of South
Africa. This policy came into existence following allegations
that the fund meant for the OAU liberation Committee was being
used by the Tanzanian government to back the secessionists.[42]
Irrespective of the attitudes of the four African states
concerned, Nigeria tried as much as possible to maintain a
working atmosphere with them construing their actions as
emotional. To Nigeria what mattered most at that critical period
was the OAU's stand.
NIGERIA AND GHANA DURING THE CIVIL WAR
Relations between Nigeria and Ghana since Nigerian independence
had not been cordial. At a certain stage during Balewa's
administration, it was so bad as to degenerate to the level of
name-calling especially during the period of late 1961 and early
1963.[43] But when the army took over in both countries in 1966
a good relationship between the two countries was anticipated.
Though there were the beginnings of a close working relationship
between them during Ironsi's regime it was shortlived. On the
contrary, during the period of mid 1966 up to 1970, the
relationship between them was marked with mutual antagonism,
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suspicion and abuse. Ghana's attitude to Nigeria stemmed partly
from the failure of its role or imagined role in the Nigerian
conflict. Ghana was the first African country to intervene in the
Nigerian crisis in late December 1966. On General Ankrah's
personal initiative both sides of the conflict were able to meet
for the first time at Aburi on the 4th and 5th of January 1967
to resolve the constitutional crisis.[44] The OAU presumed an
agreement would be reached at the Aburi conference. It was not
until it was realised that the Aburi conference would not resolve
the conflict that the OAU intervened. The OAU did not discuss any
event concerning the civil war during the meeting of its Council
of Ministers after Aburi. However, the Federal Military
Government allowed the discussion of the crisis by the OAU at its
subsequent summit. During this conference Ghana was one of the
seven African countries that sponsored an eight-point draft
resolution on the crisis adopted by the summit.[45] The main
features of the resolution were condemnation of secession, the
acceptance of the crisis as the internal affair of Nigeria, and
the decision to dispatch a consultative mission of six heads of
state to Nigeria to assure Gowon of the OAU Assembly's desire for
the territorial integrity, unity and peace of Nigeria. [461 Also
Ghana was a member of the consultative committee set up by the
OAU.[47]
The Ghanaian government welcomed the move but General Ankrah had
doubts as to whether General Gowon could stand firm by his
conditions for peace which were - the renunciation of secession
and the acceptance of a twelve states structure for Nigeria.[48]
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General Ankrah showed a great deal of disappointment towards the
non-success of the Aburi accord and this was expressed in his
reaction to the crisis. It was the Ghanaian government's
reference to the civil war at the General Assembly of the UN on
the 25th September 1967 (before the OAU mission to Lagos later
in the year in November 1967), which brought further
complications to Nigerian-Ghanaian relations.[49] Although the
Ghanaian representative explained that his country was for the
unity of Nigeria, the Nigerian press held Ghana's reference to
the civil war at the UN floor as a further evidence of Ghana's
support for the rebels. On the 28th September 1967, through a
commentary on Radio Nigeria, Ghana was accused of its concealed
support for the secessionists. This was denied by the Ghanaian
government which expressed disappointment at the commentary and
confirmed its sincere support for the Nigerian Federal Military
Government.[50] The whole incident at this stage reflected lack
of trust and confidence on both sides. In fact, the Ghanaian
delegate who read Ghana's address to the UN General Assembly only
mentioned in passing, 'that the OAU was doing its best to end
this most regretably fratricidal war in Nigeria.' Whether this
type of comment should have been offensive if made by a friendly
African state remains open to question.
At the first peace meeting of the consultative committee in Lagos
on 22nd and 23rd November 1967, General Ankrah was mandated by
the committee to convey to the secessionist leaders the text of
the OAU Kinshasa resolution on Nigeria and the conclusion and
discussions of its first meeting in Lagos which reaffirmed OAU
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support for the territorial integrity of Nigeria. In turn he was
expected to report back after the completion of the assignment.
The OAU Secretary General, Diallo Telli, also added that the main
task of General Ankrah was "to convince the secessionists to
abandon secession and to return to take part with the other
Nigerians in the building of their nation."[51] But it seems such
a role did not appeal to him nor did he appreciate the outcome
of the Lagos summit. He signified this when on returning to Accra
he merely told newsmen at the airport that if the proposals of
the Lagos peace meeting were accepted by the Ojukwu government
considerable progress would be made towards restoring peace to
Nigeria. [52]
General Ankrah for several months failed to report back to the
OAU on his telephone contacts with Ojukwu. On the strength of
that, General Mobutu, (one of the six heads of state forming the
OAU Consultative Committee, anxious to know the outcome of
Ankrah's role, as enunciated by the Secretary General) flew to
Accra in late April 1968. Mobutu's reaction to the press (on his
way home) at Accra airport, signified lack of agreement between
the two leaders. He condemned secession in Africa and warned that
it should not be encouraged nor should it be seen as a matter of
high principle. [531
During this period the pro-Biafra campaign continued unabated in
Ghana. Advertisements in memory of the 30,000 civilians said to
have been murdered during the progrom of 1966 in Northern Nigeria
were carried by the government owned Ghanaian Times and Daily
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Graphic on the 29th May 1968.[54]
During the following Consultative Committee Meeting held in
Niamey, (Niger) in mid July 1968, General Ankrah eventually
reported back to the OAU (after nearly eight months), the details
of his report were not published but he made a press statement
on the 16th July 1968 claiming that his assignment was "only"
partially successful since he had not succeeded in speaking to
Ojukwu personally (whom he referred to as Head of State).[55]
This reference together with his proposal for relief supplies to
the rebels which resembled those put forward by Ojukwu earlier
in Aba,[56] infuriated the Nigerian delegates. The effect of the
Niamey peace conference on Nigerian-Ghanaian relations was
"damaging." By this time the Nigerian government became very
vocal in criticising Ghana's role in the crisis. This resulted
in a total stop being put to the Nigerian government's previous
practice of informing Ghana of its peace proposals and about the
progress of the war.[57]
When the OAU consultative committee met in Monrovia between 18th
and 20th April 1969, Ghana was unable to take any active role in
the work of the committee. The Ghanaian delegate, Mr. J.W.K
Harlley did not take an active part in the committee discussions
nor did he take part in the series of private talks between the
leaders of the consultative committee and the representatives of
both sides in the war.[58] It was this virtual withdrawal of
Ghana that made it easy for the conference to blame the
secessionist leaders for the first time for the failure of all
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peace efforts, while it praised the Nigerian government for its
cooperation and conciliatory attitude.[59] Ghana's inability to
take any active role was due to three main reasons. Firstly,
there was no Nigerian support for, or cooperation with Ghana's
peace efforts. Secondly, Ghana was faced with a major government
crisis when the meeting was held. There was a leadership crisis
which led to the dismissal of General Ankrah on 2nd April 1969
from the chairmanship of the NLC and his successor Brigadier A.A.
Afrifa was unable to lead the Ghana delegation to the conference
and his place was taken by the vice-chairman of the NLC, Mr. J.W.
Harlley. Also Victor Owusu, who had visited Lagos a few days
earlier resigned his post as Commissioner for External Affairs
three days before the meeting. Thirdly, the involvement of Mr.
Francis Nzeribe, a powerful Biafran propagandist working in Ghana
for a foreign firm, the Jeaf fan Company Limited, in the episode
that led to the removal of General Ankrah, weakened Ghana's moral
standing at the peace meeting. [60]
However, the Ghanaian newspapers still maintained their hostile
attitude to the Federal cause. On 31st May 7969, the report of
an inquiry claimed to have been conducted under the auspices of
the so-called International Committee for the Investigation of
Crimes of Genocide, by a Ghanaian Dr. Mensah, and financed by the
Ojukwu regime, was published in London. It concluded that there
was "prima facie evidence" that genocidal intention against the
Biafrans existed among the Nigerians.[61] The Ghanaian press and
radio maintained this hostile attitude towards Nigeria up till
the end of the war. Three days before the formal surrender of the
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rebels the Evening Standard, owned by the opposition, National
Alliance of Liberals Party, criticised the UN's Secretary General
(U. Thant), then visiting Ghana, for calling on the rebel leaders
to give up secession. The paper called on the Secretary General
to reconsider the situation properly and take steps to stop
genocide against Biafrans.[62]
There was not much difference in the attitude of Ghana's
government party from that of the opposition even when Dr.
Busia's government came to office on the 1st October 1969. During
Dr. Busia's first major interview on assuming office (at Guinea—
Bissau while attending its independence celeberation), he
declined to mention anything about the basic issue of secession
in Nigeria, but merely stressed the urgency of getting a cease
fire at all costs.[63] On his return to Ghana he did launch his
country into participating in the peace efforts led by Emperor
Haile Selassie since the end of September. He sent his Foreign
Minister, Mr. Victor Owosu, to Lagos with a message to General
Gowon on the 10th October, and at the same time to Emperor Haile
Salassie. On arrival at Lagos airport, Mr. Owusu confirmed to the
newsmen that his government was in support of the Federal
government but Nigerian leaders were not convinced by his claim
and they remained skeptical of Ghana's stand on the Nigerian
conflict.
AN EXPLANATION BY THE LEGON OBSERVER ON GHANA'S
ATTITUDE TOWARDS THE NIGERIAN CIVIL WAR
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Ghana, unlike the other four African countries (Ivory Coast,
Tanzania, Zambia and Gabon which recognised Biafra openly), did
not give any formal recognition to Biafra. Right from the start
of the crisis Ghana maintained that it was on the Federal
Government's side. Despite its claim, after the unsuccessful
Aburi accord, there was a great deal of speculation amongst the
Nigerian people as to Ghana's true role. The Lagon Observer which
was the most consistent and outspoken advocate of the Biafran
cause in Ghana, gave four reasons for Ghana's stand in the
crisis. The first was the involvement of the Soviet Union in the
crisis. Ghana assumed that as a result of Soviet military and
moral support for the Federal Government Nigeria would soon
become a bridge head for Soviet penetration of Africa, and for
launching an attack on Ghana for the restoration of Nkrumah.[65]
The second reason was the view of many Ghanaians that "in the
light of Africa's concern for progress," the Ojukwu regime was
more impressive than the Gowon government in Lagos which they
described as representing the interests of the "feudal
North."[66] The third reason was what the Legon Observer called
"the Federal Government's clumsiness over the Aburi agreement."
Many Ghanaians genuinely felt that the Federal Government's
failure to implement the Aburi agreements made secession
inevitable.[67] The fourth reason was centered on the
effectiveness of the rebel propaganda. The partisan account of
events leading to the war was passionately believed by many
Ghanaians who eventually concluded that events in Nigeria had to
a large extent destroyed the basis of a federation.[68]
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Though there was no formal diplomatic break between Nigeria and
Ghana, relations between the two countries deteriorated
considerably. This was due to lack of mutual trust and
understanding on both sides. The Nigerian government found it
difficult to accommodate Ghana's role during the civil war on the
ground that not only did Ghana want to use this opportunity to
further its traditional desire of leading Africa but also its
friendly relationship and close cooperation with both Ivory Coast
and France which were pro-Biafra seemed to prejudice Ghanaian
objectivity. Indeed most Nigerians feared that its relationship
with the two pro-Biafran countries might have helped in
influencing Ghana's attitude towards the federal government. It
was recorded that the Nigerian-Ghanaian relationship sunk to its
lowest point as a result of Ghana's role during the crisis.
THE CIVIL WAR AND NIGERIAN FOREIGN POLICY
The civil war had some important effects on Nigeria's foreign
policy behaviour. It reinforced and also balanced the policy of
non-alignment and the country's earlier policy of commitment to
the principles of the OAU Charter. Since some South African help
had been accorded Biafra it also brought into perspective the
urgency of the liberation of Southern Africa; and it served to
focus Nigeria's attention on developments within its immediate
neighbours.(69] The experience of the civil war brought into
perspective two developments mainly responsible for the new
emphasis and direction of its policy in Africa. The first was a
keener perception of overall alignments, derived from the support
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of white dominated African states for Biafra. The second was a
greater appreciation of the positive role that might be played
in African affairs by the OAU.[70)
Since the formation of the OAU Nigeria has been formally
committed to the task of assisting the liberation movements in
Africa, but its commitment had not been very strong in practice
until the civil war experience. For example, up to the time of
the January 1966 coup in Nigeria, Portugal had continued to
maintain a diplomatic post in Lagos and white Africans from the
Portugese colonies were allowed in the country.[71] At the Accra
Summit Meeting of the OAU in October 1965, Balewa declared that
the most important subject before the meeting was how to defeat
and eliminate subversive forces emanating from neighbouring
countries.[72] In other words the Balewa government did not
visualise white minority rule as the major threat to Africa and
its progress (unlike Nkrumah who saw unity and African economic
progress only up on total elimination of white minority rule).
From late 1968, the Nigerian government's view changed. It
maintained that the main concern of the OAU should be how to
eliminate colonianism, racism and apartheid in Africa. This
action by the Federal Government emerged from the moral and
material assistance given to the Biafran regime by Portugal,
South Africa and Rhodesia during the civil war. This in turn
brought home to the Nigerian leaders that the continuing
existence of these colonial and racist minority regimes in
Southern Africa was not only a slur on the dignity of all black
people, but also a security threat to the independence,
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sovereignty and territorial integrity of all African states.[73]
During the OAU Summit Meeting in September 1969, Gowon refered
to those foreign countries supporting the Biafran regime as "the
evils and the plots of forces of colonialism, racism and
oppression to us," and that Nigeria had no other choice but to
commit itself wholly to struggle against racial oppression.[74]
His address to the Assembly of Heads of State and Government on
21 June 1971 was remarkable because it echoed Nkrumah's approach.
It was during this address he declared that until the whole of
Africa was completely liberated no real economic development
would take place in the continent. He emphasised that:[75]
The forces which impede the freedom and independence of Africa
and which at the same time seek to undermine our achievements
remain very formidable... They will never leave us alone to
develop our natural and human resources to our advantage. They
will forever want us to waste our time and energy in negative
pursuits.
From Gowon's speach, it seems the Nigerian government had made
a shift in its former policy under the Balewa government which
doubted the possibility of the development of the African nation
without some Western assistance or involvement on important
African issues.
The civil war experience also brought some changes in Nigeria's
activities with the OAU. After the civil war the Nigerian leaders
seemed to have greater faith in the OAU. As early as 1965, Balewa
had expressed misgivings about the survival of the
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organisation,[76] as a result of its handling of the Congo
conflict. However, after convincing the Nigerian government to
accept its deliberation on the Biafran conflict, the OAU
dismantled such fears by standing strongly for the Federal
Government's cause in its Kinshasa resolutions. The solidarity
behind the Nigerian government by all the African states (with
the exception of the four and Ghana) not only provided it with
moral encouragement but also gave it an important diplomatic edge
over the Biafrans. The OAU support for the Federal Government was
cited on several occasions by Harold Wilson (then British Prime
Minister) for the federal government.[77] The Secretary General
of the UN (U Thant), also constantly referred to the OAU's stand
in the conflict in justifying the UN's support for the Federal
Government. The Nigerian leaders in turn recognised the OAU as
a forum of resolution to any major African problem. As a result
one of their greatest commitments after the war was to make the
OAU fitter for such tasks. In order to achieve this Nigeria took
the initiative of seeking to persuade those African states whose
commitments to the OAU were minimal to change their attitudes.
All the communiques issued at the end of General Gowon's visits
to various African countries immediately after the war in January
1970, contained some commitment towards the strengthening of the
OAU.[78]
The Gowon government also took bold steps to rekindle enthusiasm
for a West African Economic Community though only a few West
African states were enthusiastic for such a proposal. [79] Nigeria
demonstrated its interest by announcing it would enter into
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economic association with any state or group of states in West
Africa which was willing to enter into such an association with
it. This resulted in the Nigeria/Togo treaty of April 1972 which
President Nyadema referred to as the 'embryo! of a Western
African Economic Community.[80]
THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT'S OBJECTIVES FOR THE
FORMATION OF ECO WAS
There was a series of controversies in Nigeria about the economic
justification of pursuing the formation of a West African
Economic Community. As early as 1962, Dr. Gerald Helleiner argued
that Nigeria would gain little or nothing ecomonically from a
West African Common Market. [81] In April 1973, Dr. Dotun Phillips
expressed a similar view. He argued that Nigeria stood to gain
little from a West African Economic Community, and that Nigeria's
crusade for the formation of such a community was "an exercise
in futility."[82] Despite all these expressed fears by the
experts the Gowon regime was not detered from such an initiative.
ECOWAS AS POLICY OUTCOME OF THE CIVIL WAR
The ideas behind Nigeria's stand on the formation of ECOWAS
during Gowon's regime was due to three main factors — political,
security and economic. For political reasons Nigeria's aim was
to pursue such an association which would put an end to colonial
divisions in West Africa and create a stronger support for the
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OAU. According to Dr. Arikpo, the Federal Military Government
held a firm belief that in order to strengthen the bargaining
position of African states with the EEC there must be a West
African economic community through which all the states in the
region could speak with one voice.[83]
For security reasons Nigeria did not want to be surrounded by
small countries that were heavily dependent on extra-African
powers, especially France, for their military, political and
economic survival. It believed that as long as there were client
West African states closely tied to European powers its own
security could not be assured. It feared that such states could
be either manipulated against Nigeria or used as a staging ground
by foreign powers as was the experience of the civil war when
Dahomy (now Republic of Benin) was used briefly in 1969 for
airlifting arms and relief supplies to Biafra.[84] This idea in
particular brought about a significant chance in the attitude of
the Nigerian leaders and helped to clarify issues more clearly
than ever. The overwhelming campaign by Nigeria for the formation
of a West African Economic Community was for the reduction of
dependence on extra-African countries.
For economic reasons, the Federal Government argued that the
formation of ECOWAS would give Nigeria access to some raw
materials which were either not available in the country or not
available in guantity.[85] It demonstrated its commitment in
ECOWAS when it decided to sell crude oil at concessionary prices
to African countries which had their own refineries. This gesture
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was welcomed by many African countries especially Ivory Coast and
Senegal whose support was crucial to the formation of the pan-
West African Economic Community. This move by Nigeria and the
successful negotiation of the ACP agreement with the EEC in
February 1975 made it possible for the formation of the ECOWAS.
There had been several attempts to create a common market for all
West African countries before the 1970 revival of the idea by the
Gowon regime, but until then Nigeria had never taken such a
concrete step towards its progress. It was the experience of the
civil war which made it seem necessary for Nigeria to play such
a regional role. From the economic point of view, it was observed
that Nigeria had not much to gain from such a unity.
Notwithstanding, a good neighbour policy and a reliable regional
security would not be guaranteed without a common goal which
involved all. This course stood as the theme of Nigeria's stand
on its ECOWAS policy which the Gowon regime pursued as a
principal factor in its foreign policy formulation.
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CHAPTER 5:
ACTORS IN FOREIGN POLICY FORMULATION:
THE EFFECT OF SOUTH AFRICA
This chapter largely represents the views and experiences of
various Nigerians who at one time or the other have been involved
in Nigerian foreign policy formulation. My experience during the
course of interviewing some of the personalities involved
established that most of them wanted to share their views and
feelings about the general behaviour of the Nigerian foreign
policy and its formulation, and the attitudes of the principal
actors in particular.
When I confronted Professor Oshuntokun, current Nigerian
Ambassador to Germany, with the question of the "principal
actors" in the formulation of the Nigerian Foreign Policy and the
process of formulation, he was able to cover many areas. He
said: [1]
From my own experience, it is almost a small group of people who work
directly with the President and look at issues and say this is the
direction we are going to take and these are the issues we are
pursuing. After they have decided, there is what we call "crisis
committee" which tries to balance these policies you want to follow and
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see their reaction. They may support what you want to do or criticise
them, and then as a result of that you get a consensus opinion. You
then write a memo and present it to the President. Mind you, the
foreign policy of a country is the foreign policy thought of the
incumbent President himself, his chief adviser or his foreign policy
adviser. No Foreign Minister can take a decision in a normal situation
and implement it without getting clearance first from the President.
So, in essence, the Nigerian foreign policy is determined by a small
group of inner circle small senior career people in the foreign office.
Then in the Presidency, the President also has his own advisers. So,
whatever you suggest with the President, he discusses with his own
inner circle because eventually he will have to take the joy of
success. In foreign policy formulation, the ball stops at the feet of
the President. The process of formulation starts from the Foreign
Office but sometimes the President also does some things without even
bothering to inform Foreign Office. So, you have a situation where you
have sometimes higher level movement in the country. In Banbagida's
regime he has always had what you call Minister for Special Duties. We
used to joke that he was the third Foreign Minister because you did not
only have Minister for Foreign Affairs you also have Minister of State
in the Foreign Office. Then you have in the Presidency, Minister for
Special Duties, sometimes the President sends this Minister for Special
Duties with special notes to his colleagues and counterparts in various
parts of the world. Sometimes it is liberally funded to do some
specific assignments apart from that of the Foreign Office.
It is not as clear cut as this for sometimes if you have a dynamic
Foreign Minster who enjoys the confidence of the President, he may be
given virtually a carte-blanche to do whatever he thinks is for the
best interest of the country. But during our own time, it is a mixture
of general people who are a coterie of small advisers deciding that
this is where to move, getting the support of the President. Even so,
some speeches by the President on foreign policy, after we would have
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drafted this speech, it then goes to the President and he then calls
his own people to look at it again, and sometimes they remove or put in
something and unfortunately their own interventions are not usally the
wisest but that demonstrates that they are in control. People in the
Presidency will try to force it to happen and it is not new. If you are
a Foreign Minister who is sensitive, you really get angry because after
having knocked heads together and you thought that you have reached a
very good idea on a particular issue, you just found out that the
President had done something completely different.
Having spoken on the largely subordinate role of the Foreign
Ministry to the President's own office, he continued to talk
on the formulation of foreign policy and the extent of
rationality in decision making using a startling example:[2]
Even in the military, there are certain pressures which one has to be
aware Of. For example, for almost four years we have been talking of
restoring diplomatic ties with Israel. It seems to me that the
President was prepared for it but there is no doubt that Israelis were
involved with our security. He would have wanted restoration of the
ties but we in the Foreign Office, at least the key playems, i.e. t2he
Minister and the advisers were also keen. So, here you are, the
President, the Foreign Minister interested but couldn't carry it
through because there are internal considerations.
The question of Israel in Nigeria is a very touchy thing. The Israeli
issue is perceived in the South by the christians and those christians
in the North as something to counter balance the Islamic factor in
Nigeria. Nigerian christians always assume erroneously as Israel was a
christain country. So, the Palestinian issue was seen in Nigerian
politics and foreign policy not only as a foreign policy issue but as
an internal policy issue. If we are to recognise restoring ties with
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Israel, there should be crisis in Nigeria. The muslims will go on
rampage and say that it is anti-muslim even though Israel is not a
christian country. But in the South, it was generally percieved as a
christian country. What I am saying in the essence is, yes, rational
considerations do determine foreign policy but while pursuing the
rational consideration you must be aware of the fact that there is
certain internal dynamic in your country that you must take care of
before you embark on certain foreign policy, in case of Israel, it is
on that type of category. If you use Israel to focus on foreign policy
decisions in Nigeria, you will be forced to listen to the people.
General Ike Nwachukwu went there cladestinely one or two times only on
his own. It was myself and one Ambassador who was his close friend
based in Belgrade who were aware of this. His wife did not even know
because she was not supposed to know, and this went on for about two
times before the official visit he made. Despite all these, we could
not go on with the restoration of ties with Israel due to the type of
outcome envisaged, and nobody would want to make Israeli problem
Nigeria's problem to the extent of disintegrating our country. So, it
was a very interesting innovation especially with the President.
Virtually all African countries have now restored ties with Israel, it
became no longer a strong thing because even now Arabs are talking to
the Israelis, the Palestinians are also talking to the Israelis. So,
when we eventually restored ties with Israel it was no longer news. Our
Ambassador went there recently to open a mission, it came up from
CNN,it was really no longer an issue. Most of the African countries
have been there, whereas, if we have restored ties at the time when
every African country was looking unto us, the dividends from that
restoration would have been really great in terms of our country's
diplomacy because whether you like it or not, Israel and America
coordinate their policies. But we wanted it as a basis of economic
diplomacy and practical politics for the internal consideration on
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Nigeria, which is the whole question of rationalisation not permiting.
This previously unpublished account of foreign policy formulation
towards Israel was of great interest. It suggested the link
between domestic opinion and foreign policy and how this
constrained the otherwise independent rationality in the foreign
policy sector.
Another example which was used by Ambassador Oshuntokun to
express the position of Nigerian foreign policy formulation was
the issue of the intervention in Liberia. [3] He said:
I am of the opinion that if there was a debate on whether Nigeria
should be involved in the Liberia issue or not, Nigeria should not have
intervened, bearing in mind the cost of such operation. The public
should not have supported it because they will think it will be a drain
on the resources. It is true that the military government had always
had the advantage in terms of their foreign policy even in terms of the
domestic policy. Since nobody elected them they are free to do whatever
they consider right to be on national interest by them. The point is
that there are the enduring interests of Nigeria which should be
protected whether military or civilian government.
Under the military regime as far as I can see, we have had a sharper
focus on foreign policy than under civilian regimes. Of course, in a
situation where in thirty three years of independence, we have had
almost twenty three years of Military regime in which case the civilian
regime is a rarity. If you are talking about Nigerian foreign policy,
in conclusion, it will be the military since it has sharper focus and
because it does not have constituencies as such it is able to focus on
its goals and aims in terms of its foreign policy considerations. Our
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achievements in the decolonisation of Southern Africa, our support on
Zimbabwian decolonisation, Namibian decolonisation, would never have
happened if we are debating in a parliamentary situation. People would
not have supported the kind of expenses we were about to incur, some of
them clandestine. When you are working on foreign policy operations,
some of the issues you will not want to debate among large group of
people.
The sharper focus of military foreign policy expressed here has been applied
also outside Africa. The Ambassador continued his surprising and again
hitherto unpublished account:
There are areas of Nigerian foreign policy many people will be
surprised when they find out how much commitment in the past we have
made not only in Africa but in some part of West Indies. I can tell you
that in the last years we have been responsible not through coups or
whatever to changing some governments in some key West Indian states
but through financing particular parties. If you have to open this up
for a debate nobody of course will support you because there is what is
called foreign policy "elite." It is only the elite who will
understand. What does an average man know about Jamaica, Trinidad or
Cuba or even Zimbabwe and Namibia? They cannot be bothered, they are
interested in water, electricity, food etc. So, the foreign policy of
the country has to be determined by the foreign policy elite. In the
military, it tend to use the foreign policy elite better than the
civilian regime which is unfortunate because I have said before that we
were talking of the Nigerian foreign policy, it is really the Military
foreign policy. So, the question of democratic behaviour on foreign
policy is a mute question. Of course a newspaper is an organ of
democracy. Many of our newspapers cover issues on foreign policy,
sometimes the newspapers are more militant than the government is
prepared to be.
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He continued with an enigmatic account of South Africa involvement in
Equatorial Guinea, something unknown tome and all Africanists I spoke to, but
he used this account to illustrate the foreign policy input of newspapers.
I can give you an example from my own experience when we had South
African personnel, troops, students meddling in the affairs of
Equatorial Guinea. Obviously Nigeria was made uncomfortable by this
country and we felt that we could exert pressure on the people and
government of Equatorial Guinea. Many of them claimed to be farmers but
we know that they were security people. To send them back to South
Africa would bring a lot of pressure on them. We even made a threat of
using military force on them. Eventually some of those people were
withdrawn but not all of them, but then we entered the period of
rapproachment between ourselves and Equatorial Guinea. The point I was
trying to make is that many of the Nigerians in 1986/87 were in fact
more interested in military intervention on the Equatorial Guinea than
the government was prepared to do. So you can see, in a way, that the
newspapers sometimes were very militant.
Our newspapers during our period were also very militantly against the
British for their policies on Southern Africa. But the government of
Banbaginda as a government has somehow had a close rapport with Mrs
Thatcher, and there was an unwritten directive in the Foreign Office
"don't attack Mrs Thatcher." It was an unwritten directive. And to me,
coming from the University, it was very difficult for me to comply with
that kind of thing, so, most statements when I wrote'them and gave them
to my Minister, they were usually toned down when it came to condemning
Britain on Southern Africa. So, you see a situation which the
newspapers were very very militant but the government was more
moderate. Of course, it is understandable, government was in possession
of several facts that the newspapers didn't have. If we invaded
Equatorial Guinea, who knows what Gabon or what even France would have
done. One cannot go into a war situation you do not know how to cover.
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As for Liberia, I believe if we had succeeded quickly, it could have
been very popular because that is the first time in the history of
Nigeria where Nigeria had gone into another country without being
invited. Nigeria has been involved in the Pacific, in Tanzania, in
1960s when there was a military up-rising against the government of
Nyerere. He invited us and we were there but there has been no case on
Nigeria going to another country without being invited.
As a Nigerian, I am proud of Nigerians actually in Liberia with
combined military and air force operations mounted on African soil. If
you see the operation you will be proud of Nigeria. I think this is
something to be proud of but it has lasted so long, the public didn't
support it, but we had not tried to carry the public along with us in
that particular incident.
To sum it up, generally, the military has been more than dynamic in
terms of its foreign policy. If you look through the period of General
Murtala Mohammed, General Joe Garba, General Nwachukwu, General
Adefope, you will see that the military has been more dynamic, but if
you look at the civilian counterpart they are not as dynamic as the
military but this is because of the concerns of the democratic control.
Also revealing new information on previously unknown or little
known foreign policy initiatives, Professor Bolaji Akinyemi
contributed a great deal on the subject of who formulates policy,
especially when he was asked by Newswatch of how he handled the
diplomatic fall-out of the wheat ban from America?[4] (This
particular question was refering to the period when the Federal
Government of Nigeria banned all importation of wheat into
Nigeria in 1986 due to certain malpractices whereby a great deal
90
of amount of money was transfered out of the country through
wrong invoicing or over invoicing, deliberate refusal to specify
the quality of grain that was being imported while quoting price
for the best, over-loading of the Free On Board, FOB charges, the
abuse of a plus or minus 10 percent charge allowed on proforma
invoice and over-loading of auxiliary and freight charges.[5]
These malpractices resulted in a loss of up to N15 billion on the
Nigerian side during the Shagari era[6] as was announced by Mr.
Olu Falae, Secretary to the Federal Government on 2 September
1986. America, being the chief exporter of wheat to Nigeria was
very bitter about this action by Nigeria though it did not sever
relationship between the two countries). Professor Akinyemi
stated that:
Surprisingly, it never became an issue. I suppose the American
ambassador was dealing with maybe the Ministry of Agriculture or
dealing with Dodan Barracks. Now let me use this opportunity to say
what is wrong with our set-up and why I also had problems with even
some of my ministerial colleagues, and why every Nigerian foreign
minister still has problems with ministerial colleagues. And thirdly,
why the Nigerian foreign minister then becomes a scapegoat for things
which he doesn't really know anything about. You have assumed that as
Minister of External Affairs, the diplomatic fall-outs of the wheat
issue should have been my responsibility to handle because the American
Secretary of State or the British Secretary of State for Foreign
Affairs handles the totality of either American relationship with
foreign countries or the totality of British relationship with foreign
countries. In Nigeria we don't. Right now, they are about to appoint
technology attaches to Nigerian missions abroad to scout around for
appropriate technology. There are information attaches attached to our
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embassies abroad. Then what is the external affaris officer supposed to
do? Does the Ministry of External Affairs have an agenda of its own
that is different from the totality of the agenda of the different
ministries in Nigeria? The whole foreign affairs is the sum totality of
your interests abroad that you're trying to advance. There's nothing
called foreign affairs that is distinct from the interest of the
Nigerian wheat grower, when it comes to Australian wheat growers. The
moment it escapes the borders it becomes foreign affairs. I had this
almighty row with Tony Momoh about whether we should send information
attaches abroad. I said, as Minister of External Affairs, I had the
home number and office number of Sir Geoffrey Howe, I didn't have the
home number of the American Secretary of State. A foreign journalist
lands in Nigeria, he would get my home number, he will get your home
number, if the President is not careful he will get the home number of
the President. And because of that you think you will send a Nigerian
Information Officer abroad and he will have access where it matters? He
will not. It even pays you more, left to me, to hire Saatchi and
Saatchi. Because the chances are that the MD of Satchi and Satchi plays
golf with whoever it is you want to talk to on the British side or
where you want to get the information across. So they know what buttons
to press to get the Nigerian message across. Who does the Nigerian
Information Officer in Washington have access to? But the President
allowed him. He opened offices for Information Attaches which within
six months ran into financial problems. Some of them had to be bailed
out by External Affairs. The Minister of External Affairs, whoever he
is, is supposed to represent the totality of Nigerian intesests abroad.
At home you feed him with all the information he needs. I was on a
mission to Yugoslavia, when the Yugoslavians raised with me something
involving an air force agreement with Nigeria, I had never heard about
it. Nobody told me anything about it. They assumed that as the Minister
of External Affairs of Nigeria, coming on an official mission, that I
knew, and that they should raise it with me. Then they said, but we
raised it with your ambassador and he too said he didn't know. But the
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air force had never briefed us. They just handled it as the Nigerian
air force with Yugoslavia. Now the man who was raising it with me on
the Yogoslavia side was not a Yugoslavian defence attache or air force
officer but their Foreign Minister. That is the way to do things. That
is the way we don't do it.
Having discussed on the often limited if not marginal role of the
Foreign Ministry, Professor Akinyemi was then asked if he found
this type of experience frustrating.[7] He responded, and I quote
extensively because it is an illuminating statement not widely
circulated in the West:
I found it terribly disturbing and terribly devastating. Let me give an
example. There was a time I was coming back from a trip abroad on the
British Caledonian. On the same plane with me - I didn't even know he
was there but obviously he had seen me, it was only when the plane
landed in Lagos and I was about to exit that I then saw - the American
ambassador. Somebody from State House Protocol was there to meet
Chester Crocker, the American Assistant Secretary of State for African
Affairs. External Affairs didn't know. He had seen me on the plane, he
had ignored me and he had appointment to see the President the
following day. And it had been set up for him not using External
Affairs. So they went to the meeting. And there he told the President
that the US was going to make an announcement about Angola; that they
had secured the concurrence of the MPLA government and he mentioned a
few other key actors. And that he didn't want Nigeria to criticise the
policy when they made the announcement. I understand that he was given
the understanding. The following day, the BBC carried the American
announcement. And thirty minutes later the MPLA released a statement
devastating the American position. And I think it was the United
Nations that issued a caution release, distancing themselves from what
the Americans had said. So, I authorised a statement to be released by
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the Ministry of External Affairs, attacking the American position.
That statement was carried by radio and seven o'clock NTA news. It was
pulled out of the nine o'clock NTA news. Of course, all the newspapers
carried it. Then I was summoned. I was asked why had I embarrassed the
government? I said, embarrassed the government or saved the government
from embarrassment? I said, are you aware that the MPLA that was
supposed to be a part of this agreement criticised that statement
thirty minutes after? Are you aware of the statement of the United
Nations that was supposed to take it under its umbrella saying that it
was not aware of this arrangement? So, if I hadn't released that
statement, we would have been seen as conniving with the Americans on
Angola much to the detriment of our MPLA allies. At that point, the
President saw that he had been sold a dead horse from which he had been
rescued. And he said, "Alright." And that was the way it ended. But if
you go back to Nigerian newspapers, you will find out that Chester
Crocker told Nigerian pressmen when he came here with the Secretary of
State at that time, George Shultz, that Professor Akinyemi does not
represent Nigerian foreign policy. And no Nigerian pressmen asked him,
"And then who does?" He said it. I have the clippings. I could give
a dozen examples like that, where a different pipeline was
being used to make alternative policies.
On the issue of whether or not the Minister of External Affairs
is really in charge of Foreign Affairs in Nigeria[8] He responded
by saying:
Let me modify that. The President is in charge of Nigerian foreign
policy, because he is the chief executive. The Minister of External
Affairs is supposed to be his principal assistant on foreign affairs.
The President holds and has the power to over-rule his Foreign
Minister. But decisions should not be taken behind that foreign
minister.
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Let me give you another example. When Shultz came to Nigeria and we
made an appointment for him to see the President, somebody who is still
in public life then said to me in Dodan Barracks while we were waiting
for Shultz to come in that the Americans have requested a one-to-one
meeting between Shultz and the President, without anybody being
present. I objected. "I said this is not right. One-to-one meetings
take place between presidents. He's just another Foreign Minister. Of
course Super Power Foreign Minister. But protocol does not have to be
placed under the table." I said, in any case, why didn't the Americans
make this request to me as the Minister of External Affairs. Why are
you the one bearing this message? Anyway the decision was for the
President to take. Then Shultz came and we all sat around the table for
the photographs-taking ceremony and so on. Then the President said to
Shultz, "Well, I understand we have things to talk about." He said
"Yes, Mr. President." So they both got up and then Shultz said to the
President: "I hope you have no objection to my ambassador sitting?" The
President said, "of course not." By this time, I had been so angry that
I had told one or two other people around what had just taken place I
won't mention names. So one then said to me, "Go on." And I went. The
Americans never raised any objection, they didn't even bat an eyelid
that I was there. So, one, I wondered whether the request came from the
Americans. But of course, when I heard what Shultz then discussed,
which was Angola, - on the opening of the line to Savimbi and UNITA and
what they wanted Nigeria to do - I understood then why there was this
attempt to keep me out of the meeting. So the Nigerian Foreign Minister
was going to be kept out of the meeting but the American Ambassador
could sit in on that meeting. And yet this was a Dodan Barracks aide
who was being used against the Nigerian Foreign Minister.
When asked if he had brought all these incidents to the
knowledge of the President, bearing in mind how he felt on these
issues at different occasions, and what efforts the President or
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the government made to ensure that the Minister of External
Affairs was not left out of important foreign policy decisions[9]
he replied:
These issues were raised with the President. I think the President
believed in running a two-parallel policy on foreign affairs. Because
he never over-ruled me. And this used to infuriate the Americans.
But you have to understand that the President himself is a product of
the Nigerian system. That was the system he inherited and that is the
system that is still there even up-till today.
Professor Gambari, the Nigerian Foreign Minister during Buhari's
regime, contributed to this issue by sharing his direct
experience with the present author while he was in the foreign
office.[10] He said:
Although it would be generally assumed that it is the responsibility of
the External Affairs to deal with all matters regarding other
countries, but this is not the case in most cases. In the case of the
expulsion of the so-called aliens from Nigeria, unfortunately, the
Ministry of External Affairs was not really consulted in the decision
to close the border and it was also not fully involved in the decision
to expel illegal aliens on a mass scale. The decision to close the
border, made by the Supreme Military Council, took effect concurrently
with the coming into power of the new military government under Buhari.
That was understandable. However, in the expulsion of illegal aliens,
the Ministry of External Affairs involvement was peripheral and its
input was made as a less than enthusiastic junior partner to the
Ministry of Internal Affairs. For example, out of the 21 or so
participants in the two meetings between Nigerian officials and
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ambassadors of some of the neighbouring countries convened to discuss
the expulsion issue, which took place on the 2nd and 15th May 1985,
presided over by the Minister of Internal Affairs, only one was from
the External Affairs Ministry.
From the author's point of view, what emerges from the comments
of these three senior participants in Nigerian foreign policy
formulation is the following list of points:-
1. The Ministry of External Affairs does not possess the
power to make or implement foreign policy issues
without clearance from the President.
2. Irrespective of the creation of what was assumed as a
proper Ministry of External Affairs as against the
pseudo one which existed even before the Nigerian
independence, and the series of modernization which it
has undergone since 1972 (Diagrams enclosed) for
effective functioning, the style of both the
formulation and implementation seem not to have
experienced significant changes.
3. It was recognised from the point of view of my
interviewees that in many cases certain issues
including very sensitive foreign policy issues, might
be tackled without the involvement of the Ministry of
External Affairs.
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4. There were certain offices which were involved in the
process of foreign policy formulation that ought not
to have been created in the first instance especially
since there are provisions in the Ministry of
External Affairs to carry out such functions; so rival
or parallel offices exist to the Ministry of External
Affairs.
5.	 The vivid account of these contributions stress that
the President as the chief executive is in charge of
foreign affairs since he holds the power to over-rule
any decision reached by his Foreign Minister if he is
not in agreement with it. As stipulated in
the Executive Powers of the Federal Republic of
Nigeria's Constitution[11] which stated as follows:
(1) Subject to the provisions of this Constitution,
the executive powers of the Federation -
(a) shall be vested in the President, and may,
subject as aforesaid and to the provisions
of any law made by the National Assembly, be
exercised by him either directly or through
the Vice-President and Ministers of the
Government of the Federation or officers in
the public service of the Federation; and...
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In order words, the ball is in the President's court to
ascertain when to involve his Foreign Minister and at
what level of the decision making. Thoughout the
Ministry of External Affairs remains a consultative
body at least on foreign affairs issues, but not
always a policy-making one. Perhaps, bearing in mind
the contents of the constitution, it might be
appropriate to conclude that this procedure could be
regarded as a common approach in dealing with
different organs of the government by the President
within the Presidential system. Therefore, the
problems encountered by the Ministry of External
Affairs might have been a common issue in the system
of operation within different Ministries at the
Federal level. The question, in this sense, is to do
with presidentialism and the concentration of powers.
It is still unsettling, however, to find it applied to
issues affecting Nigeria's reputation overseas.
THE EFFECT OF SOUTH AFRICA
Nigeria's foreign policy objectives as defined in chapter 2
paragraph 19 of the 1979 constitution state inter-alia: "The
state shall promote African Unity as well as total political,
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economic and cultural liberation of Africa and all other forms
of international co-operation, conducive to the consolidation of
universal peace and mutual respect and friendship among all
peoples and states, and shall combat racial discrimination in all
its ramifications (manifestations)."
Implicit in this is Africa's pre-eminence in Nigeria's foreign
policy and the fact that Nigeria's national interests and those
of African nations are inextricably interwoven. By virtue of its
size, population and economic potentials, Nigeria is
indispensible factor in the geo-political composition of the
African continent and this it is very much conscious of.
Against this background therefore, the formulation of policy
guide-lines of successive Federal administrations since
independence in 1960, has been reflective of these objectives.
Since independence, Nigeria has regarded the abolition of
colonialism and white minority regimes in Southern Africa as in
its interest. Nigeria does not have substantial numbers of its
nationals in any of the Southern African territories whose
interests it feels compelled to protect. Although Nigeria's
leaders may not have made contributions to the literature on
negritude to rival those of President Senghor of Senegal, the
same sort of ideas underlay Nigeria's initial interests in
Southern Africa. In a statement made in his capacity as Nigeria's
first Minister of External Affairs, Jaja Nwachukwu explained that
the reason Nigeria felt "so strongly" about racial discrimination
100
was that "for centuries people of African descent have been
humiliated. They have been treated as anthropoid apes rather than
members of the human community."[12]
The civil war of 1967-1970 had a far—reaching effect on Nigeria's
view about the geo—political nature of Southern Africa and gave
a more concrete dimension to its perceived interests in
decolonisation in Southern Africa. One of the "lessons" of the
war was "the fact that the existence of the minority regimes in
Southern Africa poses a direct threat to Nigeria's security. At
the end of the war, it had become absolutely clear, from the type
of hostility inherent in some of the industrialised Western
world, that it was compelled to announce in an unequivocal term
its non—readiness to accept relief assistance from any country
which had been studiously hostile to the Federal Military
Government during the war, specifically mentioning South Africa,
Portugal, Rhodesia and France."[13]
After the civil war, it was reasonable for Nigeria to see the
white minority and colonial regimes in Southern Africa as direct
threats to the territorial integrity of Nigeria itself and not
only as oppressors of Nigeria's black brothers and sisters. The
post civil war and comtemporary Nigerian perception of its
interest in Southern Africa was well summarised in a statement
made by General Gowon in 1971 with regard to African territories
still under colonial rule:





threat they pose to our political independence and security is as real
as it is intolerable.[14]
The announcement of the results of the third military regime's
first ever review of Nigerian foreign policy said that "Nigeria
is committed to the total liberation of all oppressed black
people in Africa and indeed anywhere else in the world." In
practice, however, Nigeria's concern for African liberation has
centred on the liberation of black people from oppression by
white colonialists and white minority regimes.
The brutality with which apartheid was identified and the dignity
suffered by Africans under the system made for perfect agreement
among the main political parties on a militant and dynamic policy
against South Africa. The leadership role which Nigeria sought
to play in Africa was conceived by most members of parliament in
terms of a militant anti-colonialist policy. This was sometimes,
particularly at first, alarmist. In a short address delivered by
Dr Kaly Ezera in 1960 on Pan Africanism, he expmessed a grave
concern over the danger the South African government posed to
Nigeria's security. He alleged, in an unequivocal terms, that he
had information about an impending South African attack on
Nigeria scheduled for early 1961.[15]
Despite this, the twin problems of the total emancipation of the
entire African continent from the last vestiges of colonialism,
racism and apartheid have remained one of the most important
diplomatic issues of the Nigerian government. Central to these
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issues was the problem of racial discrimination and apartheid in
South Africa. At the very first Commonwealth Prime Ministers'
conference to be attended by the Nigerian Prime Minister, Sir
Abubakar Tafawa Balewa opened his speech (maiden) with a two—
point condemnation of South Africa's continued participation in
the Commonwealth. He said:
There are two points which I wish to make clear at the start: the
first concerns the withdrawal of South Africa from the
Commonwealth, and I want to say that in my considered opinion
this will greatly strengthen the Commonwealth. So long as one
member openly advocated racial discrimination it was impossible
to accept that the Commonwealth was indeed an association of free
and equal nations."[16]
The gradualist or moderate approach to African unity and
decolonisation which ran through Nigeria's policy from 1960-66,
generated a heated debate among foreign policy analysts of
whether Nigeria had any clear—out policy on decolonisation in the
years immediately following its independence. It was by some
asserted that Nigeria needed no foreign policy, since its
neighbours were relatively weak and possessed neither the desire
nor the capacity to threaten it in any serious way.[17] In spite
of a general recognition it might one day lead Africa, Nigeria
was unable to provide the wherewithal in terms of ideolog y to
back up its stake.[18]
Although the hope of definite, firm, and resolute policy on
decolonisation remained unfulfilled during the Balewa regime
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(1960-66), successive administration in Nigeria have helped to
further the process of decolonisation and the eradication of
apartheid and racism in Southern Africa through the increase in
the financial, diplomatic, material and moral support for
nationalist movements and the enlargement of Nigeria's
subscription to the OAU Liberation Committee.
The attitude of Gowon's administration did a lot to improve the
old image of the country. The bold and uncompromising nature of
Nigeria's attitude towards South Africa is reflected in the stern
warnings its spokesmen often issued to the Western powers about
apartheid. In an address to the United Nations, the Foreign
Affairs Commissioner, Dr Okoi Arikpo made it clear that Western
powers had a choice between fighting apartheid and remaining
friends of Africa and staining "their hands with the precious
blood of our people until we can tolerate them no longer."[19]
In the same vein, Mr. Edwin Ogbu, then Nigeria's Ambassador to
the United Nations dismissed Western powers that traded with
South Africa as "accomplices in the crime of apartheid."
Although Gowon raised the profile of South Africa in foreign
policy, and this policy has enunciated more fiercely, it took few
risks.
The governments of General Murtala Mohammed and General Olusegun
Obasanjo came to being through a coup that could be said to be
a reaction against the past or what the past governments stood
for. In terms of foreign policy, this could be described as the
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non-militancy in the prosecution as opposed to the enunciation
of Nigerian on foreign policy. Since much emphasis was laid on
the conservatism of the Gowon regime, the government of Murtala
Mohammmed/Obasanjo endeavoured to establish its radicalism on
foreign policy issues. Africa was proclaimed as the "Centre-
piece" of the new Nigerian foreign policy and African problems
took precedence over other problems in Nigeria's reactions to
world issues. Nigeria's reaction to South Africa's involvement
in the Angolan civil war on the side of the FNLA and UNITA is
perhaps the best indication of the new twist which the nation's
foreign policy was taking. Departing radically from the Gowon
regime's reluctance to rock-the-boat of African Unity, Nigeria
mounted a strong opposition within the OAU against UNITA and the
FNLA .
The strategies adopted by both Murtala Muhammed's and Obasanjo's
governments were that of radical support for the liberation
cause. One of the first steps taken by Murtala Mohammed when he
assumed office was the permission he gave to some of the
liberation groups to open up offices in Nigeria. The government
also adopted an open-door policy for African exiles from areas
in which the liberation wars were being fought. The South African
Relief Fund (SARF) was established in an effort to encourage
public donations to the fund, and all civil servants in Nigeria
were particularly encouraged to give up to 2% of their monthly
income to the fund.
The intensification of Nigeria's support for liberation movements
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became more conspicuous. Recognition of the MPLA as the dejure
government of an independent African state, was followed by a
grant of $20,000,000[20] in December 1975 and active diplomatic
support which contributed to the acceptance of the MPLA as the
legitimate government of Angola by most African and extra African
states.
In September 1975, the Nigerian Federal Military Government gave
$32,750 to the Zimbabwe African National Congress "for
appropriate use in the interest of all the people of
Zimbabwe."[21] The money was placed in the hands of Bishop Abel
Muzorewa who had just announced the expulsion of Joshua Nkomo
from the ANC. In receiving the money he referred to past Nigerian
assistance through the OAU and Nigeria's provision of many places
in the universities and schools for Zimbabwe students, but left
the impression that it was the first time the ANC had received
funds directly from Nigeria. In October, the Nigerian Federal
Commissioner confirmed that Nigeria recognised and supported the
ANC under the leadership of Muzorewa.[22] In April 1976 however,
Joe Garba the then External Affairs Commissioner said that
"because we are getting disenchanted with the leadership of the
African National Congress, requests from both Mozorewa and Nkomo
for permission to visit Lagos had been turned down."[23] For the
same reasons of disenchantment, the OAU adopted a policy in July
1976, of cutting direct aid to the various movements and factions
in Zimbabwe and chanelling all assistance through the Liberation
Committee and the government of Mozambique in the hope that this
would provide a degree of leverage for the promotion of unity.
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Nigeria's compliance with such policy was demonstrated in July
5 when Garba presented $250,000 to Mozambique and said:
In normal conditions, the cheque would have been sent to the
unchallenged leader of Zimbabwe. Unfortunately, this person does
not exist, the two liberation movements being busy fighting each
other. [24]
He called for a united front, a theme to which he returned in
October:
Almost daily we hear that somebody has shot into prominence from
virtually nowhere and the next day you hear that another person
has gone down into obscurity. It is our hope that the
nationalists will be able, even at this late hour, to forge a
united front for the purpose of effective bargaining. [251
These examples demonstrate a new cutting edge and leadership
activism to policy. The succeeding governments of Shagari, Buhari
and Babangida continued such policy towards South Africa and the
Southern Africa Liberation Movements.
MILITARY AND CIVILIAN CO-OPERATION AND INTERCHANGE
IN POLICY FORMULATION
Professor Gambari elucidated to me the machinery of policy
formulation within the Ministry of External Affairs. There is a
Directorate of African Affairs separate from the main body which
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deals with other geographic regions of the world. [26] There are,
however, specialist inputs from other institutions and
organisations towards the foreign policy formulation of Nigeria.
Such institutions, include the Nigeria Institute of International
Affairs (which is fashioned after the British Royal Institute for
International Affairs (RIIA) and the various universities in the
country. Nigeria's foreign policy has never though been directly
related to the needs of the masses of the people but
unfortunately implemented in highly elitist circles. This has
created a situation whereby the needs and aspirations of a
national elitist group which comprises - businessmen,
bureaucrats, high ranking military men and high ranking
traditional rulers has increased,[27] and which academic or
intellectual opinion can not fully ameliorate. Even radical
policy is not always 'pure' policy. Nor is there an absolute
distinction between military input and civilian input.
In the discharge of its duties, the Ministry of External Affairs
has an organisational (structural) set-up which is headed by a
Permanent Secretary and he/she is directly responsible to the
office of the Minister. On substantive policy matters several
special task forces are appointed to examine, review and make
recommendations on almost all aspects of Nigeria's external
relations.[28] The task forces are normally headed by young
turks.[29] Their reports or recommendations are normally used in
the production of a comprehensive policy paper for the Federal
Executive Council for a conceptual framework on foreign policy.
It would be necessary to note that this system 	 became
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operational during the Buhari regime under the supervision of my
interviewee, Professor Gambari, who was the External Affairs
Minister and a former scholar and director of the NIIA.
One other major intellectual effort involving the input of able
and younger External Affairs Officers and later the Director
General and the Permanent Secretary, is the preparation of an
annual foreign policy agenda for the head of government's
consideration and approval.[30] This sort of report or agenda
endeavours to set out the major issues of concern, to rationalise
the country's impact in the external realm and to identify
priorities and options for the head of government on an annual
basis and in advance of the year of operation.
Since Buhari, External Affairs has been making use of an informal
consultative committee on foreign policy. This committee whose
membership is flexible and in varied composition, depending on
the issues to be discussed, normally has a general inclusion of
lecturers from the universities, senior research officers from
NIIA and Nigerian Institute of Policy and Strategic Studies,
leaders of the Nigerian Labour Congress, representatives of the
business community, and senior External Affairs Officers.[31]
Although External Affairs could not be said to have a monopoly
of advice to the head of government, it sees itself constantly
making efforts to be the primary source of advice and major
instrument of foreign policy. Other Ministries, agencies of
government and national institutes whose subject matter impinge
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on foreign affairs have never made this easily possible. These
other ministries, agencies and institutes are: The NIIA, NIPSS,
National Security Organisations, Ministry of National Planning
and the Ministry of Internal Affairs according to Gambari.[32]
Professor Agboola Gambari in his book "Theory and Reality in
Foreign Policy Making," noted these transitional factor in the
history of Nigerian foreign policy formulation. These factors he
noted as comprising: [33]
(a) The role of the military in redressing the balance of
power in favour of the central government in relation
to the regions and states;
(b) the aftermath of the civil war in relations to
Nigeria's view about the role played by some Western
countries; and
(b) the increasing wealth from oil revenue, which improved
its financial and general economic standing.
He also states, importantly, that the dichotomization of Nigerian
rulership between civilians on one hand and the military on the
other is a false one. In his book, Professor Gambari noted that
there has never been a "pure" military rule in post independent
Nigeria, but rather the military has often used civilians as
political heads of the various state bureaucracies and
organisations. It was his further observation that the longer the
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military men stay in power, the more they tend to behave like
civilians in order to retain office.[34] On the other hand, and
with respect to civilian administration, the potentiality of
military intervention in the political order of the country was
a daily ghost in the background, awaiting its new moment. The
former President, Shehu Shagari, said that "in reality, there
were only two major parties during the second republic; the first
being all the five registered political parties on one hand and
the military on the other."[35]
Whether civilian or military, the governance of Nigeria has been
conducted with the active involvement or guidance of alliance
of the different strata of the elite community. This elite
community could however be referred to as the permanent power
base while the installed public officers change from time to
time. The contribution of the Ministry of External Affairs,
however, while made more effective, can still be marginalised;
and elite effectiveness can often boil down to the President
alone. This chapter has sought to show how a Ministry can have
its functions improved, can involve sectors of society in its
work, can blur the distinction between military and civilian, but
still not count on its own impact and contribution. Even so, the
advert of South Africa as the foreign policy issue meant the
Ministry could at least stake a claim to participation in




THE ARTICULATION OF FOREIGN
POLICY - THREE INTERNATIONAL
ORGANISATION EXAMPLES
CHAPTER 6
NIGERIA AND SOUTH AFRICA IN THE UNITED NATIONS
INTRODUCTION
Over the last three decades, Nigeria has sought to contribute
towards the liberation of Africa from colonialism as well as the
elimination of racial discrimination and apartheid in Southern
Africa. Much of this has been attempted through international
organisations, Nigeria being conscious of its individual limits
but realising also that leadership and influence can be
accomplished in a multilateral setting.
From the earliest times of Nigeria's diplomatic history, the
Nigerian government attached great importance to international
organisations. They were seen as the foremost instruments for the
conduct of Nigeria's foreign policy. The Nigerian government,
under Balewa led Nigeria into the United Nations Organisation[1]
as the 99th member. The UN has remained immune from hostile
official reaction and pressure from the Nigerian public, as
compared with other organisations to which Nigeria belongs such
as the Commonwealth. There has been no time that any Nigerian
leader threatened to boycott or actually kept representatives
away from any meeting of the main organs of the UN. Successive
Nigerian regimes have placed a high premium on the efficacy of
the organisation as a forum in which it can press
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overriding concerns of Africa's diverse problems. Nigeria's
principal source of hope was the benevolent provisions in the
United Nations Charter for dependent territories. The Charter
appeared to reflect an abiding concern regarding 'non-self
governing Territories' stating that:
Members of the United Nations which have or assume responsibilities for
the administration of territories whose peoples have not yet attained
a full measure of self government recognise the principle that the
interests of the inhabitants of these territories are paramount, and
accept as a sacred trust the obligation to promote to the utmost,
within the system of international peace and security established by
the present Charter, the well-being of the inhabitants of these
territories, and, to this end: to develop self-government, to take due
account of the political aspirations of the peoples, and to assist them
in progressive development of their free political institutions,
according to the particular circumstances of each territory and its
peoples and their varying degrees of advancement.[2]
This provision was an implicit recognition of the rights of
colonies to self-determination, reinforcing the basic principles
of the Atlantic Charter of 1941.[3] The distinctive nature of
Nigeria's identification and belief in the efficacy of the UN is
explained by the United Nations policy enunciated by Prime
Minister, Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, at independence. The aims of
Nigeria's United Nations diplomacy, he proclaimed, were:[4]
(i)	 Respect for political independence and territorial
integrity of all states;
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(ii) Total liquidation of all forms of colonialism and
imperialism including white minority regimes in Southern
Africa;
Respect for fundamental human rights;
Promotion of international peace and security as well as
measures aimed at reducing world tensions;
(v) Reunification of all divided lands through peaceful
negotiations;
General and complete disarmament and
The establishmentment and strengthening of the UN agencies
concerned with multilateral economic aid and equitable
trade terms.
THE DEVELOPMENT OF NIGERIA'S POSITION ON THE
ELIMINATION OF COLONIALISM AND APARTHEID
I shall endeavour to examine Nigeria's positions at different
stages of her involvement on the issues of decolonisation and
elimination of apartheid. This will concern evolution of
government policies and be based upon the history of governmental
policy statements.
Studies of Nigeria's involvement in the UN for the elimination
114
of colonialism and apartheid embody two contradictory positions.
On the one hand, it is contended that since 1960 every Nigerian
government has been strongly committed to the eradication of
colonialism and apartheid. It is asserted that these twin
problems have always occupied a centre-stage in Nigeria's
diplomacy. Differences in the policies of the various regimes
have been in their approaches and styles. While there has been
a tendency for some Nigerian governments to over-dramatise their
concern on these issues, others have tended to shun 'adventurism'
in order to avoid noise in pursuit of the same goal.[5] On the
other hand, it is argued that over the years, Nigeria's policy
on these issues has changed. It has moved from being passive to
being active, from being middle-of-the-road to being militant. [61
As reflected earlier in this thesis, this is the position of the
present author. The explanation for this shift has however
varied. While some attribute it to external pressure, in
particular Nigeria's being swept by OAU consensus, others insist
that it is the product of domestic pressure. According to the
latter's point of view, a small group of people who are
aggressive and militant have been able to influence policy or,
at least, the direction of policy beyond the extent the merits
of their case deserve-through sheer and constant psychological
on successive governments. They have successfully influenced the
direction of Nigeria's policy - both in its content and its
execution.[7] More specifically, they have succeeded in getting
all Nigerian governments since Balewa and before Babangida, to
embrace African liberation, to a greater or less degree, as if
it were a national philosophy and cause.[8]
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In contrast with this prevailing orthodoxy, I have already shown
but will reiterate in the context of the UN, that the Nigerian
government's pre-occupation with the issues of colonialism and
apartheid did not start at independence. It developed gradually
over the years. The process of the evolution in Nigeria's
official attitudes and policies on these issues has been a
complex rather than a simple one. From an initial neglect of the
problems in 1960, the Nigerian government came to pay increasing
attention to these problems in the late 1960s but remained
ambivalent in relation to the strategies for their
elimination. [91 In the early 1970s she became unequivocal about
the appropriate strategy but maintained the same level of
commitment to the solution of the problems as in the late 1960s.
During the mid 1970s her official commitment or devotion to the
eradication of the problems reached a peak, but this began to
taper off in the early 1980s. The latter 1980s witnessed a low
point due to an increasing demand by most Nigerian leaders for
a redressing of the imbalance between what are regarded as
Nigeria's 'national' or 'core' interests.[10]
Secondly this chapter will offer some explanation as to why, in
general, Nigeria has been pre-occupied over the years with the
issues of colonialism and apartheid. Thirdly, it will explain why
the UN has been seen by Nigeria as the most important diplomatic
instrument for tackling these issues and the processes and
strategies by which the task of reaching a solution has been
pursued by various Nigerian governments at the UN.
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THE NIGERIAN GONVERNMENT'S ATTITUDE
AND POLICIES ON APARTHEID, 1960-1965
The evolution of Nigerian governmental policies on this issue was
sparked in the first place by the 'Sharpville massacre' of 21
March 1960 in which about one hundred people were killed and
about two hundred wounded.[11] The position adopted by Nigerian
representatives in the various organs, committees and agencies
of the UN in 1961 and 1962 reflected the reactions of the
government and people of Nigeria towards the 1960 massacre. Thus,
in 1961, Nigerian delegates to the UN co-sponsored a resolution
against racism/apartheid calling for the total condemnation of
the obnoxious practice.[12] The same year, at the UN, the
Nigerian delegation supported a draft resolution proposing the
severance of diplomatic relations by all member states of the UN
with South Africa.[13] In 1961, a Nigerian Minister, J.M.
Johnson, tabled a resolution demanding that South Africa should
quit the International Labour Organisation, and the resoultion
was passed. The Minister of Educatiotx, Jaa. WilachWt,v;Nx wade a
similar move in the United Nations Educational, Scientific and
Cultural Organisation; and the Prime Minister demanded that South
Africa should not be retained as a member of the Commonwealth.
Clearly, without making any elaborated public policy
declaration, the Nigerian government had begun to pursue a policy
of diplomatic isolation of South Africa.
It was, however, also in 1961 that the Nigerian Foreign Minister
117
issued a formal statement on Nigeria's policy concerning racial
discrimination. As he put it:[14]
The total eradication of all forms of racial discrimination.., is
one of the pillars of Nigeria's foreign policy. We will never
regard racial discrimination as an internal affair in any state.
Nowhere in the world, in no state, however powerful, however
wealthy, will Nigeria countenance humiliations to people of
African descent; and we will not consider any action on our part
as interference in the internal affairs of another state. This
includes South Africa.
In 1962, the Nigerian government took a step which represented
both redefinition of the nature of racial discrimination and re-
thinking on the strategy for eradicating it. At a meeting of the
UN Economic Commission for Africa, the representatives of Nigeria
and other states requested the ECA to declare racial
discrimination a threat to the development of African states.[15]
They also urged the ECA to proclaim that the practice of racial
discrimination was contrary to ECA's terms of reference, to
condemn South Africa for refusing to allow the Commission's sub-
committee to conduct an investigation in its territory, and to
recommend to the UN's Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) that
South Africa should be deprived of the membership of the
Commission.[16] In the same year, the Nigerian Permanent
Representative at the United Nations was appointed Chairman of
the African Group's sub-committee on apartheid, a position he
held for five years. The group recorded two significant
achievements that year. It sponsored a resolution calling for a
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break in diplomatic relations with South Africa, the closure of
African ports to South African shipping and the boycott of South
African goods, as well as refusing landing and passage facilities
to South African planes.[17]
The special committee on apartheid, of which Nigeria was from the
beginning a member, submitted three reports in quick succession
between May and September 1963[18]. In the report of September,
it identified Britain as the main supplier of arms to South
Africa. It also urged the Council to impose an arms-embargo
against South Africa. It urged the Council to suspend the right
and privileges of South Africa as a member state and to its
expel from the UN and its specialised agencies.[19] In making
recommendations in 1963, the special committee on apartheid was,
no doubt, influenced by the views of members of the African
Group, and its special sub-committee on apartheid which was
headed by Simeon Adebo, Nigeria's Permanent Representative at the
UN. The Nigerian Foreign Minister noted in 1964 at the UN General
Assembly that the government of South Africa, the perpetrator of
the "obnoxious policy of apartheid" was being steadily isolated
from the mainstream of international life.[20] He praised the
British government for placing an embargo on most of the arms
supplied to South Africa, and stressed that Nigeria was
irrevocably committed to fighting the regime of apartheid to the
finish. [21]
By 1965, the Nigerian government was, in collaboration with other
African states, engaged in a vigorous diplomatic offensive
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against racial discrimination and apartheid. The offensive was
spearheaded at the UN by the Nigerian Permanent Representative
who remained the chairman of the UN African Group's sub-committee
on apartheid. There were two major objectives of this diplomatic
offensive. The first was to convince members of the UN that the
situation in South Africa constituted a threat to international
peace and security.[22] This was for the purpose of persuading
the UN member states to invoke the provisions under Chapter VII
the UN Charter.[23] This would have made for actions ranging
from economic blockade to collective military enforcement
measures by UN forces. The second was aimed at pushing South
Africa into isolation and eventual expulsion from the UN and all
other international organisations. [24]
A CLEARER FOREIGN POLICY BY THE NIGERIAN GOVERNMENT
ON RACIAL DISCRIMINATION AND APARTHEID 1966-1974
In discussing the government's consolidation of its position
within this period, it will be worthwhile examining the view
propounded by a senior official of the Federal Ministry of
External Affairs. In 1979, Orobola Fasehun put across the
following suggestions: "If Nigerian decision makers saw colonial
rule as morally repugnant, diplomatic and economic sanctions
would be the only preferred anti-colonial strategy. If, on the
other hand, the leaders of Nigeria saw colonial rule as a threat
to the security of Nigeria and Africa, we could expect the
leaders to advocate the use of force. H [25] He tried to explain
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the major differences between the policies of Balewa's government
(1960-1966) and Gowon's after the civil war (1970-1975) and
judged Balewa's pursuance as 'passive' policy on African
liberation. In contrast, he thought that Nigeria became an
'active' liberation supporter especially from 1971.
There is, however, a line of demarcation within the period under
review. Considering the circumstances in Nigeria between 1966 and
early 1970, there was an emphasis on diplomacy alone for as long
as the Nigerian civil war raged on and there were neither
resources nor time to develop other approaches. The period
immediately after the civil war (1970-1974) marked another phase
in her foreign policies as compared with the civil war period.
For example,in the period between 1966-1969, the Nigerian
government under Gowon placed African liberation high on its
priority list (especially due to South Africa's support of
Biafra).
The resurgence of Nigeria's active role in the UN towards the
solution of the problem of colonialism and apartheid could be
attributed also to the high price of crude oil in the world
market. This activism was identified in two ways.
1. The amount of space devoted to the problem as evidenced in
the speeches of representatives at the UN; and
2. Nigeria's voting pattern at the UN on the issue.
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For example, the speech by Gowon at the UN in 1973, is of
importance. Of the fifty-one-paragraph speech, twelve paragraphs
were completely devoted to the problem of decolonisation and
apartheid.[26] And Nigeria's voting pattern during this period
clearly demonstrated her strong interest. Between 1970 and 1974,
she voted affirmatively on 74 out of 76 resolutions condemning
racism and colonialism. There were neither the abstentions or
absences when votes were cast on issues as sometimes occurred
during the 1966-1969 civil war period.[27]
In 1971, as a way of expressing his discontent and that of his
administration with regards to Southern Africa, Gowon stated: [281
Let no one be deceived that South Africa is spending over £180
million for defence purposes and seeking to acquire nuclear
capability only to come to terms with independent Africa and
grant the right of self-determination to her African population.
South Africa is growing into an octopus. It is being used by the
imperialist powers to regain their foothold in Africa.
Throughout this period, Nigeria discouraged dialogue between
members of the UN and the white minority regimes but rather
showed an increasing commitment to the imposition of sanctions
against these white minority regimes. It was the view of the
Nigerian government that the South African government was neither
genuinely interested in dialogue nor in any way serious about the
desire to introduce meaningful change. If it were, it was felt
that it would have begun the process of dialogue with the black
citizens of South Africa instead of spending a large amount of
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money for defence and attempted acquisition of nuclear
capability. [29]
The Nigerian government at the UN seized every available
opportunity to either sponsor or co—sponsor resolutions aimed at
the total isolation of South Africa from the international
scene[30]. For example in May 1966, acting on behalf of thirty—
two African states, Nigeria's Permanent Representative at the UN,
Adebo, introduced a draft resolution on Southern Rhodesia at the
Security Council. The draft called on Britain to blockade
Rhodesia fully — by land, sea and air, and to take all measures
including force to abolish the racist minority regime.[31] In
1968, Nigerian representatives together with thirty eight other
states sponsored a draft resolution meant to alter the membership
of UNCTAD in a manner that would exclude South Africa until it
had terminated its policy of racial discrimination to the
satisfaction of the General Assembly.[32] In 1970, Nigeria's
Foreign Minister Arikpo, speaking at the UN General Assembly
passionately appealed to Britain not to resume the sale of arms
to South Africa. [331 And in 1974, the Nigerian delegates to the
UN strongly supported a move at the Security Council to expel
South Africa from the UN. Upon the failure of this attempt, due
to a triple veto cast by the United States of America, Britain
and France, Arikpo became resentful and strongly deplored the
behaviour of the three.[34] Though during this period the
Nigerian government made several attempts to discourage the
Western powers from supporting the South African regime but this
was not sufficient enough when compared with its successor.
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These actions reflected Nigeria's official view on how the
problem of apartheid and racial discrimination could best be
solved. In view of this, the Nigerian Foreign Minister, Arikpo,
had earlier presented a proposal at the UN General Assembly,
arguing that the UN should support the efforts of the liberation
movements in Southern Africa in waging an "armed struggle for the
attainment of their liberty".[35] Nigeria not only made proposals
and co-sponsored resolutions but equally made good all her
financial obligations towards the annual UN Trust Fund on South
Africa as well as making regular contribution to the Education
and Training Fund for South Africa.[36]
In May 1976, a programme of action against apartheid was
formulated by the committee. The programme which was subsequently
endorsed by the United Nations General Assembly led to a World
Conference for Action Against Apartheid in Lagos on August 22,
1977. Underlining the significance of the conference to Nigeria,
Lt. General Obasanjo, the Head of the then Federal Military
Covernment asserted: [37]
We in Nigeria do not regard this Conference as just another
United Nations meeting taking place in Lagos. For us this is a
gathering of men and women of conscience from all corners of the
globe who have come to Lagos to harmonise views and work out a
programme of action of all nations and peoples of the world to
effect complete liberation of Southern Africa without delay and
without undue suffering and to bring about the eradication of the
inhuman policy of apartheid in South Africa.
124
NIGERIAN GOVERNMENT POLICIES ON THE PROBLEMS OF
RACIAL DISCRIMINATION AND APARTHEID 1975-1979
There was a change in the Nigerian government's policies during
this period because of a change of government in the country. At
the initial stage of the Murtala/Obasanjo regime, it accepted as
correct the existing policy as it began to relate itself to these
and other international issues.[38] Nevertheless, as time went
on, the strength of its determination to cut a clear and distinct
image for itself and Nigeria in the international system became
increasingly clear. The first acid test for the regime on its
foreign policy came during the Angolan crisis of 1975 and 1976.
Its eventual recognition of the MPLA despite opposing pressures
both internally and particularly externally and the subsequent
extension of a major grant to the Angolan government, coupled
with its launching of a diplomatic compaign towards other African
states on the Angolan issue, served as a pointer of the regime's
new and activist policy.
The Nigerian Foreign Minister, Joseph Garba, said that "the
present government is probably going to be more aggressive...
this government will come out firmly and state its stand on any
issue... "[391
It is pertinent to mention here that one major distinguishing
factor in the foreign policy of Nigeria under Murtala/Obasanjo
ms the volume of time and attention devoted to the problems of
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colonialism and apartheid. This was the greatest percentage by
any Nigeria leadership. Every available opportunity at the UN was
utilised by Nigeria's representative to consolidate the country's
stand on these problems. In a speech made at the 10th special
session of the General Assembly on disarmament, Nigeria's Foreign
Minister devoted two paragraphs to the problem of racism, stating
that racism "breeds war," that it has been a prime source of
conflict in the modern world.[40] The Nigerian government sought
at the UN to achieve three objectives — freedom for Rhodesia,
decolonisation of South West Africa, and the eradication of
apartheid in South Africa. Of the three main objectives, the
issue of Rhodesia's majority rule took precedence in Nigeria's
diplomacy at the UN. Between 1977 and 1978, as Garba testified,
Nigerian representatives sought every opportunity to raise the
issue of Zimbabwean independence at the General Assembly and the
Security Council.[41] The issue of eradication of apartheid came
closely in a second place with the decolonisation of South West
Africa third.
It was during this same period that Nigeria successfully hosted
the World Conference for Action Against Apartheid in August 1977.
Even though the conference was not organised at the initiative
of the Nigerian government, the Nigerian Permanent Representative
at the UN coincidentally was then working on General Assembly
Resolution 31/6.6 section 4 which proposed the holding of such
a conference. The conference provided an opportunity for the
Nigerian government to publicly articulate its policy on
apartheid. In a pre—conference seminar it proposed a series of
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strategic recommendations seeking the imposition of sanctions on
such multinational corporations and companies maintaining
economic links with both South Africa and Nigeria or even seeking
business with South Africa.
While addressing the conference, Obasanjo, by this time the
Nigerian Head of State after Murtala's death, made it clear that
he was speaking not only on behalf of the government and people
of Nigeria but equally in the name of the "black and African
people" throughout the world.[42] Like Gowon's regime,
Obasanjo's acknowledged the threat to Nigeria's national security
posed by the Pretoria-Salisbury axis.[43] Obasanjo went on to
accuse the OECD countries of being the main beneficiaries and
sustainers of the apartheid system and thereby set the stage for
the campaign for economic sanctions against both South Africa and
its collaborators as an alternative to military strategy. He
asserted that unless apartheid is dismantled, it might be the
cause of the greatest human conflict and tragedy in the
world. [44]
If the previous regime of Gowon believed in the UN, the
Murtala/Obasanjo regime increased this emphasis. Consequently,
the Nigerian Foreign Minister recommended in a memorandum to the
Nigerian Head of State that Nigeria should continue to maintain
the momentum for a settlement in Rhodesia by encouraging the
Front Line States and the Patriotic Front to take the matter to
the United Nations Security Council.[45] All this was related to
the fact that Nigeria was then, in early 1978, occupying the
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Presidency of the Security Council. During this period, according
to Garba, Nigeria used the United Nations to tackle a number of
African issues.[46] He however claimed that the Nigerian
government's faith in its membership of the Security Council at
the time was productive and claimed that it was Nigeria's
persistence, made possible by her continuous presence in the
Security Council, that prodded the British and Americans on
Zimbabwe and the Western contact group of Five on Namibia toward
serious results. [47]
The Murtala/Obasanjo regime made a very large financial
contribution towards the South African liberation struggle.
(Details will be given in chapter 9) In pursuance of its
aggressive policy on South Africa and in furtherance of its
application of sanctions the Nigeria government, in 1978, took
controlling shares in Barclays Bank, and renamed it Union Bank,
after the president of Barclays International, Anthony Turke, had
publicly declared that the Bank had no intention of closing down
its branches in South Africa in response to Nigeria's
request.[48] In 1979, it also nationalised British Petroleum in
retaliation for Britain's decision to sell crude oil to South
Africa and, as will be seen in the next chapter, to put pressure
on Britain on the eve of the crucial Commonwealth summit on
Rhodesia in Lusaka. As if these actions were not enough, the
Nigerian government also supported and co-sponsored numerous
resolutions aimed at impossing mandatory arms as well as oil
embargos on South Africa, while it joined international
declaration against apartheid in sports such as the Gleneagles
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Agreement. It led other African nations in boycotting the 1978
Montreal Olympics.
NIGERIAN GOVERNMENT POLICIES ON COLONIALISM,
RACIAL DISCRIMINATION AND APARTHEID 1980-1988
The period under review was characterised by changes in the
leadership of the government apparatus. The country was first
under civil rule and then two other successive military regimes.
The Shagari civilian administration which succeeded the
Murtala/Obasanjo regime on the 1st of October 1979 was overthrown
by the military regime of Muhammadu Buhari on the 31st of
December 1983, and subsequently, this regime was toppled on the
27th of August 1985 by the regime of Ibrahim Babaginda.
The period 1980-1988 witnessed cohesion and adherence to the
country's policy towards the elimination of racial discrimination
and apartheid in Southern Africa. None of the three regimes,
civilian as well as military, deviated significantly from
Murtala/Obasanjo's approach towards these issues. The three
regimes were equally strong in their criticism of those western
powers like USA, UK, France and West Germany for what was seen
as their attitude towards the sustenance of apartheid in South
Africa. The Vice President of Nigeria, Alex I. Ekwueme, condemned
the triple veto which was cast at the Security Council on 30th
April 1981 by France, the United Kingdom and the United States
against the cluster of sanctions for which there was otherwise
a global consensus. [49] He accused the Western governments of
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being out of step with the decent opinion of the vast majority
of mankind. [50]
At the 38th session of the UN General Assembly (1983), the leader
of the Nigerian delegation, the late Ambassador Mohammed Bello
also attacked the Western powers. He accused them of not only
failing to take actions under the UN charter, but also, directly
and convertly, assuring the apartheid regime of its survival and
prosperity through vastly improved economic cooperation.[51] He
also made an attack on US policy towards Southern Africa. He
declared that the so-called policy of 'constructive engagement'
was deeply offensive and repugnant to Africa, and completely
unacceptable to Nigeria.
Irrespective of all the three Nigerian regimes adherence to the
roles of their predecessors and particularly Murtala/Obasanjo's
during the period 1980-1988 several new developments emerged in
Nigeria's UN diplomacy on Southern Africa. One development was
the attempt to restore a balance on the two major components of
Nigeria's foreign policy. Under the Murtala/Obasanjo regime, the
country's foreign policy had an over-riding preoccupation with
the issues of colonialism, racial discrimination and apartheid,
while other issues occupied a secondary place. From the period
beginning from 1980 under the civilian administration of Shagari,
attempts were made to strike a balance between the issues of
colonialism, racial discrimination and apartheid on one hand, and
the bad economic state of the nation on the other, as well as
that of other African states as a whole. These attempts were
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reflected in the speeches of Nigerian leaders.
In 1980, at the UN General Assembly, President Shehu Shagari in
his speech placed specific emphasis on economic issues. He
declared that the termination of apartheid and racism in South
Africa was the challenge of the new decade...[52] Nevertheless,
he drew the attention of the world community to the new emphasis
which African states were placing on economic development after
decades when their overrriding preoccupation was to secure the
independence of their territories and peoples.[53] The need for
this balance was recognised by Babangida's regime. In June 1988,
the Minister for External Affairs, Ike Nwachukwu, described it
as a new direction in Nigeria's foreign policy and therefore
proposed that Nigeria's commitment towards the liberation of the
entire continent of Africa should go hand—in—hand with the fight
for the total economic liberation of Africa.[54] In the course,
however, of making such attempts to redress the imbalance between
the political and economic components of Nigeria's foreign
policy, the usefulness of the UN began to be seen in a somewhat
different perspective. There was an increasing concern for
economic issues as represented in the speeches and address of
Nigeria's Representatives at the UN, and eventually it gained a
real equality in Nigeria's UN agenda.
The whole situation becomes clearer when one puts into a tabular
form paragraphs of speeches in their totality, then the sectional
allocation of these paragraphs of speeches at the UN General
Assembly plenary sessions. The table below, as obtained from
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GAOR, plenary 1973-1989, makes for a simplified representation
of Nigeria's changing policy.
Table:	 Distribution of Reference To Issues in the speeches of
Nigerian Heads of State, Foreign Ministers or their
Representatives at the General Assembly Plenary Session,




















1973 51 12 23.53 4 7.84
1977 24 10 41.67 1 4.17
1980 38 6 15.79 5 13.16
1983 33 10 30.30 9 27.27
1986 38 11 28.95 8 21.05
1989 39 15 38.46 12 30.77
Source: General Assembly Official Report, 1973-1989
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It will be noted from the table that with each subsequent year
after the 1977 more and more attention was being focused on
economic issues. From the table, it is evident that the Nigerian
government's commitment to the elimination of colonialism and
apartheid suffered a general decline after the height of 1977.
In fairness to other succeeding regimes after Murtala/Obasanjo's,
as expressed by Professor Gambari, the present Nigerian Permanent
Representative to UN, there is the tendency at the inception of
any regime to itemise a principal policy which remains high in
its agenda.[55] He stressed though that making policy (as was
Murtala/Obasanjo's regime) towards the liberation of Southern
Africa, two important interrelated factors should be taken into
consideration. These included the country's economy and her
financial strength. He pointed out that Murtala/Obasanjo's regime
was able to go as far as it went on that issue because both the
Nigerian economy and financial position then was not in a bad
position in comparison with other African countries.[56] While
Buhari's regime, in which he served as the Foreign Minister, had
as its main objective to sustain the economy and the foreign
currency reserves of Nigeria; hence the strategy of imposing an
embargo on the movement of Naira which included the regime's
cessation of support for private students overseas except where
such courses were not available in Nigeria.[57)
Buhari's regime did make efforts to meet its financial
obligations to the liberation movements. Not only did it clear
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the arrears accumulated by Shagari's administration between 1979
and 1983 but it also gave a grant of N3 million to the liberation
movements in Zimbabwe. It was, however, the Babangida
administration that significantly increased Nigeria's financial
contribution to the liberation movements Available information
shows that between 1986 and 1988, the federal government paid out
the sum of N10 million to the Front Line States and $20 million
in fulfilment of the pledge made in 1986 to contribute $50
million over five years to the liberation struggle in Southern
Africa. [58]
The financial crisis of the country which became conspicuous in
1982 contributed a great deal to the country's problems in
meeting fully its financial obligations. This was principally
a result of dwindling foreign exchange reserves. Such was the
depth of the crisis that, in 1986, the Nigerian Foreign Minister,
Bolaji Akinyemi, gave notice that henceforth Nigeria should not
be expected to extend financial aid as readily as it had. He
warned that, in future, Nigeria's assistance would be tailored
to promote Nigerian employment and exports because Nigeria had
neither the means nor the desire any longer to become an
"African Father Christmas."[59]
A further evidence of the declining emphasis on anti-colonialism
and anti-racism as key issues in Nigeria's foreign policy was a
set of signs of the weakening of the will of the Nigerian
government to impose and implement sanctions against the allies
of, and collaborators with the racist regimes in Southern Africa.
134
significantly, no notable new sets of measures concerning the
duplication and enforcement of sanctions were announced either
during or in the wake of the International Conference on
Apartheid organised in 1988; yet the theme of the conference was
"strategies for dismantling apartheid."
Two other inter-related new development in Nigeria's diplomacy
on Southern Africa are very important because they have far-
reaching implications for Nigeria's future attitude towards the
UN. One of such developments puts into questions the rationale
behind the country's preoccupation with anti-colonialism and
anti-apartheid. There is underway a re-examination of the
relevance of some of the existing international organisations,
the UN included, as central instruments of Nigeria's diplomacy.
The whole process of re-evaluation of the country's policy on
colonialism and apartheid started in a rather direct and
spontaneous manner but as time went on, it became a little more
subtle and sophisticated.
On his return from a tour of the Front Line States in 1978,
Adeyemi Lawson, President of the Nigerian Chamber of Commerce,
called for the establishment of economic links between Nigeria
and Southern Africa. His argument was that a refusal to do that
would amount to government neglect of the economic interests of
Nigerian citizens and organisations. He buttressed his arguments
by pointing to the fact that, unlike Nigeria, the Front Line
states were doing roaring business with South Africa. The public
reaction to Adeyemi's points was somewhat hostile; as for the
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government it bluntly replied that it took the economic welfare
of Nigerians into consideration in the conduct of Nigeria's
foreign policy. [60]
And in 1980, Jaja Nwachukwu, Nigeria's former Foreign Minister
(1961-1964), who was then both the Senate Leader of the Nigerian
Peoples Party (NPP), and chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee re-opened the debate. In a television interview, he
proposed that Nigeria should establish diplomatic relations with
South Africa and also renew diplomatic relations with Israel. [61]
The Senators were appalled. It eventually led to Nwachukwu's
removal from the chairmanship of the Foreign Relations
Committee. [62]
Also in 1984, a Research Fellow at the Nigerian Institute of
International Affairs, S.T. Tarka, introduced a new dimension to
the debate. He introduced his own arguments by asking whether
Nigeria had a South Africa policy without apartheid. And to that
question, he answered negatively. His central arguement was that
while Nigeria should continue to support, morally and
financially, the liberation struggle in Southern Africa, the
government must find ways of ensuring that Nigerians derive some
economic benefits from such support especially after the
territories had been liberated.[63]
In a public lecture delivered in 1986, Akinyemi called for the
development of two additional principles for Nigeria's foreign
policy. One of these new principles he referred to as the need
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to define and articulate Nigeria's foreign policy in the post-
apartheid era.[64] His first fear in this, was that the anti-
apartheid principle, as a basis of Nigeria's foreign policy,
would become irrelevant as soon as South Africa was free of white
racist domination and had come under black majority rule. Second,
the new free South Africa would be industrialised, militarily
strong and therefore powerful. Indeed, it would easily overshadow
Nigeria unless she took immediate steps restructuring her economy
and reordering her priorities. Third, in the twenty first
century, issues of international economic cooperation as well as
peace and security would be the problems rather than colonialism
and apartheid. Therefore, pressumably, Nigeria should begin to
pay more attention to the issues that were acquiring a new
urgency. [65]
Similarly, writing a little earlier in 1986/87, the former
Nigerian Foreign Minister (1975-1987), and at present (1990) the
President to the UN General Assembly, Joseph Nanven Garba,
asserted rather confidently, as follows:[66]
The rhetoric of African liberation will wear increasingly thin as
South Africa becomes the only target for the struggle. The
problems of economic development and the provision of a better
standard of living for our people will become the preoccupation
of foreign policy.
Such were the feelings broaching into the 1990s, both in public
and government circles about Nigeria's foreign policy towards
Southern Africa with regards to colonialism and racism. In other
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words, the hitherto much neglected economic concerns are leading
to government re-appraisal of policy at the UN towards Southern
Africa. The critical question is how this racist or anti-racist
sentiment will be translated into specific policies of economic
well-being for the country.
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CHAPTER 7:
NIGERIA AND SOUTH AFRICA IN THE COMMONWEALTH:
Nigeria's participation in the Commonwealth organisation was
heavily influenced by its British Colonial heritage. A number of
similarities mark membership of the Commonwealth, among them,
language, history and a shared legacy of colonial rule.[1]
Nigeria became a member of the Commonwealth on the attainment of
independence and appeared to incline toward the organisation as
a strategic forum for advancing its national interests while
pursuing general goals in multilateral activities. The then Prime
Minister, Tafawa Balewa, elaborated on this point:
While benefiting greatly from the free interchange of ideas and
consultation between members of the Commonwealth and from their
experience within the framework of the United Nations, we would
have a free hand to select those policies which are considered to
be most advantageous to Nigeria. [21
This was demonstrated in Nigeria's unflinching stance against
South Africa at the Commonwealth Summit in 1961. When the issue
of apartheid came up Nigeria not only protested vehemently
against the evils of apartheid and violations of human rights in
South Africa, but also demanded the expulsion of South Africa
from the Commonwealth organisation. This action increased
Nigeria's international image and many observers concede that
Nigeria was, alongside other African states, instrumental in
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forcing South Africa out of the Commonwealth as well as from the
Economic Commission for Africa (ECA).
This chapter will concentrate on three major decisions Nigeria
took as a member of the Commonwealth in order to demonstrate its
objection to South African apartheid policy. These include:
Nigeria's request for an extraordinary Commonwealth summit in
1966, Nigeria's nationalisation of BP before the Lusaka CHOGM,
and Nigeria's boycott of the 1986 Edinburgh Commonwealth Games.
THE 1966 LAGOS COMMONWEALTH
HEADS OF GOVERNMENT MEETING
In January 1966 an important shift was witnessed in the general
attitude of the Commonwealth organisation. This was when an
extraordinary Commonwealth summit was convened in Lagos on
Nigerian and Commonwealth Secretariat initiative. This meeting
was the first of its kind, and also the first to be convened
outside London after fourteen previous meetings. It was the first
to deal with a single issue (Rhodesia); and the first to be
organised and serviced by a non-British body - the Commonwealth
Secretariat.[3] It was during this meeting that the Heads of
Government confirmed the need to assemble from time to time in
different Commonwealth capitals in order to underline the
essential character of the Commonwealth as a free association of
equal nations.
Since this was a single agenda meeting, it wholly concentrated
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on the issue of Rhodesia. The Heads of Government discussed in
particular the ending of the rebellion, the need for cooperation
with assistance to Zambia, and the future of Rhodesia under
constitutional rule. A Working Party of officials discussed in
greater detail the nature and efficacy of economic measures
against the illegal regime in Rhodesia; ways in which Zambia
could be helped in its cooperation with these measures. Also the
question of assistance in training Africans in Rhodesia was
discussed. Their conclusion on these issues was reported to the
meeting. [4]
The Prime Ministers reaffirmed that the authority and
responsibility for guiding Rhodesia to independence
rested with Britain, but acknowledged that the problem
was of wider concern to Africa, the Commonwealth and
the world as a whole.[5]
That Britain was in agreement with this proposal, and this
formula eventually formed the basis of all future Commonwealth
intervention on this issue. At the meeting, the Prime Ministers
statement first made in 1964 was recalled. This stated that for
all Commonwealth governments, it should be an objective of policy
to build in each country a structure of society which offers
equal opportunity and non-discrimination for all its people,
irrespective of race, colour or creed. They also refered to their
1965 communique whereby they stated that the principle of one-
man-one-vote was regarded as the very basis of democracy and this
should be applied to Rhodesia.
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They expressed their concern at the danger to all
multi-racial communities in the Commonwealth,
particularly in East and Central Africa, and also at
the danger to the future of the multi-racial
Commonwealth itself if the situation in Rhodesia was
to continue.
According to Patsy Robertson, the Lagos summit was
unable to propose a programme of actions but it laid
down a declaration of interest on how Britain
conducted its bilateralism. She pointed out that it
was recognised by all member states in the meeting
that Rhodesia was an African as well as a Commonwealth
concern. The success of the Lagos summit established
the need for the rotation of Commonwealth Heads of
Government within all Commonwealth member nations. The
maintenance of this would uphold the principle of
equality for all member nations. She added that the
Lagos summit also brought to light the importance and
the role of the newly created organ of the
Commonwealth Secretariat. The success of the
Secretariat in organising and serving the Lagos summit
on the critical subject of Rhodesia gave it a very
good image as an organ of the Commonwealth
organisation.[6] It also of course established
Nigeria, as host, in the centre of Commonwealth
efforts over Rhodesia. Still conservative in its
foreign policy, as discussed in earlier chapters, the
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Nigerian government acted against Britain within a
body first founded by Britain. Within the same
organisation, by 1979, all traces of Nigerian
reticence and conservatism had disappeared.
THE 1979 NATIONALISATION OF BRITISH
PETROLEUM BEFORE THE COMMONWEALTH
HEAD OF GOVERNMENTS MEETING IN LUSAKA
On 31st July 1979 the Federal Cabinet Office in Lagos announced
that the Supreme Military Council had decided to take over all
the assets of the British Petroleum Company (BP) in Nigeria with
effect from 1st August 1979. It added that the government would
pay compensation for BP's assets. The Federal government gave its
reason for such a move as a reaction to the British government's
permission to BP to start exporting North Sea oil to South
Africa. It added that the whole arrangement was a "mere
subterfuge" to make Nigerian oil available to the apartheid
regime in Pretoria.[7] It argued that the most effective way to
stop Nigerian oil from reaching the South Africa was to cut BP
off from Nigeria's crude oil supply.[8] This was supported by the
Bingham Report which expressed how BP in particular had managed
to get around the sanctions on trade with Zimbabwe and supplied
the rebels with oil.[9] Nigeria's announcement of its decision
on BP's assets looked more of a calculated effort particularly
to put pressure on the British government not to recognise the
Muzorewa government in Rhodesia or lift sanctions. This
noticed by the British government and, as Lord Carrington, the
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British Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary, put it to Major-
General Henry Adefope, leader of the Nigerian delegation to the
Lusaka Commonwealth summit early in August 1979, it would appear
designed "to scotch Mrs Thatcher's hopes of returning Zimbabwe-
Rhodesia to legality in the way she wants."[10]
The decision to nationalise BP was, however, generally received
with dismay, anger and fury in Britain; it rapidly provoked
acerbic arguments between the two countries and eventually became
the biggest single setback to the cordial Anglo-Nigerian
relations which had existed since the end of the Nigerian civil
war in January 1970. The British Prime Minister, Mrs Margaret
Thatcher, denounced the action as "sudden and arbitrary."[11]
Lord Carrington publicly condemned it and added that "the seizure
had badly strained (Anglo-Nigerian) relations" and that Lagos
would "regret the timing of the decision," that it was unhelpful
and would be "counter-productive."[12] Many British newspapers
and magazines condemned the nationalisation. The Guardian
described it as "crude bullying" and wondered where General
Olusegun Obasanjo, then Head of the Federal Military Government,
stood on "the rational scale of demon kings."[13] While the
Economist in an editorial entitled "Nigerian growls" criticized
the take-over, saying that in the end it would not achieve its
primary objectives. [14]
On the Nigerian side, there were sharp reactions. In Lusaka,
General Adefope, the Nigerian Commissioner for External Affairs,
replied to Lord Carrington's public comments on the
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nationalisation decision by the Federal Government. He defended
his government's decision on BP, claiming that a tanker chartered
by BP to ship crude oil to South Africa was caught red-handed;
therefore the Federal Government's measures against BP were
appropriate and within the rules of international law.[15] The
Nigerian newspapers were even harsher in their reactions. The New
Nigeria described the Federal takeover in an editorial entitled
"The right decision" as correct and courageous and urged the
Federal Government to widen its expropriation of British economic
and financial interests in Nigeria.[16]
The pressures from interest groups were intense. For instance,
some associations supported a tougher action against the British
Conservative government's policy on Zimbabwe and Southern Africa
in general. By May 1979, the Nigerian Society of International
Affairs had called on the Federal Military Government to take
some drastic action against Britain if it went ahead and
recognised the Muzorewa government. Among the measures suggested
were the withdrawal of Nigeria from the Commonwealth, the
suspension of diplomatic relations with the United Kingdom, and
a review of all British investments in Nigeria with a view to
nationalising them. The progressive boycott of British goods and
services and the withdrawal of Nigeria's foreign reserves from
sterling were also suggested. [17] In July 1979, the Dock Workers'
Union of Nigeria threatened to boycott all British ships in
Nigerian ports if Mrs Thatcher proceeded to recognise the
Muzorewa government. It also declared in a press statement that
it would spearhead a resolution at the "All West Africa Transport
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Workers" Union Conference in Freetown, Sierra Leone, in October
1979, that all dock workers on all West African ports should
boycott British ships should Mrs Thatcher recognise the Muzorewa
government. Making reference to the British government's lifting
of the oil embargo on South Africa it argued that such an
attitude showed "the Conservative government was bent on
befriending apartheid... and on recognising the puppet regime in
Salisbury at the expense of the Zimbabwean people."[18]
Despite the tough stand by the Federal Government on its dealings
with the British government, and the enormous encouragement it
enjoyed from public support, a division of opinion was witnessed
among Ministerial officials on the adoption of such policy. For
example, the Nigerian National Petroleum officials showed little
or no enthusiasm. They argued that nationalisation would result
in a decline in production especially since it coincided with the
time when the Federal Government was contemplating stepping up
production of crude oil to gain more revenue for the country.[19]
They were also concerned with the loss of expertise from British
expatriates. On the other hand, some officials from the home
ministries like the Federal Ministry of Economic Development and
Federal Ministry of Finance argued that, although some short-term
problems might arise, they could be overcome without a serious
disruption to the economy.[20]
THE REPERCUSSION OF THE
NATIONALISATION POLICY OF BP
146
The immediate decision of the takeover of BP brought about
strained relations between Britain and Nigeria. The cutoff of BP
from access to Nigerian crude oil brought about a fall of 6.5 per
cent in sterling in the world stock markets. [211 This claim might
be properly illustrated by taking into consideration the size and
range of BP interests in Nigeria.
SIZE AND RANGE OF BP INTERESTS
It was estimated that BP's investments in the area of production,
marketing and lifting of crude oil in Nigeria amounted to about
1 billion pounds (or about N1.5 billion) by July 1979.[22] The
Shell-BP Petroleum Development Company of Nigeria Limited had oil
concessions covering an area of 31,801.9 square miles expiring
on 30 November, 2000, more than 80% of all the concessions
granted to oil companies in the country.[23] Furthermore, in
terms of production, Shell-BP had been responsible for an average
of 60% of total production in Nigeria. In April 1979, the two
giant oil companies were responsible for producing about 1.373
million out of a total of 2.422 million barrels a day.
BP had a contract to lift oil from Nigeria and through this was
getting 240,000 barrels a day which represented about 10% of its
global oil requirements. Removing this source would hit BP hard
at a time when it was finding it extremely difficult to get
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alternative sources and when the Islamic revolution in Iran had
virtually cut off Iranian crude. Indeed, it has been estimated
that cutting the Nigerian supply would have left BP with a mere
160,000 barrels a day which was said to be too little for its
operation. [24]
Apart from all this, BP had petroleum retail marketing stations
in Nigeria, as shown in the table below:
OIL COMPANIES WITH PETROLEUM RETAIL MARKETING
STATIONS IN NIGERIA
Companies Number of Marketing Outlets of
Petroleum products
1975 1976 1977
1. Mobil Oil Nigeria Ltd 257 257 258
2. Texaco Nigeria Led 165 165 167
3. BP Nigeria Ltd 182 182 158
4. Total Nigeria Ltd 230 230 215
5. Agip Nigeria Ltd 119 119 131
6. National Oil Company 240 240 212
7. Unipetrol 167 167 211
Source:	 'petroleum products retail outlets in Nigeria,' in
Progress of Public Sector Participation in the Nigeria Oil 
Industry (Lagos: Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation,
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September 1978).
Indeed, the position of some British newspapers and magazines did
not help the situation. For instance, The Economist in its
editorial of 25 May 1979, called on the British government to
recognize the Muzorewa government; and predicted that Nigeria
would "only bark and not bite." Since the Conservative victory
of 3 May 1979, the Daily Telegraph and the Sunday Telegraph had
been calling on the Conservative government to recognize
Muzorewa and lift sanctions. In one of its editorials, the Daily
Telegraph not only bitterly criticized President Carter's press
statement on the Zimbabwe elections of April 1979 and the
Zimbabwe-Rhodesian constitution, but also demanded that London
should go ahead and recognize the Muzorewa government and present
the Commonwealth summit in Lusaka with a fait accompli.[25] While
it might be argued that these newspapers and magazines were
independent organisations and that they were not expressing the
British government's views, it is suggested that the Daily
Telegraph sometimes reflects government thinking and that, with
the Sunday Telegraph and The Economist, often expresses weighty
views that cannot easily be brushed aside by any government in
the United Kingdom, least of all a Conservative government.
It is against this background that the Obasanjo government issued
a number of statements from early May 1979 onwards on its
position towards the "sham elections in Zimbabwe" and warned that
any attempt to recognize the puppet regime of Muzorewa and/or to
lift sanctions would be met with hostility from Nigeria.[26] In
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an official statement on 1st May 1979, the Nigerian government
warned against some elements in the UK and other Western
countries "for whom the glitter and lure of share dividends and
the multinational corporate profits are irresistable and more
precious than buckets full of black Zimbabwean blood" and added
that the road to peace and stability in Salisbury lay in the
dismissal of the puppet Muzorewa government and the holding of
free and fair elections in that territory under UN supervision
with all the major parties actively participating. The Obasanjo
government sent a series of special notes to Mrs Thatcher. On 5th
June 1979, General Obasanjo insisted that any attempt to
recognize the Salisbury government would amount to "provocation
and a calculated and deliberate spite, constituting a wanton
disregard for African opinion and well-being and deserving of an
appropriate response."[27]
Though the nationalisation of BP brought about some hostilities
between the countries, the outcome of such antagonism was not in
the end very grave. Mrs Thatcher drew back from recognising the
Muzorewa government because of new directions agreed at the
Lusaka summit. However, the Nigerian government claimed that the
nationalisation policy softened her attitude, despite the fact
that the nationalisation policy was seen as only one factor among
others by most observers.
NIGERIA'S BOYCOTT OF THE 1986
EDINBURGH COMMONWEALTH GAMES
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Sport has always been an important instrument of Nigeria's
foreign policy since the country attained independence in October
1960. It was first used for the purpose of attaining a specific
foreign policy objective in 1976 when the country, along with the
other members of the OAU, boycotted the Montreal Olympic Games
to protest against the tour of South Africa by New Zealand rugby
players and the failure of the International Olympic Committee
(IOC) and the rest of the world to exclude the New Zealand team
from the games.[29] This same method was used again in 1978 when
Nigeria decided, along with Commonwealth African countries, to
boycott the Edmonton Commonwealth Games in protest against
further New Zealand sporting links with South Africa in defiance
of a United Nations ban on such links and in breach of the
Gleneagles agreement. [301
Bearing in mind that there will always be difference of opinions
as far as sports issues are concerned, this type of decision
becomes very difficult and complex to make. It becomes more
difficult in the specific case of the Commonwealth Games, one
important factor being the historical fact that Nigeria is a
creation of British colonialism and, as such, there exists in the
country a powerful pro-British lobby that often makes the case
against whatever is perceived to be detrimental to Anglo-Nigerian
relations. On the other hand, there is an articulate body of
opinion in the country which has historically made the case for
a more activist and progressive foreign policy and which has, on
occasions, succeeded in pushing the state into what Gambari
describes as its "radical impulses" in the arena of international
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affairs. [31]
The decision to boycott the 1986 Edinburgh Commonwealth Games was
a very difficult one. According to Professor Akinyemi, then
Minister of External Affairs, Nigeria as a leading member of the
Commonwealth, ought to play a frontline role in the
organisation.[32] It was on this ground that the Babangida
administration justified its decision to boycott the Edinburgh
Games. Akinyemi felt that it was necessary to stay away from
Edinburgh in order to leave no doubt about the commitment of
Nigeria to the liberation struggle in Southern Africa.[33] He
also believed that such an action was necessary in order to
strengthen Nigeria's credentials as an important actor in African
international affairs. [34]
The Babangida administration came to power in August 1985 at a
time when Anglo-Nigerian relations were probably at their worst.
The deterioration in relations arose out of the controversy over
Britain's decision to grant refuge to prominent politicians of
the Second Republic wanted in Lagos to answer charges of large-
scale corruption and fraud. The Buhari administration insisted
that the British had no basis for shielding the wanted men from
justice while the British argued that they were not convinced
that fair trials would be extended to the politicians if they
were extradited to their country. The so-called 'Dikko affair'
was prominent development of this episode.
After Buhari, at the inception of Babangida's administration, one
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of its ambitions was to improve relations between Nigeria and
Britain. The road to the restoration of improved ties between
Nigeria and Britain was, however, hindered by the British
attitude to the Commonwealth Heads of Government Summit held in
Nassau, Bahamas, in October 1985. That meeting was the first
direct, face-to-face high level contact between officials from
Lagos and London since the Dikko affair, but it was not at all
a pleasant affair. Whereas Nigeria, along with other Commonwealth
countries, wanted a strong stand on sanctions against South
Africa, the British sought to block any such move. Mrs Thatcher
argued that the South African government should be given more
time to carry out reforms to the apartheid system, a position
which was criticized by the rest of the Commonwealth.
To avert the result of a disastrous summit, it was agreed that
a Commonwealth Eminent Persons Group (EPG) be established to
study the South African situation closely and report back, with
specific recommendations to members. The Nigerian External
Affairs Minister at the time, Professor Bolaji Akinyemi, saw the
EPG as little more than a ploy by the British to delay concerted
Commonwealth action on the South African question and,
accordingly voiced the country's strong objections to such a
move. It took the combined pressure of other Commonwealth
countries and members of the Frontline States to persuade the
Nigerian government to participate in the EPG and nominate the
former Head of State, General Olusegun Obasanjo, to serve as co-
Chair of the Group with the former Australian Prime Minister,
Malcolm Fraser. [35] There was an implicit understanding at Nassau
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that Mrs Thatcher was willing to accept and implement, along with
other Commonwealth countries, the recommendations of the EPG.[36]
The irritation felt in Lagos over the British attitude to the
sanctions question receded into the background as the Nigerian
government decided to await for the outcome of the EPG's mission
and as the regime began to address seriously the worsening
economic crisis in the country. Upon its return to London, the
EPG recommended mandatory economic sanctions against the Pretoria
regime, thereby putting Mrs Thatcher on the spot. The British
Prime Minister had reached an implicit understanding with the
other delegates at Nassau to accept the outcome of the EPG's
mission. Faced with a report calling for sanctions, a report that
was unanimously reached and to which the British government's
nominee on the Group, Lord Barber, whose nomination was much
criticized in Britain on account of his extensive economic
interests in South Africa, was signatory, Mrs Thatcher abandoned
her earlier pledge in Nassau and rejected the EPG's sanctions
proposals. [371
Mrs Thatcher's statements over the sanctions question and her
decision to dishonour the Nassau accord on the EPG infuriated
much of the Commonwealth and threatened a major split in the 49-
nation organisation with members suggesting the expulsion of
Britain, which threat led to a rift between Queen Elizabeth II
and Mrs Thatcher.[38] Apart from her disagreement with the EPG
findings, Mrs Thatcher also disagreed openly with the Canadian
Prime Minister who was trying to soften her position on the
154
sanctions issue. It was at this point she made her position clear
that, as far as sanctions are concerned,".. .if I were the odd one
out and I were right it wouldn't matter, would it?'[39] On the
threat of countries such as Nigeria, India, Zimbabwe and others
that they were reviewing their membership of the Commonwealth in
view of the obduracy of the British, Mrs Thatcher wasted no time
in saying publicly that "... it does not matter who pulls out of
the Commonwealth."[40] At the same time, Mrs Thatcher's
government had permitted a violation of the spirit of Nassau by
permiting British companies to sponsor a trade fair with South
Africa, the pretext being that the fair had been planned well
before the Nassau Summit whose decisions precluded such
contacts. [41]
Nigeria was not in any way impressed by the British argument that
sanctions would hurt black Africans more than they would the
white racists against whom they were meant. There was a deep
sense of betrayal at the rejection of the EPG's report by London.
Comparisons were made between the UK government's prevarications
and hypocrisy on the sanctions issue and the swiftness with which
it decided to suspend its membership of the United Nation's
Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) in
solidarity with the United States.[42]
The feeling was so strong that the only appropriate response
seemed increasingly to be a radical one. The British made that
task easier when they released the official list of their
athletes for the impending Commonwealth Games scheduled for July
1986 in Edinburgh, Scotland. The list contained the names of two
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South African-born athletes - the controversial long distance
runner, Zola Budd, who had been the subject of a sustained anti-
apartheid campaign in Britain and beyond, and the swimmer,
Annette Cowley, also a South African-born.sportswoman.[43]
On the strength of this, the Nigerian Minister of External
Affairs, Bolaji Akinyemi, had no doubt in his mind what Nigeria
had to do. He recommended the boycott of the Edinburgh Games as
the first of a package of measures to protest against Britain's
South Africa policy.[44) Akinyemi's recommendation was accepted
by President Ibrahim Babangida and the Nigerian decision was soon
followed by many other Commonwealth countries of Africa, the
Caribbean and the Pacific.
CONCLUSION:
The commonwealth became an arena for action over Southern Africa
by successive Nigerian governments, conservative and radical.
Although having Britain as its founding member meant at list some
deference towards her in summit meetings. This gradually changed
and the Commonwealth became a forum of complains and protest
against the British. Unlike the UN, the Commonwealth carried
economic weight. Nigerian policy never highlighted the
Commonwealth as an economic forum or major development agency.
Here, Nigeria was free to emphasise only its liberation agenda -




NIGERIA AND SOUTH AFRICA IN THE OAU
The position taken by Nigeria on the Southern African political
situation, as well as its stand on anti-colonialism and racism
in any form, is a reflection of its foreign policy which
emphasises Africa as its corner-stone. Commonwealth Secretary-
General, Chief Anyaoku, told the author, "this is an area of
foreign policy where the peoples wish prevails. There is no
question of rational actor model or otherwise on this issue. It
is a situation which is very close to peoples' hearts especially
the Nigerian people."[1]
Various approaches have been pursued in the analysis of Nigerian
foreign policy towards South Africa, out there is one central
issue which has remained consistent in the foreign policy
prouncements of the successive administrations since Nigerian
Independence in 1960. There has been a condemnation of
colonialism, racism and racial discrimination. Also, there has
been continuous efforts by different Nigerian governments toward
their eradication.[2] Having helped create the OAU, as discussed
earlier in this thesis, this chapter will study Nigerian efforts
against racism under the umbrella of the OAU. Having already
documented the history of the Nigerian civil war and the effect
of the OAU on that issue, this chapter will take up Nigeria's
posture in the OAU from the time of Murtala/Obasanjo.
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MURTALA MOHAMMED/OBASANJO'S ADMINISTRATION
The Murtala Mohammed government brought a dramatic shift to
Nigerian foreign policy. It was Murtala Mohammed's government in
1975 which recognised the MPLA government in Angola thereby
ending the political stalemate between the three major liberation
movements - MPLA led by Dr. Agostino Neto, UNITA led by Dr. Jonas
Samvimbi and FNLA led by Mr. Holden Roberto. Nigeria took this
decision on the basis that MPLA was effectively in control of a
large part of Angolan territory and was also widely percieved as
having been more successful in prosecuting the liberation war.
The MPLA was also seen as more truly nationalistic and 'African,'
a view reinforced by the intervention of South Africa on the side
of forces ranged against the MPLA.
On the other hand, many other African countries were in favour
of according recognition to a Government of National Unity
composed of all three Angolan liberation movements. Coincidently,
the administration of President Gerald Ford of the United States,
canvassed vigorously for the same position during and after the
extraordinary summit conference of the OAU held in Addis Ababa
in January 1976 which was wholly devoted to the Angolan
crisis. [31




lucidly stated by General Murtala Mohammed, in his address
delivered on 11 January 1976, at the extraordinary summit
conference of the OAU. This speech has not been widely available
and I have reproduced it in full below; it contains a very clear
statement of Nigerian policy, unequivocal, and marks a
significant change in Nigerian foreign policy as well as support
for the OAU, and gratitude for its past help to Nigeria.[4]
It is in consideration of the unedifying role which the United
States has played in the African liberation struggle that the
Nigerian Federal Military Government took very strong objection
to the patronising interest which President Ford suddenly
developed in the Angolan situation. It should be made clear that
African memory is not as short as the American government thinks;
we are intelligent enough to draw a distinction between foreign
advisers from friendly countries invited by patriotic forces to
assist in maintaining national sovereignty and defend territorial
integrity and those racist adventurers who take it upon
themselves to invade African countries in order to undermine
their independence and exercise neo-colonialist influence.
This is the crux of the Angolan question. On the one hand is the
MPLA whose record in the struggle against Portuguese imperialism
is impeccable and whose government in Luanda has been recognised
by 23 African countries. The Nigerian Federal Military Government
being deeply convinced that the MPLA is the most dynamic, most
nationalistic of all the movements representing the interests of
the Angolan people, and convinced that it possesses the
attributes of an effective government, joined other African




summit session to complete the process undertaken so far by
individual governments by unanimously according the recognition
of our organisation to the Government of the MPLA.
On the other hand are the FNLA and UNITA, two movements which no
doubt played their part in the liberation struggle but which have
forfeited their right to leadership of the Angolan people by
joining hands with neo-colonialist adventurers and racist
soldiers of fortune including the apostles of apartheid, in a
determined effort to destroy the sovereignty of Angola. After the
moral and material support which Nigeria gave to the Angolan
liberation struggle, the Federal Military Government cannot
support any movement that seeks to hand the fruit of Angolan,
indeed African labour, to the enemies of Angola and Africa. It is
a mark of the disrepute in which the FNLA/UNITA front has thrown
themselves by their unpatriotic association with the notorious
subverters of African independence and the band of racists in
Pretoria, that no African country has accorded them recognition.
Mr. Chairman, the Angolan situation is not unique in the stormy
history of our continent - a history which is mostly the making
of outsiders. There is hardly any of our countries which, having
emerged from colonialism to independence, has not been subjected
to subversion and other covert activities to promote instability.
Such a situation of political chaos helps to keep our countries
weak and underdeveloped, to the delight of the neo-colonialist
who can always point to the inability of the Africans to rule
themselves much less rule the white minorities in Southern
Africa. Yet we know that peace is the most vital prerequisite for
orderly development. As long as the neo-colonists who pretend to




another, they ensure thereby our continued dependence on them. We
spend our meagre resources in maintaining law and order often to
the advantage of the military industrial complexes in the so-
called developed world. The gap between them and us thereby grows
even wider, we become ever weaker and create greater conditions
for the interference of the developed countries in our domestic
affairs.
In the circumstance, Mr. Chairman, this assembly has before it a
clear choice. It should endorse the MPLA as the only government
of Angola and invite its President, Dr. Agostino Neto, to take
his place of honour among us. The Assembly should call upon the
FNLA and UNITA to dissociate themselves from South Africa and lay
down their arms and the OAU should use its good offices in
consultation with the Angolan government to effect national
reconciliation of all the people of the country. This is not
without precedent. Nigeria recalls with tremendous pride and
satisfaction the noble role which this organisation played during
our crisis. The effectiveness of the role of the OAU rested on
three key factors:
First, the insistence on non-interference by foreign
powers;
Secondly, the firm recognition of the Nigerian
Federal Government as the only Government in the country;
Thirdly, the close collaboration between the OAU Commission
and the Nigerian Federal Government.




developments in Nigeria since 1970 is as much a tribute to the
enlightened policy of the Nigerian Federal Military Government as
it is a justification of the sensible approach of the OAU to the
crisis. It is worth recalling that those who are now seeking to
dictate a solution on Angola to the OAU were the same do-gooders
and self-appointed keepers of the moral conscience of the world
who condemned the OAU. Mr. Chairman, Africa has come of age. It
is no longer under the orbit of any extra continental power. It
should no longer take orders from any country, however powerful.
The fortunes of Africa are in our hands to make or mar. For too
long have we been kicked around; for too long have we been
treated like adolescents who cannot discern their interests and
act accordingly. For too long has it been presumed that the
African needs outside "experts" to tell him who are his friends
and who are his enemies. The time has come when we should make it
clear that we can decide for ourselves; that we know our own
interests and how to protect those interests; that we are capable
of resolving African problems without pressumptuous lessons in
ideological dangers, which more often than not have no relevance
for us, nor for the problem at hand.
General Murtala's speech is evidence of the arguments I put
forward earlier concerning the role the OAU played in the
Nigerian Civil War. In the Angolan case, General Murtala's
statement was regarded as significant and bold and was
significant for tilting the balance among OAU states in favour
of the MPLA government in Luanda. The statement marked the divide
between the foreign policy of the Gowon administration, which was
largely seen as low-key execution, and the more dynamic foreign
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policy of the Murtala administration.
On the assassination of General Murtala Mohammed, General
Obasanjo's administration continued this active support for the
MPLA government in Angola.
COMMITMENT BY NIGERIA AND THE
OAU OVER SOUTHERN AFRICA
In an interview on 17th January 1977 Oliver Tambo said:[5]
In Mauritius, we discussed with Nigeria's External Affairs
Commissioner, Brigadier Joe Garba, about the possibility of a
delegation of the African National Congress visiting Nigeria to
discuss the whole of the situation in southern Africa; the
problems and the prospects.
We are aware that the Federal Government of Nigeria is concerned
about the struggle in southern Africa. We have discussed with the
Nigerian authorities some areas where Nigeria could play an
effective role in the liberation struggle in southern Africa.
These areas include our main strategy for the attainment of the
objective of taking power from the white minority regime. We
discussed all the problems related to the carrying out of armed
struggle in southern Africa. We made quite clear, the kind of
assistance which Nigeria could render in order to achieve these
objectives. Alongside other African countries, Nigeria has a
vital role to play in advancing the struggle for total liberation
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in southern Africa. 	 We see the situation in Namibia and in
Zimbabwe as aspects of our own struggle in South Africa.
The frontline states require all kinds of assistance, but there
are other areas which require assistance as well. I am thinking
of Lesotho and Swaziland for example. These are countries which
share common borders with South Africa. In fact, the whole of the
southern Africa sub-region can now be seen as a composite theatre
of revolutionary struggle. As the struggle develops in South
Africa, it is inescapable that the border States will be
involved. For example, in the recent past, the military forces of
rebel Ian Smith in Zimbabwe had launched unprovoked attacks on an
independent African country - Mozambique.
The African National Congress is concerned that all the OAU
member states, individually and collectively should evolve
methods for more immediate and practical participation in the
unfolding struggle in Southern Africa. The OAU Liberation
Committee is active, it is involved in the struggle and it is
carrying out its mandate in a commendable manner. But it is the
IMMEDIATE involvement of each individual African country which is
important. The problem is that a struggle which is most likely to
escalate to international dimensions should not be regarded as
the main concern of the frontline States in southern Africa and
of the OAU Liberation Committee.
It is necessary for African States which are not one of the
Frontline States to be involved in the southern Africa situation
on a PERMANENT basis. Nigeria for example, is not a Frontline
State, but the country is actively involved. Other African




situation in southern Africa. The reaction of the Nigerian
authorities during our conversations have been positive and very
encouraging.
Tambo's statement reflected how well-received the new Nigerian
activism was. Generally speaking, the onus was heavier on
Murtala/Obasanjo's regime than on its predecessors. This was due
to the regime's practice of declaring Nigeria's position openly
without any hesitation irrespective of poor consequences. This
administration dealt with most of the issues that concerned
Southern Africa openly including its assistance to the MPLA
government. It was politically astute as well as idealistic. For
example, in 1976, Nigeria played a key role in getting the Gulf
Oil Corporation, to resume operations in Angola. This was the
type of recognition the MPLA government needed. One of its
important objectives in the early days of its struggle was to
secure recognition from the Ford administration. When this was
not forthcoming, the next option towards recognition from the
United States was the operation of Gulf oil in Cabinda the
Angolan enclave. The MPLA government recognised Nigerian
influence in the oil-producing community and sought its
assistance. [61
The account of what transpired, as related to the present author,




government made a proposition to Gulf Oil for it to resume
operations in Angola. As well as seeing the political
implications of such a move, Nigeria made its proposition with
political and economic muscle. Gulf was asked to reopen Cabinda
or have its operations in Nigeria closed. The president of Gulf
Oil came to Nigeria to determine whether the threat was a serious
one. General Obasanjo confirmed to him that it was "dead serious"
and offered him an escort to proceed to Angola to negotiate with
the authorities there. With Nigeria's help, an agreement was
reached. Shortly thereafter, a statement was issued
simultaneously from Luanda and Pittsburgh (the location of
headquarters of Gulf Oil) announcing Gulf Oil's resumption of
operations in Angola. Likewise, net royalties due to Angola were
paid the next day.[7]
The resumption of operations by a major United States corporation
brought additional credibility and more recognition to the MPLA
government; and this was the type of influence Nigeria wanted to
have in the international arena especially over Southern African.
Nigeria was very pleased with the outcome of its assistance. Even
the continuation of Cuban troops in Angola a hackle that
irritated the US, could be used ingeniously against the US.
Angola maintained that the troops were used to protect the
installations of multi-national companies in Angola, including
those of Gulf Oil. Having said that, Nigeria recorded few other




pressure on Britain over Zimbabwe was accomplished through the
Commonwealth. By the mid-to-late 1980s emphasis on Southern
Africa was increasingly balanced by economic concerns. With the
advent of the early 1990s, and changes in South African policy,
Nigerian policy was articulated through the OAU but also in other
fora, especially the UN, and in concert with the emerging
regional organisation of Southern Africans themselves.
SIGNIFICANT CHANGES IN SOUTHERN AFRICA
There have been some significant developments since 1990. These
include the release of Nelson Mandela in February 1990. As
changes began, they were welcomed but conditionally. Diplomatic
pressure, it was felt, still had a role to play against South
Africa. The Frontline States adopted the Harare Declaration on
20th August 1989, specifying the changes that had to be made by
the racist South African regime in order to allow a negotiated
solution to the crisis. These included the abrogation of the
pillars of apartheid such as the Group Areas Act, and the
Population Registration Act, among others. The Harare Declaration
subsequently formed the basis for the United Nations Consensus
Declaration on Apartheid adopted by the Special Session of the
General Assembly in December 1989. It is significant that the
Nigerian Permanent Representative to the United Nations and




Major General Joe Garba (rtd), presided over the Special Session
on Apartheid; Nigeria is a member of both the OAU Committee on
Southern Africa as well as the Commonwealth Committee of Foreign
Ministers on Southern Africa.[8]
When the February 1, 1991 declaration in the South African
Parliament by President de Klerk failed to address the issues of
the release of political prisoners, ending of political trials
and the safe return of exiles, Nigeria joined other OAU member-
states in demanding that profound and irreversible changes in
South Africa take place before the lifting or relaxation of
sanctions. Nigeria's position was fully articulated in a speech
given by Foreign Minister Major-General Ike Nwachukwu at the
meeting of the Commonwealth Committee of Foreign Ministers.[9]
Let it be made clear at the outset: the Nigerian government welcomes,
in the most positive terms, the declaration made by President de Klerk
before the South African Parliament on the 1st of February. The group
Areas Act, the Land Acts and the Population Registration Act, are among
the most obnoxious and intractable of the pillars of the apartheid
legal system. President de Klerk has shown great courage in tabling a
promise to repudiate them. In addition, parts of his vision for a new
South Africa give evidence of a new realism on the part of the
manifesto for a new South Africa, give evidence of a new realism on the
part of the South African government in their recognition that the
intransigence of outmoded policies cannot promote the cause of peace




But a promise is not a programme, and glimpses of a vision however
rosy, do not amount to a blueprint. What we need now, above all, in
South Africa, indeed what the Commonwealth as a body has demanded are
specific constitutional actions, agreed in a democratic manner and
implemented with just and equitable modalities.
Those of us who are anxious for change in South Africa have learned,
in the past, to meet South African declarations with growing
skepticism. This as a result of a series of promises that went
unfulfilled and false dawns that did not break.
Another development was Namibia's independence on 21st March
1990, and its accession to the Charter of the OAU as the 52nd
member in July 1990. Nigeria's moral, political, diplomatic,
material and financial support contributed immensely to the
success of the Namibian people's struggle for independence,
under their liberation organisation, the South West African
People's Organisation (SWAPO). The SWAPO leader, Mr. Sam
Nujoma, became independent Namibia's first president. During
his inaugural address at independence, and in several other
speeches, President Nujoma paid tribute to Nigeria for its
pivotal support.
Apart from the overall massive material and financial
assistance which Nigeria extended to SWAPO throughout the
prosecution of the war of liberation, some specific assistance
given by Nigeria immediately before and after the independence




author have not been previously published.
The launching of the Namibia Solidarity Fund by
President Ibrahim Babangida on 16 June 1989. This
Fund which was made up of entirely voluntary
contributions by Nigerians worldwide, helped raise
N100 million (11 million US dollars) for Namibia;
payment of US $400,000.00 to the OAU as assessed
contribution in aid of SWAPO, to enable the latter
to finance its electoral campaign in the period
leading to the United Nations supervised election in
November 1989;
the voluntary contribution of US $1,000,000.00 to
the United Nations for the repatriation of Namibian
refugees and exiles to enable them to participate in
the UN-sponsored decolonization process. This pledge
was made in January 1989 and subsequently redeemed;
the payment of US $162,674.00 as its assessed
contribution to the budget of the United Nations
Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG), which was
emplaced in Namibia to supervise Namibia's




the contribution of a 182-man police contingent, the
single largest, to UNTAG. In fact, a Nigerian Police
Commissioner, Mr. Ezedinma Ifejika, was appointed
the Deputy Police Adviser on the UN Transition
Assistance Group (UNTAG) in Namibia;
contribution of 40 electoral personnel to UNTAG;
the release of a retired Nigerian senior Ambassador,
Ambassador 0. Jolaoso to head the OAU Observer
Mission in Namibia, during the implementation of
Security Council resolution 435 (1978);
the pledge of US $1 million, at the Namibia Pledging
Conference held at UN Headquarters, New York, in
July 1990. The money is meant to finance specific
economic and technical projects in Namibia, during
the immediate post-independence period. Nigeria has
repeatedly expressed its readiness to extend
economic, technical and financial support for newly
independent Namibia.
In addition to its generosity towards Namibia and the honoring
of its international pledges, Nigeria has been giving
political, financial and material assistance to the other
Frontline States (Angola, Botwsana, Mozambique, Tanzania,
OAU
	 171
Zambia and Zimbabwe) both multilaterally, through the Southern
African Development Coordinating Conference (SADCC), and
bilaterally, by giving soft loans to the tune of US
$45,207,018.00 to SADCC member-States through the Nigerian
Trust Fund (NTF) administered by the African Development Bank
(ADB). It has equally provided the sum of US $109,783,109.45
to individual member states of the Frontline States between
1975 and 1989.[11]
CONCLUSION
There is now the clear evidence that the "singular policy"
which has earned Nigeria prominence in the international arena
is evaporating. The question now is, "what next?" Professor
Oshuntokun's response to this question when I put it to him
was: [121
In fact, many people including scholars, have often wondered
whether Nigeria's foreign policy was not in danger of becoming
one `single issue' policy, sometimes they do not stop wondering
what will happen to the Nigerian foreign policy if apartheid
was fully eradicated in Southern Africa. But as the apartheid
is being won, Nigeria is also preparing itself for a changed




informal discussions between the government of Nigeria and
other governments which Nigeria feels it could do business
with. President Babangida's administration has introduced two
additional guiding principles of Nigeria's foreign policy - the
principle of reciprocity based on mutual respect, and economic
diplomacy.
Economic diplomacy, aggressively pursued by the Minister of
External Affairs, Major General Ike Nwachukwu, consists of
active pursuit of foreign policy objectives that are designed
to promote trade and investments and to complement domestic
economic reforms such as trade liberalisation and
commercialization of public enterprises.
The fact that Nigeria now emphasises the economic element of
its policy is a logical sequence and offers incentive to the
development of trade possibilities yet untapped. Peace in
Angola helped by the consolidation of the independence of
Namibia, which among other factors would speed up the end of
racism and apartheid in South Africa. In the final analysis
this would create new markets and economic blocs and make trade
and economic cooperation between Nigeria and Southern Africa
much more practicable.
A short market survey of Southern Africa trade area otherwise
known as SADCC, in particular Zimbabwe, shows a great deal of
decline of commercial exchange between Nigeria and Zimbabwe
from what obtained before. But strong possibilities exist for





Some of the countries of the SADCC have no refineries and
import whole-sale refined petroleum outside Africa. This is
trade diverted from Nigeria against threats of destabilisation
and infrastructural constraints. Nigeria cannot only enlarge
its political cooperation with countries of Southern Africa but
also economic and commercial exchange.
From the stage of the liberation struggle to the negotiating
table, Nigeria has been firm and effective supporter of the
nationalist movements in Southern Africa, using both the
international platform of the UN and the continental forum of
the OAU. Nigeria has ranked among the Frontline States in the
struggle against colonialism and racial domination especially
apartheid in South Africa.
This is the clear articulation of change. It is also an
articulation of the OAU's limits. Without South Africa as an
'organising principle,' the OAU cannot continue as before in a
continental political role. It has no substantial economic
influence which is what Nigeria now seeks. Having helped
create the OAU as a conservative political body, Nigeria now
looks to groups such as SADCC (now SADC) for economic
exchange, and may in time look to South Africa itself.
OAU	 174
PART III:
THE DEVELOPMENT AND CONTINUITY
OF FOREIGN POLICY
CHAPTER 9:
MILITARY GOVERNMENTS AND CONTINUITY OF POLICY
The coup d'etat of July 1975 which toppled Gowon's regime ushered
in an entirely new character to the Nigerian political scene in
matters of style and approach. From the official pronouncements
of the Balewa, Ironsi and Gowon administrations, it was possible
to discern the embryonic stages of what was later to develop as
Nigeria's 'assertive African policy'under Murtala and Obasanjo.
Akinyemi and Vogt pointed out that the Southern African problem
has been one of the continuing preoccupations of Nigerian
governments since the attainment of independence. Successive
Nigerian administrations have inherited the problem of Southern
Africa and they have to varying degrees pursued policies designed
to solve the problem.[1] Since Murtala, however, there has been
until 1990 at least, and the beginnings of change in South
Africa, certain continuities of policy across both civilian and
military regimes. There can be said as a result to be a national 
foreign policy.
MURTALA MOHAMMED/OBASANJO'S REGIME 1975-1979
Murtala Mohammed without any previous experience in government
or foreign affairs pursued a policy which has been recognised by
many as adventurous, activist, yet pragmatic and realistic in
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nature. Through his own personal view of the world he decided to
initiate a policy based on the conviction that Africans,
particularly Nigerians, would simply not tolerate South African
designs in Southern Africa.[2] His first step was the swift
recognition and support to the MPLA as the legitimate government
of Angola. This was not a favoured decision in the eyes of
western countries. However, it elevated Nigeria's foreign policy
profile. Davidson stated that "this event was the onset of a new
development of African independence."[3]
After the assassination of Murtala, General Obasanjo took over
the leadership of Nigeria with the commitment to carry out the
policies already laid down by his predecessor, but this was
pursued with a different style. Obasanjo was seen as both
calculating and reflective. It was certainly not ideological. He
did not view the involvement of communist countries in Southern
Africa as immoral or threatening to Africa. On the Cuban
involvement in Angola, he said:[4]
In every case where Cuba's intervention was
established, they intervened as a consequence of the
failure of western policies and on behalf of
legitimate African interests... We have no right to
condemn the Cubans nor the countries which felt they
needed Cuban assistance to consolidate their
sovereignty or territorial integrity.
But he also stated that Nigeria was unwilling to be identified
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with either of the two great ideological camps and that its goal
was to minimise the influence of both. He admonished the Cubans
not to "overstay their welcome."[5]
The most remarkable point is that Obasanjo's regime also made a
continuous use of its position on the United Nations Committee
on Apartheid, Non-aligned Movement and other Afro-Asian groups
to isolate South Africa and Rhodesia, and support the liberation
movements in tangible terms. Nigeria also persistently attempted
during this regime to bring pressure to bear on the great powers
that sustained the minority regimes with infusions of armaments
and above all capital. It also employed the use of threat to
pressurise Britain on its stand and role in Zimbabwe and South
Africa. This threat was translated into action when Nigeria
nationalised Barclays Bank for doing business with South Africa
and British Petroleum in Nigeria for selling Nigeria's oil
illegally to South Africa.[6]
SHAGARI'S ADMINISTRATION - 1979-1982
This administration came to power in October 1979 after a
successful election which was won by the Nigerian National Party
headed by Shagari. It therefore became the second civilian
government since the Nigerian independence, after the successful
transfer of power back to civilian hands by Obasanjo.
The question to be addressed in this part of the chapter is
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whether there has been a continuity of radicalism in policy since
the Murtala/Obasanjo regime. In this matter economic factors
cannot be overlooked. Nnoli, in his analysis of Nigeria's
Southern African policy stated that Nigeria's inability to
implement the 1965 OAU Ministerial Council's resolution to sever
diplomatic relations with Britain for a perceived lack of action
over Ian Smith's rebellion in Rhodesia was due to its
incapability of paying the political and economic costs of such
an action.[7] Nigeria in 1965 relied on the industrialised
countries of the west for the supply of technology and capital
for development. This had led to a conservative foreign policy
in the first decade of independence. But the second decade of
Nigeria's independence showed a greater economic potential which
paved the way for more confidence and greater political will. By
the end of the civil war, Nigeria had acquired a new economic
strength. The boom in the oil industry not only accelerated the
economic growth rate but also greatly enhanced its standing in
the international arena.[8] According to Aluko, dependence is
incompatible with an assertive foreign policy. Aluko stated that
the phenomenal growth of the economy, largely as a result of the
oil boom, had strengthened Nigeria's position in relations with
the superpowers. "Neither of the superpowers can now use foreign
aid as a means of political leverage on Nigeria... Heavy American
dependence on Nigeria's oil means that Nigeria is free not only
to criticise the United States but also to put pressure on
it."[9] This observation describes the conditions influencing
Nigeria's subsequent foreign policy decisions and its external
behaviour which included Murtala's rebuff of United States
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President, Gerald Ford, over the issue of Angola and the
subsequent recognition of the MPLA as the legitimate government
of Angola. The first step now is to examine how far the Shagari's
administration was able to carry on with this type of
assertiveness in its foreign policy.
The Shagari administration became heir to the strong economic
position and confidence of its predecessors. It maintained the
tempo by Nigeria's active participation in the Lancaster House
proceedings which led to the independence of Zimbabwe.
Reminiscent of the Murtala/Obasanjo era was a protest by
President Shagari to the British government on the issue of
Zimbabwe. He warned that unless agreement was reached on the
transitional arrangements, no agreement should have been deemed
to be reached on the constitution.[10] President Shagari also
gave renewed emphasis to the liberation of Namibia and the
eradication of apartheid in South Africa.
The attainment of Zimbabwe's independence in 1980 did not prevent
Nigeria from having concern over Zimbabwe's domestic political,
social and economic needs. For example, President Shagari's offer
of ten million Naira towards Zimbabwe's independence
celebration[11] inaugurated a marked interest in the survival of
Zimbabwe. Up to 1991, Nigeria's contribution to Namibia's
independence fund, according to the present author's sources,
amounted to about $666.6 million.[12] Nigeria's interest in the
long-range stability of Southern Africa with the decolonisation
of Namibia remained part of the Shagari policy. It was involved
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in drawing up long-range plans with the front-line states of
Tanzania, Zambia, Angola, Mozambique, Botswana and Zimbabwe in
pursuing the liberation policy. Nigeria's concern for the future
of Southern Africa was identified by its firm position on the
status of Walvis Bay as Namibian territory and on the conduct of
free and fair elections in Namibia. Shagari in his foreign policy
pronouncement reiterated Nigeria's commitment in Southern Africa.
He stated:[13]
We are supporting and we will continue to support the
liberation fighters... we will not sacrifice this
commitment to any other course.
The linkage between the security of the Nigerian people and the
liberation struggle served to establish an anti-apartheid
Nigerian public opinion which provided invaluable moral support
for successive Nigerian governments in their involvement in
Southern Africa. [14]
OBSTACLES
By the end of 1980 Nigerian public opinion was that Nigeria's oil
revenue would grow and that the new administration would be able
to manage the domestic economy and use it to project a firm
foreign policy.[15] But in reality this was not the case. The
aftermath of the sudden passing of oil prosperity presented a
major economic constraint on Nigeria's foreign policy. Nigeria's
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earnings from the middle of 1980 to the beginning of 1982 failed
to match its commitments. The President's response to the
economic crisis underlined the vulnerability of the Nigerian
economy. For example, strict remedial measures were announced
including the reduction of travel allowance for all categories
of citizens, and a reduction of imports.[16]
Nigeria was faced with the problem of a chronic trade account
deficit, inflation, a rising foreign debt and particularly an
umbilical dependence on one source of revenue for
expenditures.[17] President Shagari identified the problem as the
global economic and geopolitical calculations of the major
industrial nations to break OPEC. "The major and lesser
industrial nations depend on petroleum for a substantial
proportion of their energy needs. It is naturally in their
interest to protect the economic growth of their nations from
being endangered by a seeming impenetrable OPEC solidarity."[18]
As the states maintained the squeeze on OPEC, Nigeria's import
bills continued to rise because the domestic economy could no
longer be sustained without capital imports. At the same time the
foreign exchange reserves maintained a steady decline. Under
these circumstances, the government had no alternative but to
borrow from the western banks.
The government continued to impose more stringent austerity
measures on the domestic budget and also reduced its spending.
But the unemployment created by austerity and the burden of
economic measures created discontent and social imbalance -
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destabilising influences. The situation in Nigeria during this
period was reminiscent of the fragile domestic environment of the
first years. This not only undermined Nigria's ability to act
assertively in its external interactions but also compelled it
to divert attention to the domestic arena.[19]
It could be argued that what brought about the end of Shagari's
administration was its abandonment of the 'zoning' arrangement
which involved different regions and ethnic groups. These groups
were allocated leading governmental offices and party
responsibilities which made the National Party of Nigeria
stronger than any of the other four parties. Most importantly was
the failure of the office of the President to rotate among the
zones of the National Party, as agreed by its members, following
the renomination of Shagari for the 1983 general election. The
NPN was therefore seen by its opponents as a tool for Hausa-
Fulani domination of Nigeria. As a party which controlled the
central government but not a majority of the state governments,
it began to experience stiff opposition from a united frGat (If
the state governments that the other political parties
controlled. In other words, the first Republic's pattern of
ethnic and regionally based political parties, and
confrontational politics emerged in the second Republic. By the
time the second round of the national and state elections took
place in 1983, the political establishment in Nigeria had
developed serious credibility problems. [20]
The economic problems which the Shagari administration failed to
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address exacerbated social tensions and domestic unrest. This was
a result of an almost total dependence of the Nigerian economy
on oil revenue alone. This type of dependence on one source of
revenue meant that the position of the oil market determined
Nigeria's ability to manage its economy. For example, by 1979/80,
Federal collected revenue for that year was estimated at N12,272
billion.[21] The result was that Nigeria at this time found it
extremely difficult to finance its import bills for consumer
goods, food, raw materials as well as machinery for domestic
production.
BUHARI'S ADMINISTRATION - 1983-1985
Shagari's administration came to an end by a coup d'etat on the
31st of December 1983. The Buhari regime declared that the
intervention by the military and the overthrow of the civilian
administration was a political act designed, in the MOT IaS Di his
supporters, "essentially to prevent the country from imminent
collapse, since all indications pointed that the former civilian
administration (at federal and state levels) has exhausted its
capacity and legitimacy to withstand the reaction of the
people."[22] Buhari's regime did not hesitate to point out the
enormous debt burden which it inherited. It was proclaimed that
on the domestic level, the last civilian administration converted
the budget surplus of N1,461 million inherited from its
predecessor in 1979 into a deficit of N1,975 million by the
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following year.[23] Between 1980 and 1983, there seemed to be a
competition between federal and state governments in recording
huge budget deficits. While the federal budget deficit came to
between N4,000 million and N6,000 million, the combined budget
deficits of the states rose from N3,295 million in 1980 to about
N6,000 million in 1983.[24] On the external front, it was
understood that the civilian administration exhausted the credit
balance of N2.5 billion inherited from its predecessor. There was
also an outstanding trade arrears on letters of credit of $1.88
billion and accumulated short term trade arrears on the open
accounts of about $5 billion.[25]
It is pertinent to make mention of the above points in some of
Buhari's speeches because of the effect this type of inheritance
had on the regime itself. With all these economic and financial
problems, the regime's attitude might well have deviated sharply
from the pattern existing before it took over.
The Buhari regime addressed itself to two major issues. On the
domestic sector, it proclaimed a better management of the economy
and the establishment of greater discipline by the rulers and the
ruled which culminated in the 'War Against Indiscipline' (WAI )
campaign.[26] On the external sector, the regime was poised to
use foreign policy as an instrument for rebuilding the shattered
economy and internal security. This led to two major decisions
by the regime. These included the closure of the land borders and
the explusion of what it regarded as "aliens."[27] These people
were mainly citizens of other African countries. The Nigerian
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stand on these issues was proclaimed in one of the early speeches
of Buhari where he stated that "where the national interest of
Nigeria conflicted with those of its neighbouring states and
African countries in general, the national interest of Nigeria
will take priority."[28]
The regime claimed that the collapse of the previous
administration was due to leadership inability or unwillingness
to take tough decisions to manage the economy especially in the
face of declining oil revenue; this prompted the regime to reach
its decision to take what it called corrective measures.
SOUTHERN AFRICAN ISSUE:
On the issue of the liberation of Southern Africa, the regime
took on board the belief that South Africa constitutes one of the
greatest threats to its national interest. Even under this
regime, irrespective of the critical period Nigeria was
undergoing both economically and financially, it sought to
maximize the advantages inherent in holding the chairmanship of
the United Nations Special Committee against Apartheid and sought
to expose the moral poverty of apartheid before world opinion.
As a result, according to Nigerian diplomatic opinion even the
friends of South Africa in Western world were persuaded to
denounce apartheid in various international fora.[29] The main
foreign policy concern of the Nigerian government during this
period, however, was the economic position of most of the third
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world countries resulting from the oil glut which adversely
affected earnings from oil exports, alongside other ailments such
as drought, famine, and flood. The Nigerian government was of the
opinion that the inability of most African countries to meet
their financial contributions towards the liberation of Southern
Africa made it a 'necessity' for Mozambique to sign a non-
aggression pact with Pretoria in 1984 and not a 'choice.'
Secondly, the regime observed that the Reagan administration had
gained the upper hand in promoting the idea of the so-called
'constructive engagement' with South Africa. The Buhari regime
sought to redress some of these setbacks. On the strength of
this, Nigeria proclaimed that it would maintain support of the
liberation movements through strategies such as:[30]
(a) making substantial financial and other materials
contributions to ANC and SWAPO, and to a much
lesser extent to PAC...
(b) encouraging the ANC to rethink new strategies of
operations within South Africa itself...
(c) increasing consultations with Eastern bloc
countries with a view to improving their
assistance to the liberation movements;
(d) on the wider international scene, identifying and
working actively with influential groups such as
religious organisations and anti-apartheid groups
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to increase world attention directed at the evils
of apartheid;
(e) obtaining international support for the
frontline states through the Non-
Aligned Movement, the UNO, and OPEC, so
as to strengthen their economies and
reduce their dependence on South
Africa.
The regime was quite aware of the sharp limitations in its
capability to make the US government change its policies. It
realised that the era of use of oil as a diplomatic instrument
was over. The economy was in such a poor state it meant more
dependence on the western world than before. Nigeria's diplomatic
opinion shared the view that the main reason for maintaining the
pressure on the Reagan administration in particular was to get
the US public well-informed and this made the Reagan
administration particularly careful not to veto a Security
Council resolution passed with wide support.[31]
The Nigerian press felt that, in the Buhari administration, the
country's leadership on issues affecting apartheid in South
Africa or independence in Namibia remained unchallenged and
positively in tune with the world in general and Africa in
particular.[32] Nigeria's participation in the work of the 20th
summit of the OAU at Addis Ababa was considered very positive.
The National Concord's comment on this was that it showed that
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the regime could articulate a credible stand on African policy
issues and also give necessary leadership.[33] The regime's
decision to honour its pledge at the summit to contribute $5
million to Africa's famine problems irrespective of its economic
state at home was also applauded.[34]
Generally speaking, public opinion considered that the regime
gave all possible diplomatic support and moral encouragement to
the liberation movements in Southern Africa. Notwithstanding,
it has been suggested that the regime should probably have
allocated more financial resources than it did through increasing
private and governmental contributions to the Nigerian Fund for
South African relief which should have been re-named the fund for
the liberation of Southern Africa.[35] This will be clarified
below from the table of contributions by different
administrations.
The Buhari regime proclaimed that the defence of Nigeria's
national security and the welfare of its citizens would be the
axes around which foreign policy would revolve as long as it
stayed in power. The regime's main foreign policy objective
therefore was to project the country's national interests along
the lines of concentric circles of policy priorities, an
orientation of foreign policy which would be assumed to be
conceptually sound and consistent especially with the recognition
of reduced national financial resources and power, starting close
to home before spreading outwards. Unfortunately, the decisions
to close the borders and to expel the so-called illegal aliens
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were out of order with the declared policy of concentric circles,
which ought to have given priority to relations with
neighbours.[36] There were mixed feelings shown by the Nigerian
newspapers. Some openly commended such decisions while some did
so implicitly. However, many of these decisions might have served
only the short-term national interests. The length of time the
borders remained closed and the mass nature of the expulsion
exercise did more harm to Nigeria's long-term affairs, and
especially its commitments to ECOWAS and the OAU. Nigeria's
attitude during this period would have created a basis for
retaliation, except for the patience exercised by most African
countries, even bearing in mind that Nigeria had broken the
ECOWAS treaty of free movement. Burkina Faso for one, made an
attempt to give Nigeria a taste of its own coin by rounding up
its citizens resident in Ouagadougou, with the intention of
expelling them in sympathy with Ghana. This attempt came to a
halt due to the Nigerian government's protest that at no time did
it ever expel all the aliens working in Nigeria but rather it
expelled only the illegal ones. [37] It was also pointed out that
the Ministry of External Affairs was not really consulted in the
decision to close the border and also not fully involved in the
decision to expel illegal aliens on a mass scale.[38]
Nevertheless, as 1985 progressed and the full effects of the
administration's efforts to revamp the economy and instill public
accountability and national discipline began to be felt, public
alienation grew. There were reports of a widening split among
senior members of the Supreme Military Council and rumours about
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an impending military coup. Under these circumstances, public
interest in foreign policy issues diminished and the
administration's efforts were consigned to the back stage.[39]
The Buhari regime was overthrown on 27th August 1985. Major
General Ibrahim Badamasi Babanginda succeeded as the President
and the Commander-in-chief of the Federal Republic of Nigeria.
BABANGIDA'S REGIME - 1985 TO THE EARLY 1990S
When Babangida's regime took office on 27th August 1985 he made
a direct statement to the nation - "Events today indicate that
most of the reasons which justified the military take over of
government from civilians still persist... A phenomenon of
constant insecurity and overbearing uncertainty have become
characteristic of our existence. My colleagues and I are
determined to change the course of history."[40] This very
statement has been quoted because it would assist in determining
whether the regime eventually measured up to its promise or not.
I will attempt to compare the achievements of the present regime
with the previous administrations after Murtala/Obasanjo and
examine whether there has been refinement of policy since then.
The first move by the administration was to repair relations with
Nigeria's West African neighbours left frosty by Buhari's
expulsion of Africans from Nigeria and the closure of the land
borders. Also, high-powered solidarity visits were paid to the
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Frontline states such as Zimbabwe, Zambia, Botswana, Mozambique
and Angola. The liberation movements - SWAPO fighting for the
independence of Namibia, the ANC and the PAC then in exile, got
renewed pledges of financial support from Nigeria.[41] Professor
Akinyemi made Nigeria's position with other African countries
clear during his maiden speech as the Minister of External
Affairs. He said that there was no disputing the fact that
Nigeria had responsibilities to Africa and that also Africa owed
responsibilities to Nigeria. [421 When it is said that Africa is
the centre-piece of Nigeria's foreign policy, it means that
Nigeria should identify and defend the legitimate interests of
Africa collectively, and each African state individually. This
he explained to mean that Africa and African states should
identify with and defend Nigerian interests. If Nigeria owes a
responsibility to stand up for and respond to Africa, it was owed
an obligation to be consulted when the situation allows for
consultations.[43] He also added that "Nigeria must not and
cannot allow states which of their own free-will adopt policies
that lead to crisis." [44] Akinyemi's position on African issues
generally was received with mixed feelings by most Nigerians.
After the loss of an aeroplane by Libya in its dispute with the
United States of America over the Gulf of Sirte Nigeria kept mute
over the development; this attitude angered the Nigerian
radicals. Again, days later, the bombing of the Libyan cities of
Tripoli and Bergazi led to angry attacks on the Minister. Though
the federal government condemned what it recognised as American
terrorism in a fellow African country, Professor Akinyemi
justified his line of foreign policy formulation during the
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author's interview with him. He stressed that the fact that
Nigeria has the interest of Africa at heart does not indicate
that it should be dragged into other countries decision to carry
out certain obligation for which it was not originally
consulted.[45] He cited the Libyan issue as an example.
Akinyemi's ministership in Babangida's administration was
nevertheless noted as a remarkable period in Nigeria's foreign
policy pursuits, remarkable for the symmetryinvisionbetween the
national leader who wanted to re-enact the activism of the second
half of the 1970's and the External Affairs Minister who
envisioned his country discovering its power potential, its
regional supremacy and its causing other countries to respect its
primacy. He was almost seen as being a Nigerian equivalent of
Henry Kissinger, the widely acclaimed U.S. Secretary of State
under Presidents Nixon and Ford. The conceptions of his
ministerial role underpinned policy ideas such as the All Nigeria
Conference of Foreign Policy, Technical Aid Corps Scheme (TAC),
the proposed but stalled Pan Africanist Congress, the call for
the development of a "black" atom bomb (never presented as a
formal policy proposal), and the Concert of Medium Powers. This
presumed that the Ministry of External Affairs was determined to
play a dynamic vanguard role as a force both for implementation
and support of policy, not to mention the academic origin and
impetus of the External Affairs Minister himself. Akinyemi,
justifies his moves on these issues when, during the author's
interview with him, he pointed out that the Soviet Union rose
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from one of the poorest countries in the world to a power to be
reckoned with due to its efforts towards its military
capability. [46] He added that no country becomes totally well-to-
do internally before embarking on policies which would elevate
its position in the international circle.[47] He argued that both
in US and the USSR poverty still exists but it did not stop them
from either pursuing their military capabilities or giving aid
to such countries as they wish to assist.[48] Therefore, African
states have no reason to hesitate in increasing their military
capabilities he said. However, the Ministry of External Affairs,
was ill-suited for Akinyemi's bold initiatives. This was
explained by Francis Ogene when he stated that "The foreign
service was created and moulded in 1957 by the colonial
government in Nigeria and the foreign office in London as a force
to moderate Nigerian foreign policy after independence. The
training of the first corps of the foreign service officers
between 1956 and 1960 stressed traditional diplomatic values and
necessity to foster peace and stability in inter-state relations.
This first group of diplomats have moulded the foreign service
and imposed their values on the organisation... Apart from its
inability to innovate or create new and revolutionary ideas in
foreign policy, the foreign service at times constitutes itself
into formidable force opposing or frustrating radical ideas and
advocating the more traditional approaches."[49]
In any case, the idea of the Concert of Medium Powers did not
last as the economic realities and Nigeria's 'leaner purse' kept
hammering the point home which indicated that a shift in
193
diplomacy from a political to economic emphasis was essential.
Coincidently, the shift was observed through the departure of
Akinyemi from the Ministry of External Affairs.
THE LINKAGE ISSUE
Babangida's regime did not lose sight of the linkage between the
domestic and the foreign policy behaviour, It recognised that in
order to build a sound domestic environment which would
eventually influence Nigeria's foreign policy behaviour there was
the prior need to seek accommodation and compromise with
important segments of the Nigerian public. In order to achieve
this, there were established Directorate for Social Mobilisation,
the Armed Forces Consultative Assembly, the Directorate for
Employment, the Directorate for Food, Roads, and Rural
Infrastructure, the Centre for Democratic Studies, the National
Commission for Women and the Peoples Bank.[50]
Babangida's most radical programme, however, was the Structural
Adjustment Programme which came to encompass every economic
policy programme and measure of the regime. A reading of the one-
year old South Commission Report, shows that what is happening
Nigeria is taking place in most of the developing world.[51]
While it is true that the SAP has given rise to efficient
utilisation of resources, particularly local one, it could be
argued that the quality of life of many Nigerians who should be
both the means and end of all economic activities is yet to
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appreciate.
NIGERIA AND SOUTHERN AFRICA
The early stage of Babangida's administration witnessed
difficulties with the British government over South Africa.
issue. This period includes Mrs. Thatcher's abandonment of her
earlier pledge in Nassau and her launch of a tirade against the
Eminent Persons Group (EPG) and its sanctions proposals. [521 Mrs
Thatcher's intemperate statements over the sanctions issue and
her decision to dishonour the Nassau accord on the EPG infuriated
much of the Commonwealth and threatened a major split in the 49-
nation organisation with some members calling openly for the
expulsion of Britain. [53]
On the issue of aid towards liberation of South Africa it was
confirmed by most of the author's interviewees that Babangida's
administration has contributed enormously both militarily and
financially. During one of the author's interviews, it was
stressed that this assistance cannot be quantified.[54] For
instance, most of the liberation movements were based in Lagos
and Nigeria was fully responsible for them and there was also a
'Special Committee' which was headed by the President
himself.[55] This was also confirmed by Professor Akinyemi who
stressed that he would give as equally high marks to Babangida's
regime as that of the Murtala/Obasanjo regime in terms of content
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of policy. [56] He pointed out differences from Murtala/Obasanjo's
regime since there has been no Head of State who could bring the
type of flair of Murtala's government; but in terms of the
resources disbursed as in the case of SWAPO, ANC and PAC, the
number of confrontations, and the boycott of Commonwealth games
in Scotland in 1986/87, Banbagida's government perfromed well.
The most interesting observation made during the course of this
search is that inspite of Nigeria's strong stand on the
elimination of apartheid, it seems Babangida's administration
began a shift in international behaviour generally towards
apartheid and South Africa in particular. This observation was
pointed out by one of the government ministers during the
author's interview with him. He stressed that the issue of South
Africa presently is ‘fluid' and it was being "reconsidered
everyday" by the Babangida administration, on the ground that it
is not only Nigeria's interest that should be taken into
consideration but also that of black South Africans as well as
the attitude of other nations of the world.[57]
When General Ike Nwachukwu took over from Akinyemi as External
Affairs Minister, the approach to Nigeria's foreign policy
management changed dramatically. General Nwachukwu pointed to a
new direction quite early when he declared that "the new
realities and challenges demand that we embark on a new era of
dynamic and functional diplomacy to enhance our economic and
technological well-being."[58] Stated simply, this was the time
for economic diplomacy. It was not that Nigeria changed its
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foreign policy focus from Africa or that it abandoned any of its
commitments to the international community, but the Ministry
appeared to be operating with an over-bearing consciousness of
the economic demands in its brief.[59] In pursuance of this
strategy many seminars and conferences have been held. The most
important one was the seminar on Southern Africa in Transition
held in Lagos between 10th-12th April 1990.[60] The text of this
forms an appendix to this thesis, as it forms a fairly
comprehensive foreign policy document which all the same keep an
economic consciousness. Economic cooperation with a future free
South Africa should be explored immediately, it concluded.
AID TO LIBERATION MOVEMENTS
Because of the bureaucratic culture of secrecy precise data on
Nigeria's aid to liberation movements are difficult to come by.
Accordingly the figures that follow have been obtained by the
author and have not been preciously published. They allow,
however, only a rough comparison though a useful one.It is clear,
however, that Nigeria's aid, (both bilateral and multilateral)
to all African Liberation Movements in general began as far back
as 1963 when Nigeria became a member of the Coordinating
Committee for the Liberation of Africa. Nigeria's election to the
Committee was due to recognition of her potential importance in
any joint African endeavour rather than that of past
performances.
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In 1990 Nigeria hosted three Southern African Liberation
Movements namely, the African National Congress of South Africa
(ANC), the Pan Africanist Congress of Azania (PAC) and the South
West African Peoples Organisation(SWAPO) . The Nigerian Government
provided both residential and office accommodations to the Chief
Representaives of these freedom fighters in Lagos and in addition
made statutory allocation for their upkeep and maintenance. The
Chief Representatives of these movements were accredited to the
Honourable Minister of External Affairs and enjoyed diplomatic
status and courtesies in the performance of their functions in
Nigeria. [61]
Apart from the provision of financial assistance for the smooth
running of their offices in Lagos, Nigeria's aid to the above-
mentioned Southern African Liberation Movements takes the form
of bilateral and multilateral assistance. In the bilateral
sphere, Government gives direct financial assistance, outright
grants and at other times cash gifts to the Frontline states'
headquarters of these movements for use in meeting their
immediate requirements. [62] Government's multilateral assistance
to these movements is usually channelled through the OAU
Liberation Committee based in Dar-es-Salaam, the Special
Committee Against Apartheid and other International Organisations
like the Non-Aligned Movements.[63] Solidarity Organisations in
Nigeria like the National Committee Against Apartheid (NACAP)
also receive subvention from the government in furtherance of
their objectives. [64]
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Nigeria's aid and assistance to Liberation Movements in Southern
Africa are predicated upon the following criteria:
(a) The Organisation of these movements
(b) Their effectiveness in prosecuting the armed
struggle
(c) The support they enjoy within the countries they
intend to liberate and
(d) The facilities offered to these movements by the
neighbouring countries.
This chapter in the light of the foregoing background
information, will attempt a general overview and critical
assessment of Nigeria's commitment in aid to the Southern African
Liberation Movements with the hope of bringing into focus the
consistency or otherwise of successive Nigerian administrations
in their proclaimed commitment to the cause of decolonisation and
eradication of apartheid in the Southern African region.
AID POLICY UNDER BALEWA REGIME, 1960-1966
Under Balewa, Nigeria was known to have exhibited considerable
diffidence in its relations with all Liberation Movements and
tended to keep them at a distance. The channelling of aid or all
assistance to the Liberation Movements through the Coordination
Committee for the Liberation of Africa offered a highly
satisfactory means of assisting the movements. The Committee was
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a branch of the OAU but it had its headquarters in Dar-es-Salaam,
where Tanzania kept it under fairly close supervision. In 1968
when Tanzania was the first of the five states to recognise
Biafra, the Federal Military Government of Nigeria ceased making
its contribution to the Liberation Movements through the
Committee on the grounds that Tanzania was diverting Liberation
funds to Biafra.[65] After the war, Nigeria resumed its payment
through the Committee and other contacts with the Liberation
Movements.
Under the Balewa administration, Nigeria made substantial
contributions to the Special Fund of the OAU Liberation Committee
as follows:[66]
(a) N200,000 in 1963/64
(b) N140,000 in 1964/65
(c) N168,000 in 1965/66
In spite of the above financial grants to the liberation
movements via the OAU Liberation Committee Fund, the Balewa
regime rejected the idea of supplying arms directly to the
Liberation Movements despite calls to this effect by some members
of Parliament in 1965. Balewa's rejection of armed struggle
against South Africa and the refusal to supply arms to the
freedom fighters is said to be on the ground of his personal
moral and view that it would lead to brothers killing
brothers. [67]
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(ii) THE IRONS! REGIME, JANUARY 1966 - JULY 1966
There was no record of Nigeria's aid to Southern African
Liberation Movements under the short-lived regime of Ironsi. His
administration was however known to have inherited the anti-
apartheid policy of the preceding Balewa administration, and in
fact operated the same strategy.
(iii) THE GOWON REGIME, 1966-1975
Aid	 to	 Liberation	 Movements	 under	 Gowon's
administration was as folloVis:[68]
(a) Making financial contribution via the OAU Liberation
Fund. This contribution had been suspended due to
Nigeria's suspicion that Tanzania might be diverting
part of the fund to assist Biafra but Nigeria's
contribution was reinstated in 1970 after the civil
war. Consequently Nigeria's contribution to the Fund
was raised from N168,000 to N252,000 in 1973.
(b) Commencement of direct bilateral assistance to the
Liberation Movements in 1968 mainly arms, trucks,
food, clothing, medicines, etc, contrary to Balewa's
policy (though the Gowon regime initially rejected
supporting armed struggle).
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(c) Provision of training facilities to liberation
movements.
( iv ) THE MURTALA MLTHAMMED/OLUSEGUN OBASANJO
REGIME, 1975-1979
The Murtala/Obasanjo regime like Gowon's regime, operated
in a period when oil fetched Nigeria some huge revenue
which enabled the regime to exercise a reasonable degree of
independence in foreign policy formulation and execution.
The specific aid given to Southern African Liberation
Movements by this administration included:
(a) provision of free training opportunities for the
victims of apartheid in Nigerian schools
(b) establishment of a Southern African Relief Fund (SARF)
in 1975 to which Nigeria contributed N20 million for
aid to victims of apartheid
(c) N20,000,000 grant to Angola following Nigeria's
recognition of the MPLA government in December
1975.[69]
(d) Grant of $32,750 by the Federal Military Government in
September 1975, to the African National Congress (ANC)
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"for appropriate use in the interest of all the people
of Zimbabwe. "[70]
(e) Grant of $250,000 to Mozambique in July 5, 1976, for
use in Zimbabwe. [71]
(f) Support for the OAU decision to increase aid on
education and publications of the evils of apartheid
to all countries.
( v ) AID DURING THE SHAGARI REGIME 1979-1983
During Shagari's administration, Nigeria continued to give
aid to the under listed Southern African Liberation
Movements both bilaterally and multilaterally through its
contributions to the OAU Liberation Fund: SWAPO of Namibia,
ANC (SA) and the Pan Africanist Congress of Azania (PAC)
During this period these liberation movements received
direct financial grants from Nigeria as follows:[72]
(a) SWAPO of Namibia - 1981 - N1,000,000
1983 - N689,685.17
(b) PAC of South Africa 1981 - N502,000
1983 - N45,000 worth of
Drugs and medical equipment.
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(c) ANC of South Africa 1981 - N1,000,000
1983 - N689,685.17
A sharp drop in aid could therefore be seen.
(vi)) AID DURING BUHARI'S REGIME, DECEMBER
31ST 1983 - AUGUST 27TH 1985
The Buhari regime inherited the foreign policy objective to
"Combat racial discrimination in all its manifestations" as
provided in the 1979 constitution of the Federal Republic
of Nigeria. In keeping with this objective, Buhari's
government made it clear that it would continue financial,
material and diplomatic support to the Liberation Movements
in Southern Africa despite Nigeria's economic problems.
Consequently on the inception of the administration,
Nigeria continued to make prompt payments of her dues to
the OAU Liberation Fund of which she was the Chairman then,
and in addition, the government continued its moral and
other direct fiscal and material assistance to the
underlisted liberation movements as follows:[73]
(a) SWAPO of Namibia - 1984 - $921,310.34
1985 - $250,000.00
(b) ANC of South Africa 1984 - $1,000,000
1985 - $40,000 grant
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(c) PAC of Azania (South Africa) - 1984 - Nil
1985 - $100,000
There were therefore rises and falls compared with earlier years,
but a pattern of decline was evident.
BABANGIDA'S ADMINISTRATION
Most of the contributions by this administration towards
the Southern African cause have not been released because
the President himself is involved in the 'Special
Committee' which controls most of the funds to Southern
African liberation movements. The conclusion drawn from the
account given by most of my interviewees was that Babangida
administration is as involved in Southern Africa as
Murtala/Obasanjo's administration. Question marks must
remain here given accusations of corruption levelled
against Banbagida.
A CRITIQUE OF NIGERIA'S AID
POLICY TO LIBERATION MOVEMENTS
In spite of its own pressing domestic commitments and the fiscal
restraints occasioned by the present economic difficulties,
Nigeria accepted the principle of sharing its resources with
other African countries including the liberation movements of
the continent.
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Furthermore, Nigeria in addition to being a major contributor to
the OAU Liberation Committee Fund, also gives direct grants-in-
aid for the political emancipation of oppressed parts of Africa
and of those African countries which carry heavy financial
burdens in providing support and facilities to nationalist
movements particularly in the Southern African sub-region.
Between 1975 to March 1980, Nigeria was reported to have expended
an amount approximately N25 million[74] as aid to African
countries and Liberation Movements.
Inspite of Nigeria's positive role in the liberation struggle in
Africa, her aid policy in general, with particular reference to
the Southern African Liberation Movements, deserve some critical
comments or examination.
While many people have tended to justify the current policy of
direct financial subventions to liberation movements, other argue
that assistance in term of material and logistical equipments,
would appear to be more cost-effective in strengthening the
struggle for liberation. The latter group opined that the
provision of cash grants tends to give room to abuse as well as
making accountability difficult. There have been allegations of
diversion of money and material assistance to purposes other than
their intended objectives by the leadership of some of the
national liberation movements. This position makes the case for
a de-emphasis on cash gifts. This is to say that as long as
Nigeria's system of aid and assistance to national liberation
movements continues to be characterised by cash and material
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grants, the actual benefits of its efforts would continue to go
to the advanced countries where the cash gifts are spent for the
purchase of materials and services.
From confidential sources speaking to the present author, it
would appear there is a piecemeal approach in the doling out of
aid whenever any arm of the liberation movements comes asking,
since there has been no stipulated amount budgeted annually for the
respective movements nor any report of expenditure ever requested from
dlern. Furthermore, aid has often been given out to these
liberation movements without proper evaluation of the political
leverage to be derived by Nigeria from such gesture. Although
Nigeria as a matter of policy does not believe in attaching any
strings or pre-conditions to its aids to sister African countries
and Liberation Movements, perhaps the time is propitious for a
review of Nigeria's aid programme to these movements in
particular and to African countries in general with a view to
correcting the impression of Nigeria as a "Father Christmas" (as
indicated by Professor Akinyemi during the author's interview
with him).
Be that as it may, Nigeria's aid figures to Southern African
Liberation Movements since 1981, seem to suggest that on the
average, Nigeria gave out about one million United States Dollars
annually to the African National Congress (ANC) and to the South
West Africa Peoples Organisation (SWAPO) while the Pan Africanist
Congress of Azania (PAC) received less.
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In the decade from Obasanjo to Babangida there have been ups and
downs in aid disbursal. Notwithstanding the new emphasis on
economic policy, something of a slowly declining though still
reasonably consistent aid disbursal record shows through. Here,
notwithstanding economic difficulties, some measure of
consistency is identifiable. One has the feeling, however, that
change in South Africa could not have come fast enough.
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CONCLUSION:
I clearly pointed out in the introduction the areas covered by
this study. Starting from the origin of foreign policy
formulation in Nigeria with special reference South Africa, it
went on to include the study of policy as expressed within
international organisations. The thesis also looked at the
continuity of foreign policy within the various Nigerian
governments and with emphasis on how it was formulated within
military governments.
I enjoyed a great deal of satisfaction with the outcome of this
research because of the major originalities uncovered. The areas
identified include the importance of Ghana's relationship to
Nigeria and the impact it made on the formulation of the Nigerian
foreign policy especially as a result of the civil war. Another
finding stressed the style and the actual formulation of
Nigerian foreign policy and how dependent it is on the
presidential office but not necessarily dependent on traaitional
divisions between military and civilian office. Finally, there
is the survey of the involvement of Nigeria financially towards
the liberation of Southern Africa.
The emphasis given different international organisations is also
a helpful contribution to the literature.
I believe that my entire thesis makes a contribution to the act
of knowledge. This is the first time there has been a sustained
work which covers the history of the Nigerian foreign policy
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formulation from the days of pre-independence right up to 1990.
The unity that existed from the civilian to military government
and military to the military government, all this continued right
up to the emerging era with the advent of improved relationships
with South Africa. Up to this critical point in time in 1990, I
have outlined the development of policies, continuity of policies
and continuity between government to government. This thesis was
sought to act as a major critical exposition major critical
exposition of how all this happened.
I am looking forward to a new Africa. This new Africa is one in
which all states will have to drive a common policy. The policy,
conceived by interdependent Africans towards Africa will be
essentially the same, whether military or civilian in its origin.
I look forward to this new day with the same fervour as I have
studied and researched this thesis on an era now closing.
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APPENDIX
SEMINAR ON SOUTHERN AFRICA IN TRANSITION
HELD IN LAGOS, 10TH-12TH APRIL, 1990
INTRODUCTION
The decision to organise the seminar was taken by the Minister
of External Affairs, Ike Nwachukwu following a discussion on the
issue in the Policy Planning Committee of the Ministry in
February, 1990. The objective was to review Nigeria's policy
towards South Africa in response to the developments taking place
in the Southern African region. The seminar was attended by
Nigerian Heads of Mission in the Frontline States and Heads of
Mission from the United Nations and representatives of the
Presidency, Ministry of Defence, NIIA, NIPSS, NIA and the
University of Lagos also participated at the seminar.
In his opening address, the Minister raised a number of issues
which participants were expected address. He drew attention to
the developments now taking palce in South Africa and asked:-
(a) "If Nigeria should review its present policy in
view of the on-going developments which hopefully
would lead to the establishment of a non-racial
society in South Africa?
(b) Should Nigeria continue to hold on tenaciously to
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its policy of non-collaboration with South Africa
until there was an irreversible evidence aimed at
dismantling apartheid?
(c) Should Nigeria single-handedly or in concert with
the OAU act to ensure a successful and
satisfactory conclusion of the peaceful
negotiations which have now been agreed between
the ANC and the South African government?"
Finally, the Minister of External Affairs charged the
participants to consider what Nigeria's position would be in a
post-apartheid South Africa.
SITUATION REPORTS AND ANALYSIS BY PARTICIPANTS
The seminar took note of the recent changes in South Africa which
led to the release of some political prisoners including Mr.
Nelson Mandela. These changes, the seminar further noted, are
attributable to internal as well as external factors. The
external factors included Gorbachev's ascension to power in the
Soviet Union and the effect of his policy of Perestroika and
Glasnost which precipitatd changes within the USSR and East
European countries and introduced a new climate in the
international political environment. The independence of Namibia,
sanctions applied by the International Community, various United
Nations and OAU resolutions and activities against the apartheid
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regime, and South African military reverses in Angola were the
other external factors responsible for the change. The internal
factors included the activities of liberation movements, trade
unions, students' groups, the role of the churches and the
replacement of Mr. P.W. Botha by Mr. Frederick de Klerk as
President.
The seminar noted the difficulty in sustaining the armed struggle
since the Soviet Union and other Socialist countries which have
been the main suppliers of arms and ammunition have advocated
dialogue. Nevertheless, it was agreed that the armed struggle
should be continued until the process of dismantling apartheid
becomes irreversible. The seminar proceeded to examine
desirability or otherwise of establishing contacts with the
various groups in South Africa as a possible option for
Government.
Two approaches emerged from the discussion. The first approach
argued that Nigeria should establish contacts with the key actors
across the broad political spectrum of South African society
including the white community. However, discreet contacts with
the South African government should be with the knowledge of the
liberation movements.
The other position is the continuation of the policy of total
isolation of the minority regime while continuing to intensify
contacts with the various anti-apartheid groups in South Africa.
Until then contacts with the regime should be conducted only
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through the OAU monitoring group.
The meeting noted the position of the OAU in the unfolding
development in South Africa as reflected in both the Harare
Declaration and the Lusaka Statement of the OAU Ad-Hoc Committee
on South Africa. In a bid to monitor the evolving of the Pretoria
regime, the OAU has set up a Monitoring Group on South Africa,
to be based in Lusaka. The monitoring group's responsibilities
would involve among other things, contacts with South Africa. The
seminar observed that this OAU position is a significant shift
from the age-long policy which forbids any form of contacts with
the racist regime.
The seminar observed that lack of unity in the ranks of the black
nationalist groups in South Africa has weakened their solidarity
and has inhibited the emergence of a common action front which
is very crucial in the final battle against apartheid. The
seminar is of the view that Nigeria has an important role to play
in the reconciliation of the black nationalist movements and all
the anti-apartheid groups in order to present a common position
in the ensuing negotiations with the Pretoria regime.
The seminar noted that the apartheid system still remained
intact, since its structures and laws were yet to be dismantled.
The deplorable socio-economic condition of the blacks also
provides fertile grounds for chaos.
The meeting drew attention to the peculiar complexity of the
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internal situation in South Africa in terms of heterogeneity of
race, ethnicity and class which should be taken into
consideration. There is need to know more about them in re-
assessing Nigeria's policy towards that region.
The meeting also observed that the various strata of the white
community which constitute the fighting forces and the security
apparatus were antagonistic to the present dispensation in South
Africa and if care was not taken, they could embark on organised
violence to provoke the blacks, thus intensifying violence that
could upset the transition process.
The seminar considered economic cooperation between Nigeria and
post-apartheid South Africa and was of the view that Nigeria
should commence a programme of action aimed at cooperating with
a post-apartheid South Africa in the economic field. It is
expected that a post-apartheid government will be non-racial and
acceptable to Nigeria and the international community, thereby
facilitating economic cooperation and or competition. It was also
noted that Nigeria and South Africa are economic giants in their
respective zones and therefore there will be competition between
the two countries.
In order to achieve a healthy competition there is need for
Nigeria to carry out a survey of South Africa's economic
capabilities. For instance, it is recognised that South Africa
has comparative advantage over Nigeria in areas such as mining,
manufacturing, agriuclture, livestock and fishing in which
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meaningful cooperation could be establised. On the other hand,
since South Africa depends so much on external sources for its
crude oil, Nigeria could readily meet part of that demand.
The meeting also recognised that a free South Africa will attract
a return of capital which may make it possible for her to wish
to invest in other States. Nigeria and ECOWAS countries
constitute big markets for such investments provided there is
political stability in the sub-region. Other possible areas of
cooperation which are mainly confidence building measures are
collaboration between professional bodies. In addition,
cooperation in military field would also facilitate the
realisation of some of the objectives of the Nigerian Defence
Industries Corporation.
The seminar noted that cooperation between Nigeria and South
Africa which are two main economic powers in the continent, will
bring about a push in intra-African trade and cooperation. It
also noted that economic growth will accelerate in a free South
Africa, leading to increased economic penetration into all parts
of Africa. It noted the dangers in terms of the possible
domination of Nigeria's domestic economy by a more highly
developed post-apartheid Nigeria's economic performance.
Consequently, there is an urgent and, indeed, compelling
necessity to rapidly transform the manufacturing and industrial
base of Nigeria's economy in accordance with the Structural
Adjustment Programme.
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The seminar noted that the recent developments in South Africa
may have the following implications for Nigeria and Africa:-
(a) It will enhance the prospects for the eradication
of apartheid leading to a united, democratic and
non-racial society after a tough process of
negotiations;
(b) The eradication of apartheid will signify the
achievement of one of Nigeria's major foreign
policy objectives but would also remove a major
rallying point in African politics for which
Nigeria has provided leadership;
(c) The eradication of apartheid will lead to the
release of energy which can then be channelled to
economic development issues. Similarly, the end
of apartheid will remove those irritants in
Nigeria's relations with some Western countries
arising from her anti-apartheid stnce;
(d) The re-integration of a new South Africa into the
international system would make her Nigeria's
main competitor for political influence, economic
and military power in sub-sahara Africa;
(e) Percentage of capital flows going to South Africa
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will rise as a proportion of total capital flows
into Africa. Consequently the capital flows into
Nigeria may considerably reduce.
RECOMMENDATIONS
The meeting agreed that the current situation in South Africa
call for a clear articulation of Nigeria's national interests and
therefore made the following recommendations:
(a) Political
(i) Nigeria	 should	 continue	 to	 render
diplomatic, financial, moral and material
support to the Liberation Movements in order
to maintain the momentum of the armed
struggle and thereby enhance their
negotiation power;
(ii) Nigeria should continue	 to play a
significant role in bringing about
reconciliation among all anti-apartheid
groups;
(iii) Nigeria should continue to maintain contacts
not only with the present nationalist
leaders but also seek to cultivate their
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likely successors and all those connected
with the struggle in order to sustain its
momentum;
(iv) Nigeria should explore the possibility of
establishing contacts with all relevant
actors across the broad spectrum of the
South African society, provided that
Nigeria's credibility is not compromised;
(v) The seminar welcomes the invitation to Mr.
Nelson Mandela and recommends that same be
extended to the other anti-apartheid leaders
to visit Nigeria, for discussion and
consultation;
(vi) Nigeria should assist the Liberation
Movements to physically establish their
presence in South Africa;
(vii) Nigeria should provide expertise to assist
the Liberation Movements during the process
of negotiations;
(viii) Nigeria should be more circumspect in its
offer of financial assistance to the
Liberation Movements in South Africa.
However, where direct financial grant has to
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be made it should be monitored by the
Ministry of External Affairs.
(b) International Organisations
Nigeria should continue to use the United Nations,
Commonwealth, and Non-Aligned Movement platforms to ensure
that sanctions remain in force until the process for
dismantling apartheid becomes irreversible.
(c) O.A.U.
(i) The OAU should continue to urge International
Organisations to enforce sanctions against the racist
regime;
(ii) The OAU as a body should mount campaign for
discouraging the emigration to South Africa,
especially by East Germans, East Eropeans and the
Arabs.
(iii) Nigeria should make efforts to dissuade all African
countries from relaxing existing measures for the
total isolation of apartheid South Africa. In this
regard, Mr. President may wish to consider making
direct contacts with his African brothers with a view
to dissuading them from establishing diplomatic
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relations with South Africa until negotiations are
successfully concluded;
(iv) The OAU Monitoring Group should ensure that a
political frame work is put in place to facilitate the
process of negotiations that would lead to the
emergence of a non-racial South Africa, as reflected
in the Harare Declaration.
(a) Economic
(i) Nigeria should strive to improve her economic
performance and investment climate in order to
adequately meet the challenges that a post-apartheid
South Africa may pose;
ii) Since ECOWAS will be a target market for a post-
apartheid South Africa, Nigeria should consolidate her
economic position within a strengthened ECOWAS sub-
region;
(iii) In order to reach out to the South African market,
Nigeria should cooperate with economic organisations
in Southern Africa, such as Southern Africa
Development	 Coordinating	 Council	 (SADCC)	 and
(
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Preferential Trade Area (PTA)
(iv) Nigeria should use Namibia as a springboard for
economic relations with a free and democratic South
Africa;
( e ) Military
The military aspect of the situation was not exhaustively
discussed and was therefore recommended for further
examination. However, the seminar was of the view that
there are possibilities for military cooperation between
Nigeria and post-apartheid South Africa, especially in the
defence industry and training.
( f ) General
(i) The Nigerian media particularly the Voice of Nigeria
(VON) and Nigeria Television Authority (NTA), should
be encouraged to play an important role in
disseminating information on events in South Africa
during the negotiations;
(ii) A Presidential Special Envoy on South Africa should be
appointed during the process of negotiations and when
the climate is deemed appropriate, to make contact,
monitor developments and influence where possible, the
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attitude and positions of the negotiating parties;
(iii) A Study Group on Transition and post-apartheid South
Africa should be set up;
(iv) Government should seize the opportunity of the
Liberation Movements at the forthcoming meeting in
Abuja of the Commonwealth Committee of Foreign
Ministers on Southern Africa to forge closer contact
with those movements;
(v) Government should relax travel restrictions for
Nigerians to visit South Africa and liberalise its
visa policy for foreigners who have visited South
Africa.
On the peace initiative in Angola and Mozambique, the seminar
noted the proposed meeting for the Angolan Government and UNITA
in Lisbon for direct talks. Similarly, the Government of
Mozambique and RENAMO proposed meeting in Malawi on April the
16th. These are happy developments in the relationship with the
development in South Africa itself. It was, therefore,
recommended that the Federal Government should continue to help
to enhance these peace initiatives with a view to having a
sharper focus on South Africa.
From official sources it has been confirmed that most of these
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recommendations have been established and are functioning as part





1. Finer S, The Man on Horseback, London, Pall Mall Press,
1962
2. Chan S, 'The Study of African Coups - Some Notes for a
Fresh Approach,' Royal Institute for Defence Studies 




1. Lugard F., Report on the Amalgamation of Northern and
Southern Nigeria, Quoted in Forsyth F, The Biafra Story,
Harmondsworth Middlesex, Penguin Books Ltd, 1969, p.13
2. Ibid
3. Schwarz F.A.O. Jr.  The Tribes, Nation or the Race - The 
Politics of Independence - Cambridge Mass, M.I.T. Press,
1965 f P 3
4. Crowder M, The Story of Nigeria. Fourth Edition, Trowbridge
and Esher, Burn Ltd., 1962, p.1
5. Ibid
6. Ibid
7. Panter-Brick S.K., Nigerian Politics Military Rule -
Prelude to the Civil War, University of London, Institute
of Commonwealth Studies. The Athlone Press, 1970, p.4
8. Op.Cit Schwarz F.A.O. Jr. p.3
9. Ibid p.4




14. Dudley B.J., Instability and Political Order - Politics and 
Crisis in Nigeria, Ibadan, Ibadan University Press 1973,
p.24
15. Op.Cit Forsyth p.24
16. Gambari A.I.,  Party Politics and Foreign Policy - Nigeria
under the First Republic, Kaduna, Ahmadu Bello University
Press 1980, p.16
17. Ibid, Whitaker Jr., The Policies of Tradition, quoted in
Gambari A.I.
18. Ibid
19. Daily Times, Lagos, 6 July 1959
226
20. Opcit. Whitaker Jr., The Policies of Tradition, quoted in
Gambari A.I., p. 17
21. Op.cit, Sklar, Nigerian Political Paper, quoted in Gambari
A.I., p.17
22. Ibid p.18
23. Sessional paper No. 11, House of Representatives Debates,
Lagos, 1956.
24. Op.cit, Gambari A.I., p.18
25. Statement by the Prime Minister in Parliament, 1958.
Balewa, Mr. Prime Minister, quoted in Gambari A.I., p.18
26. Alhaji Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa and Sam Epelle, Nigeria
Speaks, Lagos, Longmans of Nigeria, 1964, p.10
27. Sessional Paper No.11 1956, House of Representatives, Lagos
1956
28. Jone Coleman, The Foreign Policy of Nigeria, Quoted in
Gambari A.I., p.19
29. Ibid, Gambari A.I.
30. Daily Times, Lagos, 3 August 1959
31. Ibid
32. Ibid, 1 September 1959
33. Ibid, 4 September 1959
34. Ibid, 9 September 1959




39. Ibid, 17 September 1959
40. Ibid
41. Ibid
42. Op.Cit, Gambari A.I., p.22
43. Whitaker Jr. - Politics of Tradition, quoted in Gambari
A.I., p.22
227
44. Op.Cit, Schwarz Jr. p.109
45. Op.Cit, Gambari p.22
46. Ibid, Gambari A.I., pp.22
47. See Whitaker's comment on how the NPC's domestic attitude
coloured the leaders' attitude on the idea of West African
Union, Pan-Africanism, relations with the USSR, etc., The
Politics of Tradition, quoted in Gambari, p.23
48. Daily Times, 19 January 1960
49. Op.Cit, Balewa and Epelle, p.61
50. Daily Times, 7 July 1960
51. West Africa, London, 29 January 1966
52. Aluko 0. - The Fundamentals of the Nigerian Policy-
Necessity and Freedom in Nigerian Foreign Policy: An
Inaugural Lecture delivered at the University of Ife on
17th March 1981. (Inaugural Lecture Series 51). University




1. Doudou T, The Foreign Policy of States - Translated from
the original - La Politique Etrangere de Etats Africans C
Presses, Universitaries de France, 1963. J. M. Dent
Limited, London. A Phoenix House Publication, 1965 p.15
2. Ibid
3. Sekou Toure L'Experience quiene et l'unite africaine (The
Guinean Experiment and African Unity), a collection of
speeches of the Guinea Democratic Party, at public or
official demonstrations. Presence Africaine. No.4, 1959
4. Op.cit Doudou T. p.15
5. Flint E.J, Nigeria and Ghana, A Spectrum Book, The Modern
Nations in Historical Perspective, Prentice Hall, Eaglewood
Cliffs, New Jersey, 1966, p.3
6. Author's interview with Professor A.I. Gambari, The
Nigerian Permanent Representative to UN, New York, USA, 6th
August 1990.
7. Aluko 0, The Fundamentals of the Nigerian Foreign Policy, 
Necessity and Freedom in Nigerian Foreign Policy. An
Inaugural Lecture delivered at the University of Ife on
17th March 1981. (Inaugural lecture series 51). University
Press, Ile-Ife, 1982, p.1
8. Akinyemi A.B,  Foreign Policy and Federalism, The Nigerian 
experience, Ibadan. Ibadan University Press, 1974 p.76
9. Author's interview with Professor A.I. Gambari, The
Nigerian Permanent Representative to UN, New York, USA, 6th
August 1990
10. Op.Cit, Akinyemi A.B., p.77
11. Ibid, p.9
12. Thompson W.S., Ghana's Foreign Policy 1957-1966 -
Diplomacy, Ideology, and the New State, Princeton
University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, 1969, p.xi






18. Op.Cit Thompson, p.122
19. Ibid
20. Ibid, p.125
21. Op.cit Thompson W.S, p.122
22. Ibid
23. Ibid p.125
24. Evening News, Accra, 23 July 1960








32. Phillips C.S. Jr - The Development of Nigerian Foreign
Policy, Evaston, Northwestern University Press 1964, p.91
33. Nkrumah's Press Conference 13 July, (I speak of Freedom)
London, 1961
34. Government of Ghana Cabinet Minutes, Item 1 8 August 1960,
quoted in Thompson W.S, p.134
35. Gavin Young, "Struggle for Influence", Observer Foreign
News Service, 29 September, 1960
36. Op. Cit Doudou T, p.23
37. Op.cit Phillips C.S, p.90
38. Ibid p.91
39. African Report, June 1961, p.11
40. House of Representatives Debates, 20 November, 1961
230
41. Daily Times, Lagos, 18 December 1961
42. Daily Express, Lagos, 22 January 1962
43. Morning Post, Lagos, 5 February 1962
44. The Lagos Conference, Article 2
45. Ibid Article 34
46. Ibid
47. Ibid
48. Africa Report, June 1963, p.23
49. Wachuku J, United Nations General Assembly Official
Records, 16th session, 1031st Plenary session, Federal
Government Press, Lagos, Nigeria, 10 October 1961, p.339
50. House of Representatives Debates, 4 September 1961 Cols.
332-71
51. Op.cit Flint J.E, p.1
52. Op.cit, Akinyemi A.B., Foreign Policy and Federalism, p.76
53. Ibid
54. Op.cit Phillip C.S, p.90
55. The Economist, 17 June, 1961, p.1240
56. Daily Times, Lagos, February, 1962













1	 Gordon J. Idan, Nigeria: Internal Politics and Foreign 
Policy, 1960-66, Ibadan, University of Ibadan 1963, p.86
2. Ogunbadejo 0, Ideology and Pragmatism: The Soviet Role in
Nigeria, 1960-77,  Orbis XXI (Winter 1978) p.803
3. Ogunbadejo 0, Nigeria's Foreign Policy Under Military Rule,
1966-79, International Journal V.35 No.4 1980 p.765
4. Akindele R.A, Nigerian Parliament and Foreign Policy, 1960-
, (Quarterly Journal of Administration, April 1975) p.297
5. Idang G.J, The Politics of Nigerian Foreign Policy: The
Ratification and Renunciation of the Anglo-Nigerian Defence
Agreement. African Studies Review, September 1970
6. Ogunbadejo 0, Nigeria and The Great Powers: The Impact of
the Civil War on Nigerian Foreign Relations.  African
Affairs V.75, No.298 1976 p.14
7. Ibid
8. Ajayi E.A, Nigeria-Soviet Aid Relations, 1960-68, Nigeria
Bulletin Foreign Affairs V.1 No.3 1972, p.7
9. West African Magazine, February 22, 1969
10. Op.cit Ajayi E.A, p.6
11. Ibid p.9
12. Schwarz W, Nigeria, (London Pall Mall Press 1968) p.xv
13. West Africa, July 15, 1967
14. Ibid
15. Morning Post, Lagos, July 11, 1967
16. New Nigeria, Kaduna, July 12, 1967
17. Morning Post, Lagos, November 10, 1967
18. Op.cit Ogunbadejo 0, Nigeria and the Great Powers, p.752
19. Ibid
20. Op.cit Ogunbadejo 0, 'Ideology and Pragmatism' pp.816-18
232
21. Op.cit Ogunbadejo 0, Nigeria's Foreign Policy Under
Military Rule, 1966-79, p.749
22. Ogunbadejo 0, Civil Strife in International Relations: A
case study of the Nigerian Civil War, 1967-70, (Unpublished
University of London PhD Thesis, 1974) p.4
23. The Department of State Bulletin, Vo.LIX No.1428, p.353







30. The French Foreign Minister's speech to the National
Assembly November 4, 1969. (Text of the speech provided to
the present author by the French Embassy, London).
31. Op.cit Ogunbadejo 0, The Civil Strife (French Involvement
in Nigerian Civil War) p.325
32. Op.cit Ogunbadejo 0, Nigeria's Foreign Policy Under
Military Rule,1966-79, p.735
33. Ibid
34. Col. Ojukwu's Ahiara Declaration which contained arguments
that support property on one hand and drew its inspiration
from Maoist rather than from Marxist ideas on the other
hand.
35. Op.cit Ogunbadejo 0, Civil Strife, p.329
36. Aluko 0, The Civil War and Nigerian Foreign Policy
(Political Quarterly, XLII, 1971) p.187
37. West Africa, November 18, 1974, p.1416
38. Zdenek Cervanka, The Unfinished Quest for Unity of Africa





42. Op. Cit, Aluko 0., The Civil War and Nigerian Foreign
Policy, p.187
43. Under the Balewa administration the main causes of friction
with Ghana were the following - personality clash between
Balewa and Nkrumah, their different views of, and attitudes
to the great powers and their conflicting ideas about
African unity including the roles of their respective
countries.
44. Op.Cit, Aluko 0., The Civil War and Nigerian Foreign
Policy, p .131
45. Ibid
46. Report on OAU Consultative Mission to Nigeria (Lagos
Government Press 1967)
47. Ibid
48. Daily Graphic, Lagos, September 19, 1967
49. Address by J.W.K. Harlley to UN General Assembly on 25th
September 1967 in Ghana Today, October 4, 1967
50. Ghana Today, October 4. 1967
51. Africa Research Bulletin, November 1966, p.901
52. Ibid
53. Ghana Today, Accra, 1 May, 1968
54. Africa Research Bulletin, p.902
55. West Africa, July 27, 1968
56. Ibid
57. In December 1967, Chief Enahoro had personally visited
Ghana to brief the Accra government on the details of the
civil war and Nigeria's stand on peace.
58. Africa Research Bulletin, April 1969, pp.382-3
59. Ibid
60. Ibid
61. Waugh A. and Cronje S, Biafra: Britain's Shame (London:
Michael Joseph, 1969) p.113
62. Evening Standard (Accra), January 9, 1970
63. West Africa, October 4, 1969
234
64. Daily Times, October 11, 1969
65. Aluko 0, The Civil War and Nigerian Foreign Policy, Pol. 




69. Aluko 0, The Civil War and Nigerian Foreign Policy, Pol.
Quarterly, XLIII 1971 p.190
70. Aluko 0, Essays on Nigerian Foreign Policy, London, George
Allen and Unwin 1971, p.34
71. Ibid
72. House of Representative Debates, April 5, 1965 (Oral
Answers, Col. 507)
73. OAU Verbatim Records of the Plenary Meeting of Second
Ordinary Session of the Assembly of Heads of State and
Government at Accra, October 21-26, 1965
74. Morning Post, June 25, 1971 (Gowon's address to the third
African-American dialogue meeting in Lagos, March 1971)
75. Long Live African Unity, text of an address to Heads of
State of the OAU, September 6, 1969
76. The Morning Post of 15th December 1964 stated that the
exclusion of the Tshombe delegation from the Cairo Summit
of the OAU in July 1964 might as well mean the beginning
of the end of the organisation. For similar comments on the
OAU - see the Morning Post of 19th February 1965, and the
issue of 28th January 1965, which said that the future of
the OAU was 'bleak'. The setting of the OAU Consultative
Committee by the Assembly of Heads of State at Kinshasa in
September 1967 was greeted with mixed feelings. See -
Nigeria, November 7, 1967 for further reference.
77. 'Let Us Reconcile', Text of the broadcast to the nation by
General Gowon, January 15, 1970 (Lagos Government Printer,
1970)
78. New Nigeria, (Kaduna) June 13, 1971
79. Op.cit Aluko 0, Essays on Nigerian Foreign Policy p.13
80. West Africa, July 21, 1972
81. Helleiner G.K, 'Nigeria and the African Common Market' in
the Journal of Economic and Social Studies, Vol.3 No.9,
235
Nov. 1962
82. Dotun Phillips, 'West African Economic Community', in the
Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol.17, No.3, July 1970
83. West Africa, April 2, 1973





1. Author's interview with Professor Jide Oshuntokun, The




4. Excerpts from the interview by Newswatch, Lagos, with
Professor Akinyemi, Lagos, Nigeria, 26th October 1992.
5. Newswatch, 20 October 1986, p.25
6. Ibid




10. Author's interview with Professor A. Gambari, the Nigerian
Representative in the United Nations, New York, 6th August,
1990.
11. The Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1979,
p3
12. Quoted in New Nigeria (Kaduna), 15th September 1975.
13. New York Times, 15th January, 1970, p.1
14. Statement by His Excellency, Major General Yakubu Gowon,
Head of the Federal Military Government, 21st June 1971.
Bulletin of Foreign Affairs, 1st July 1971, p.43.
15. Parliamentary Debates, H. of R., 19th April 1960, co1.1440.
16. Nigerian Speaks - Speeches of Alhaii Sir Abubakar Tafawa
Balewa, introduced by Sam Epelle Longmans of Nigeria,
Lagos, 1964, p.62.
17. Quoted in 0. Ohonbamu, The Psychology of the Nigerian 
Revolution, Devon, Authur H. Stockwell Ltd, 1969, p.46.
18. Ibid
237
19. Daily Times, 17th October 1970, p.40.
20. Daily Times, Lagos, 22nd December 1975
21. New Nigerian, Kaduna, 15th September 1975
22. Ibid, 28th October 1975
23. Ibid, 24th April 1976
24. West Africa, 19th July 1976, p.1042
25. West Africa, 25th October 1976, p.1602. In January 1977
Joshua Nkomo was reported to have met with General Obasanjo
in Lagos. Ibid, 17th January 1977.








33. Professor Ibrahim A. Gambari - Theory and Reality in
Foreign Policy Making, Atlantic Highlands, Humanities Press






1. Asobie Assisi H, National Studies on the future of the 
United Nations: The Nigerian Report. Depertment of
Political Science, University of Nigeria, Nsukka. September
1989, p.2
2. Van Dyke Vernon , International Politics, quoted in Ogwu
Joy U., Nigerian Foreign Policy, Alternative Features, The
Nigerian Institute of International Affairs, in cooperation
with Macmillian Nigeria Limited, Lagos, 1986, p.116
3. Declaration of Principles known as the Atlantic Charter, 14
August, 1941 concluded between the United States and Great
Britain. The relevant clause 3 states that they respect the
rights of all peoples to chose the form of government under
which they will live, and they wish to see sovereign rights
and self-government restored to those who have been
forcibly deprived of them. Source: Greeville J.A.S. The
major International Treaties 191 4-1 973 Methuen and Co. Ltd.
(London 1974) pp.198-192
4. Garba J.N. , 'The New Nigerian Foreign Policy' Federal
Ministry of Information News Release, No.1538, 1 December
1976
5. I.C. Olisemeka "Nigeria's Foreign Policy Options: A Review
of Development since Independence", Institute of Policy and
Strategic Studies, Kuru, May 1989, pp.10-12
6. Adeniran Babatunde Olatunde, A Developing country in the 
United Nations system: A study of Nigeria's participation 
in the UN, 1960-1975. University of Columbia, unpublished
Ph.D. thesis, 1978
7. Op.cit Olisemeka (1989), p.6
8. Ibid p.7
9. OP.cit Asobie, p.117
10. Ibid p.118
11. Thompson V.B.Africa and Unity: The Evolution of Pan-
Africanism. London, Longman Group Ltd. 1973, p.156
12. Ibid
13. Nwachukwu's	 report	 to	 the	 Nigerian	 House	 of
Representatives. H.R. Debates, 23 November 1961, cols.
239
3331-3332
14. Cited by Tyoden S.G. "Africa in Nigeria's Foreign Policy:
1990 and Beyond", in Aforka Nweke G. ed., Nigerian Foreign
Policy and the Political System: 1990 and Beyond. (Nsukka:
Nigerian Society of International Affairs, 1987) p.389





20. GOAR, 19th Session, 1302nd Plenary Meeting, 15 December
1964, p.6
21. Ibid
22. Cervenka Zdenek, The Unifinished Quest for Unity; Africa
and the OAU, London and Boulder: Westview, 1977, p.112
23. Ibid
24. Ibid
25. *Fasehun 0. Politics and Roles of Nigeria in the OAU:
University of Pittsburgh, unpublished Ph.D thesis, 1979,
p.279
26. Nigeria: Bulletin on Foreign Affairs, Vol.3 Nos. 1-4
(January to December 1973), p.149
27. Obiozor G.A. "Nigerian Participation at the UN" 1960-1977,
quoted in Ugwu Joy U., Op.cit, Nigerian Foreign Policy, 
Alternative Features, P.117
28. West Africa, 9 July 1971, p.773
29. Op.cit, George A. Obiozor, quoted in Ugwu Joy U., Nigerian
Foreign Policy, Alternative Feature, p.117
30. West Africa, 21 May 1966, p.586
31. Ibid
32. Op.cit, Asobie Assisi H, National Studies on the future of 
the United Nations: The Nigerian Report, p.2
33. Year book of the UN, 1968, pp.114-115
34. West Africa, 24 October 1970, p.1265
240
35. West Africa, 18 November 1974, p.1416
36. GAOR, 24th Session Plenary 1173rd Meeting, 1 October 1974,
pp.13-14
37. Olisemaka Ingatius C. , "Nigeria's Foreign Policy Options":
A Review of Development since Independence. National
Institute of Policy and Strategic Studies, Kuru, May 1989.
p.35
38. Lt. General Olusegun Obasanjo. An address to the delegates
at the World Conference for Action Against Apartheid, in
Lagos, 22 August, 1977. Reported in Daily Times, 26 August
1977, pp.5 and 9.
39. Garba Joe , Diplomatic Soldering: Nigerian Foreign Policy:
1975-1979, Ibadan, Spectrum Books Ltd. 1987, p.188
40. Ibid
41. Speech by Brigadier Garba J.N. at the 9th Special Session
of the UN General Assembly on the Question of Namibia, 24
April 1978, p.9
42. Obasanjo's Opening Address to the World Conference for





46. Op.cit Garba (1987) p.61
47. Ibid p.175
48. Ibid p.188
49 Address by Dr. Alex Ekwueme, at the UN/OAU International




52. GAOR 38th Session Plenary, 29 September to 14 October 1983,
p.341
53. Ibid
54. See Asobie A.H. "A critical survey of Nigeria's Economic
Diplomacy" for an analysis of the historical evolution of
241
this policy. The Statesman (Owerri) 5 October 1988, p.7
55. Author's interview with Professor A.I. Gambari, the
Nigerian epresentative to UN, New York, 6 August 1990
56. Ibid
57. Ibid
58. Okafor C.N. Nigeria: "Aid and Diplomatic Support to the 
Liberation Movement in Southern Africa, 1960-1968 - An 
Assessment of Policy" (University of Lagos, unpublished
thesis for the degree of Master of International Law and
Diplomacy, July 1988) p.22
59. Akinyemi B.A. "Balance and Credibility in Nigerian Foreign 
Policy", (Gold Medal Lecture Series, Lagos, 17 September
1986) pp. 11-12
60. Aluko O., in Aluko and Shaw, Nigerian Foreign Policy, 
Alternative Perspective and Projections. The MacMillan
Press Ltd, London 1963 p.45
61. West Africa, 4 February 1984, p.232
62. Nigerian Forum (Lagos) January/February, 1984
63. Ibid
64. Op.cit Akinyemi, Balance and Credibility (1986) p.6
65. Ibid




1. Author's interview with Mrs Patsy Robertson, Head of
Information Division, Commonwealth Secretariat, London, 13
March 1990
2. Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Meeting in Lagos 1966 - Final
Communique, London, Commonwealth Secretariat, January 1966
p3
3. Papadopoulos A.N. , Multilateral Diplomacy within the
Commonwealth - A decade of Expansion, Nijhoff, The Hague,
1982, p.45 See also Chan Stephen,  The Commonwealth in World 
Politics, London, Lester Crook, 1988
4. Op cit, Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Meeting in Lagos 1966
5. Ibid
6. Op.cit author's interview with Mrs Patsy Robertson
7. New Nigeria, Kaduna, 1 August 1979
8. Ibid
9. Aluko 0, Essays in Nigerian Foreign Policy, London, George
Allen and Unwin Ltd, 1981 p.226
10. The Economist (London) 4 August, 1979
11. International Herald Tribune (New York) 2 August, 1978
12. Ibid
13. Guardian (London) 2 August, 1979
14. The Economist (London) 4 August, 1979
15. Unpublished minutes of Lusaka Commonwealth Heads of
Government Meeting, Zambia 1979, provided to the author by
the Commonwealth Secretariat, p.3
16. New Nigeria (Kaduna) 3 August, 1979
17. New Nigeria (Kaduna) 5 May 1979
18. New Nigeria (Kaduna) 20 May 1979




22. Observer (London) 5 August 1979
23. Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPL) Monthly
Petroleum Information, Lagos, Government Printer, April
1979
24. The Economist (London) 4 August, 1979
25. Daily Telegraph (London) 14 June, 1979
26. New Nigeria (Kaduna) 2 May, 1979
27. New Nigeria (Kaduna) 6 June, 1979
28. Author's interview with Dominic Sankey, Head of Research
Unit, International Affairs Division, Commonwealth
Secretariat, London, 12 March 1990
29. Newswatch (Nigeria) 21 July, 1986, p.32
30. Ibid
31. Gambari A.I, Party Politics and Foreign Policy, Nigeria 
Under the First Republic, Zaria, Ahmadu Bello University
Press, 1980, p.47
32. Author's interview with Professor Bolaji Akinyemi, then
Minister of External Affairs, Lagos, 19 April, 1991
33. Ibid
34. Ibid
35. Newswatch, Lagos, 28 July 1986, pp.25-27
36. Ibid
37. Newswatch, Lagos, 4 August 1986, pp.14-25
38. Newswatch, Lagos, 28 July 1986, pp.25-27
39. Newswatch, Lagos, 4 August 1986, p.15
40. Ibid
41. The African Guardian, 16 January 1986, p.28
42. The African Guardian, 30 January 1986, p.38
43. Newswatch, Lagos, 21 July 1986, p.32
244




1. Author's interview with Chief Emeka Anyaoku - The Secretary
General of the Commonwealth of Nations, Commonwealth
Secretariat, London, 31st March 1993
2. Author's interview with Professor Jide Oshuntokun - The
Ambassador of the Federal Republic of Nigeria to Germany,
Bonn, Germany, 10th April 1993.
3. Ibid
4. Speech by General Murtala Mohammed at the OAU Extraordinary
Summit Conference on the Angolan Crisis, 	 Addis Ababa,
Ethiopia, 11 January 1976
5. Nigerian Bulletin on Foreign Affairs, January 1979, pp.31-
32
6. Op cit, Author's interview with Professor Jide Oshuntokun,
Germany
7. Ibid
8. Author's interview with 0.M.A.Abiola - Director, Foreign
Service, Ministry of External Affiars, Abuja, 23rd April
1991.
9. Excerpts from the then Nigerian Minister of External
Affairs, Major General Ike Nwachukwu (rtd). Submission to
the Commonwealth Committee of Foreign Ministers on South
Africa meeting held in London to review the stand in the
aftermath of President F.W. de Klerk. 1st February 1991.
"Nwachukwu Defends Sanction on Pretoria." Nigerian Daily 
Times, 23rd February 1991.
10. Author's interview with Adigun A, Abuja - Special Assistant
to the Deputy Director General, (Supply & Finance) Ministry
of External Affairs, Abuja, 24th April 1991
11. Ibid
12. Op cit, Author's interview with Professor Jide Oshuntokun,
Germany.
246
FOOT NOTES - CHAPTER 9
1. Akinyemi A.B. and Vogt M. Quoted in Ogwu U. Joy,  Nigerian
Foreign policy Alternative Futures, Nigerian Institute of
International Affairs in cooperation with Macmillan Nigeria
Publishers Ltd, Lagos, 1986, p.12
2. Speech delivered by General Murtala Mohammed at the Extra-
Ordinary Session of the OAU in Addis Ababa in January 1976,
quoted in an address by J.N. Garba, Commissioner for Exter-
nal Affairs, at the University of Ife entitled "The New
Nigerian Foreign Policy." Nigerian Bulletin on Foreign 
Affairs  (Vol.6 No.12, December 1974) p.4
3. Davidson B. "Africa Finds a New Power" - Daily Times,
Lagos, Friday 3rd November 1978, p.3
4. Lt. General Olusegun Obasanjo at the 15th Ordinary Session
of the OAU Assembly of Heads of States and Government in
Khartoum. Federal Ministry of Information Release No. 992
and 993, Lagos, 19th July 1978.
5. Ibid
6. Author's interview with Joy U. Ogwu - Deputy
Director of Research, Institute of International Affairs,
Lagos, Nigeria, 18th April, 1991. "The nationalisation of
companies which disregarded Nigeria's sanctions against
South Africa amply demonstrated at the time, Nigeria's
determination to utilise its economic leverage to enforce
sanctions.
7. Nnoli Okwudiba, Nigerian Policy Towards Southern Africa,
in Nigerian Journal of International Affairs, Vol.2 Nos.
1 and 2, 1976, pp.26-29
8. Africa Monthly, London No. 58, June 1976, p.14
9. Aluko Olajide, Essays on Nigerian Foreign Policy - George
Allen and Unwin Ltd. London 1981, pp.162-163.
10. Nigeria:  Bulletin on Foreign Affairs Vol.9, No.11, November
1979.
11. Nigerian National Concord, 20th June 1980, pp.1-2
12. Author's interview with A. Adugun, Special Assistant to the
Deputy Director General, (Supply & Finance) Ministry of
External Affairs, 24th April 1991. He stated that the
doctrine of assistance was not conceived in a vacuum;
rather it was formulated as the result of the practical
conception of the Nigerian national interest.
247
13. Press Release No.2300, 21st November 1980 - Department of
Information, Executive Office of the President, Lagos.
14. Author'sInterview with 0.M.A. Abiola - Director Foreign
Service, Ministry of External Affairs, Abuja, 23rd April
1991.
15. Op.cit Author's interview with A. Adigun, 24th April 1991.
16. President Shagari's broadcast to the nation in April 1982,
announcing stringent economic measures to contain the
decline of foreign exchange earnings and economic growth,
Daily Times, Lagos, 22nd April, 1982, pp.1-3
17. Op.cit Author's interview with A. Adigun.
18. Author's interview with Dr. Otunbanjo Fern!, Head of
Department, Social Science, University of Ibadan, Ibadan,
Nigeria, 15th April 1991.
19. Ogwu U. Joy - Nigerian Foreign Policy, Alternative 
Futures, Nigerian Institute of International
Affairs with Macmillian Nigerian Limited, 1986, Lagos,
p 36
20. Author's interview with Professor A. Ajala - Director of
Research, Institute of International Affairs, Lagos,
Nigeria, 18th April 1991.
21. "On the State of Nigerian Economy" - Lagos, Federal
Ministry of National Planning, February 1983.
22. Nigerian Workers' Socio-Political View Point in the
situation of Military Take-over of the governments
of the Federations, presented to the Federal Military
Government" - Lagos, Nigerian Labour Congress, 
January 1984.
23. Moment of Truth: Collected speeches of Major General
Buhari, Lagos, Federal Government Press, 1984, quoted
in Gambari I.A., Theory and Reality in Foreign Policy 
Making, published by Humanities Press International,
Inc., Atlantic Highlands, NJ 07716, 1989, p. 30.
24. Ibid
25. Ibid
26. Interview with Professor A.I. Gambari - Permanent
Representative of the Nigerian Mission, United
Nations, New York, United States of America, 6th
August 1990. He said that the Nigerian Labour
Congress expected the new administration to involve
248
mass organisations like Trade Unions, Students
(NANS) and relevant professional bodies and economic
groups in the present political set up at both the
national and state levels. The aim of this proposal
was that those in the social strata who suffered the
most from the recklessness of the past civilian regime
should receive a chance to contribute towards finding
solutions to the nation's socio-economic and political
problems.
27. Ibid
28 Moment of Truth, quoted in Gambari I.A. Theory and Reality 
in Foreign Policy Making, published by Humanities Press
International Inc., Atlantic Highlands, NJ 07716, 1989,
p.30.




32	 "From Kuru to the World" - The Nigerian Guardian, Lagos, 7th
August 1985, p.9
33. National Concord, Lagos, 23rd February 1985, p.2
34	 Ibid - Editorial "$5 million for African Famine"
35	 Op.cit, Author's interview with Gambari, New York, 6th
August 1990
36. Ibid
37 Ibid - The decision to close the border made by the
Supreme Military Council, took effect concurrently with
the coming into power of the new military government under
Buhari. In the expulsion of illegal aliens, the Ministry
of External Affairs involvement was peripheral and its
input was made as a less than enthusiastic junior partner
to the Ministry of Internal Affairs. For example, out of
the twenty one participants in the two meetings between
Nigerian officials and the ambassadors of some of the
neighbouring countries, convened to discuss the expulsion
issue which took place on the 2nd and 15th of May 1985,
presided over by the Minister of Internal Affairs, only
one was from the Ministry of External Affairs.
38. Ibid
39. Ibid
40. "Why we struck" Special Edition, Newswatch, Lagos, 9th
249
September 1985.
41. Author's interview with B.A. Akinyemi -Minister of External
Affairs, 1985-1987, Lagos, Nigeria, 19th April 1991.
42. Ibid
43. Ibid




48. The African Guardian, 16th January 1986, p.28
49. Ogene Francis - "The Foreign Service the Nation Deserves'
Nigerian Forum, June 1981, p.156
50. The African Guardian, 30th January 1986, p.38
51. Newswatch, Lagos, 21st July 1986, p.32
52. Op. cit, Author's interview with Akinyemi, Lagos, 19th April
1991.
53. Ibid
54. Op.cit, Author's interview with Adigun A., Abuja, 24th April
1991 .
55. Ibid
56. Author's interview with Akinyemi, Lagos, 19th Aprif 199T
57. Ibid
58. The African Guardian, 3rd September 1990, p.29
59. Ibid
60. Report of Seminar on Southern Africa in Transition, held in
Lagos, Nigeria, 10th-12th February 1990.






65. Aluko 0., The Foreign Policies of African States, 
London, Hodder and Stoughton, 1977, pp.167-170.
66. Ibid
67. Author's interview with Adigun A., Abuja, Nigeria, 24th
April 1991.
68. Ibid
69. Daily Times, Lagos, 5th December 1975
70. New Nigeria, Kaduna, 15th September 1975
71. West Africa, 19th July 1976, p.1042
72. Adigun A. - Unpublished M.A. dissertation on Nigeria's 
Policy Towards Liberation Movements in South Africa,





PRIMARY SOURCES - INTERVIEWS
Abiola 0.M.A, Director, Foreign Service, Ministry of External
Affairs, Abuja, 23 April 1991
Adigun A, Special Assistant to the Deputy Director General
(Supply &Finance) Ministry of External Affairs, Abuja, 24 April,
1991
Professor Akinyemi B.A, Nigerian Minister for External Affairs
(1985-1987) 19 April, 1991
Anafu Moses, Deputy Director, International Affairs Division,
Commonwealth Secretariat, London, 13 March 1990
Chief Anyaoku E, The Secretary General of the Commonwealth of
Nations, Commonwealth Secretariat, London, 31 March 1993
Professor Gambari Al,. The Nigerian Representative in the United
Nations, New York, 6 August 1990
Gaylard Max, Director, International Affairs Division,
Commonwealth Secretariat, London, 25 April 1990
Nzerem Richard, Assistant Director, Legal Division, Commonwealth
Secretariat, London, 12 March 1990.
252
Professor Ogwu U. Joy, Deputy Director of Research, Institute of
International Affairs, Lagos, Nigeria, 18 April 1991
Professor Oshuntokun J, The Ambassador of the Federal Republic
of Nigeria to the Republic of Germany, Bonn, 10 April 1993
Dr. Otunbanjo Femi, Head of Department, Social Science,
University of Ibadan, Nigeria, 15 April 1991
Mrs. Roberston Patsy, Head of Information Division, Commonwealth
Secretariat, London, 13 March 1990
Sankey D, Head of Research Unit, International Affairs Division,




Nigerian Cabinet Minutes, 8 August 1960
Ekwueme A. "An address at the UN/OAU International Conference on
Sanctions Against South Africa, Paris, May 1987 Abuja,
Presidential office release, 1987
Federal Ministry of Information Release, No.1538, 1 December 1976
Federal Ministry of Information Release, Nos. 992 and 993, 19
July 1978
Foreign Affairs, Journal of Nigerian Ministry of External
Affairs, October 1962
Major General Garba's speech at the 9th Special Session of the
UN General Assembly, on the question of Namibia, 24 April 1978
General Assembly Official Records, 38th Session Plenary, 6
October 1980
GAOR 24th Session Plenary 1173rd Meeting, 1 October 1969
GAOR 38th Session Plenary, 29 September to 14 October 1983
254
Gold Medal Lecture Series, Lagos, 17 September 1986
House of Representatives Debates, 4 September 1961
House of Representatives Debates, 20 November 1961
House of Representatives Debates, 5 April 1965
"Long Live African Unity" Text of an address to Heads of State
of OAU, General Gowon, 6 September 1969
"Let Us Reconcile" Text of the broadcast to the Nation by General
Gowon, 15 January 1970
Minutes of the Commonwealth Lusaka Heads of Government Meeting,
Zambia, 1979 (Unpublished)
"Moment of Truth" Collected speeches of Major General Buhari,
Lagos, Federal Government Press, 1984
Murtala Mohammed's speech at the OAU Extraordinary Summit
Conference on Angolan Crisis, Addis Ababa, 11 Junuary 1976
Nigerian Bulletin of Foreign Affairs, Vol.1 No.3, 1972
Nigerian Bulletin of Foreign Affars, Vol.3 Nos. 1-4, 1973
Nigerian Bulletin of Foreign Affairs, Vol.9 No.1, 1979
255
Nigerian Representative's speech on the 10th Special Session of
the General Assembly, 26 May 1978
OAU Verbatim Records of the Plenary Meeting of State and
Government of Accra, 21-26 October 1965
Obasanjo's Opening Address to the World Conference for Action
Against Apartheid, Lagos, August 1977
Ojukwu's Ahiara Declaration during the Nigerian Civil War
(1968)
"On the State of Nigerian Economy" Federal Ministry of National
Planing, February 1983
Press Release No. 2300, Executive Office of the President, Lagos,
21 November 1980
Report on OAU Consultative Mission to Nigeria, Lagos Government
Press, 1967
Report on Amalgamation of Northern Nigeria, 1919
Second Ordinary Session of the Assembly of Heads of State and
Government, Accra, 21-26 October 1965
Seminar on South Africa in Transition, Lagos, 10-12 February 1990
256
Sessional Paper No.11, House of Representatives, Lagos, 1956
The Department of State Bulletin, Vo.IX, No.1428
The French Foreign Minister's Speech to the National Assembly,
4 November 1969
The Monronvia Conference Article 2




African Guardian, 16 January 1986
African Guardian, 30 January 1986
African Guardian, 3 September 1990
Africa Monthly (London) June 1976
American Journal of International Law, 1945
Daily Express (Lagos) 22 January 1962
Daily Graphic (Lagos) 19 September 1967
Daily Telegraph (London) 14 June 1979
Daily Times (Lagos) 6 July 1959
Daily Times (Lagos) 3 August 1959
Daily Times (Lagos) 1 September 1959
Daily Times (Lagos) 4 September 1959
Daily Times (Lagos) 9 September 1959
Daily Times (Lagos) 13 September 1959
Daily Times (Lagos) 17 September 1959
Daily Times (Lagos) 19 January 1960
Daily Times (Lagos) 7 July 1960
Daily Times (Lagos) 18 December 1961
Daily Times (Lagos) 28 February 1962
Daily Times (Lagos) 11 October 1969
Daily Times (Lagos) 17 October 1970
Daily Times (Lagos) 3 July 1975
Daily Times (Lagos) 22 December 1975
Daily Times (Lagos) 26 August 1977
258
Daily Times (Lagos) 5 December 1975
Daily Times (Lagos) 3 November 1978
Daily Times (Lagos) 22 April 1982
Economist (London) 17 June 1961
Economist (London)4 August 1979
Evening Standard (Accra) 23 July 1960
Evening Standard (Accra) 9 January 1970
Ghana Today, 4 October 1967
Guardian (London) 26 August 1979
International Herald Tribune (New York) 21 August 1978
Le Monde, 17 October 1968
Morning Post (Lagos) 5 February 1962
Morning Post (Lagos) 12 July 1963
Morning Post (Lagos) 15 December 1964
Morning Post (Lagos) 10 November 1967
Morning Post (Lagos) 25 June 1971
National Concord (Nigeria) 20 June 1980
National Concord (Nigeria) 22 September 1985
National Concord (Nigeria) 9 September 1985
New Nigeria (Kaduna) 12 July 1967
New Nigeria (Kaduna) 13 June 1971
New Nigeria (Kaduna) 15 September 1975
New Nigeria (Kaduna) 28 October 1975
New Nigeria (Kaduna) 24 April 1976
New Nigeria (Kaduna) 2 May 1979
New Nigeria (Kaduna) 5 May 1979
New Nigeria (Kaduna) 29 May 1979
New Nigeria (Kaduna) 6 June 1979
259
Newswatch (Lagos) 9 September 1985
Newswatch (Lagos) 21 July 1986
Newswatch (Lagos) 28 July 19867
Newswatch (Lagos) 4 August 1986
Newswatch (Lagos) 20 October 1986
New York Times, 15 January 1970
Observer (Lagos) 28 January 1979
Observer (London) 5 August 1979
West Africa 21 May 1966
West Africa 15 July 1967
West Africa 27 July 1968
West Africa 22 February 1969
West Africa 4 October 1969
West Africa 24 October 1970
West Africa 9 July 1972
West Africa 21 July 1972
West Africa 2 April 1973
West Africa 18 November 1974




Adeniran Babatunde Olatunde, A Developing country in the United
Nations system: A study of Nigeria's participation in the UN,
1969-1975, University of Comumbia unpublished PhD thesis, 1978
Adigun A, Unpublished M.A. Dissertation on Nigeria's Policy
Towards Liberation Movements in South Africa (1960-85)
Akinyemi A.B, Foreign Policy and Federalism, The Nigerian
experience, Ibadan University Press, 1974
Aluko 0, Essays on Nigerian Foreign Policy, Geo. Allen & Uwin
vii, 1971
Aluko 0, Nigerian Foreign Policy, Alternative Perspective and
Projections. The MacMillan Press Ltd, London, 1963
Aluko 0, The Foreign Policies of African States, London and
Stoughton, 1977
Asobie Assisi H, National Studies on the future of the United
Nations: University of Nigeria, Nsukka,1989
Asobie A.H. "A critical Survey of Nigeria's Economic Diplomacy."
The Statesman, Owerri, 1988
261
Balewa A.T, Nigeria Speaks, London Longmans, 1964
Balewa T. and Sam Epelle, Nigeria Speaks, Lagos, 1964
Cervanka Zdenek, The Unfinished Quest for Unity, Julian Friedman,
London, 1977
Crowder M, The Story of Nigeria, Fourth Edition, Burn Ltd,
Trowdridge and Esher, Great Britain
Doudou T, The Foreign Policy of States, J.M. Dent Ltd,
London, 1965
Dudley B.J, Instability and Political Order - Politics and Crisis
in Nigeria, Ibadan University Press, 1973
Fasehun 0, Politics and Roles of Nigeria in the OAU: USA,
Unpublished PH.D Thesis, 1979
Flint E.J, Nigeria and Ghana, The Modern Nations in Historical
Perspective, Prentice Hall Eaglewood Cliffs, New Jersey
Gambari A.I, Party Politics and Foreign Policy - Nigeria under
the First Republic, Ahmadu Bellow University Press, 1980
Gambari A.I, Theory and Reality in Foreign Policy Making,
Humanities Press International Inc., Atlantic Highlands, 1989
262
Garba J, Diplomatic Soldering: Nigerian Foreign Policy 1975-1979,
Ibadan, Spectrum Books Ltd, 1987
Idan G.J, Nigeria: Internal Politics and Foreign Policy, 1960-
1966, University of Ibadan, 1963
Obiozor G.A, Nigerian Participation at the UN 1960-1977
(Unpublished) New York, Content analysis of Nigeria's
participation at the UN
Ogunbadejo 0, Civil Strife in International Relations: A Case
Study of the Nigerian Civil War 1967-1970, Unpublished Ph.D
Thesis, University of London, 1974
Ogwu U. Joy, Nigerian Foreign Policy, Alternative Futures,
Nigerian Institute of International Affairs with MacMillian
Nigerian Publishers Limited,1986
Okafor C.N, Nigeria: "Aid and Diplomatic Support to the
Liberation Movement in Southern Africa, 1960-1968. An Assessment
of Policy" University of Lagos, Unpublished M.A. Thesis on
International Law and Diplomacy, 1988.
Olisemeka I.C, "Nigeria's Foreign Policy Options: A Review of
Development since Independence" Institute of Policy and Strategic
Studies, Kuru, 1989
Orobola Fasehun, Politics and Roles of Nigeria in the OAU (USA)
Unpublished Ph.D Thesis, 1979,
263
Papadopoulos A.N, Multilateral Diplomacy within the Commonwealth
- A decade of Expansion, Nijhoff, the Hague, 1982
Phillips C.S, Jr. The Development of Nigerian Foreign Policy,
Evaston, Northwestern University Press, 1964
Thompson V.B, Africa and Unity: The Evolution of Pan-Africanism,
London, Longman Group Ltd, 1973
Thompson W.S, Ghana's Foreign Policy, 1957-1966, Diplomacy,
Ideology, and the New State, Princeton University Press,
Princeton, New Jersey, 1969
264
